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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Tests of the static trade-off theory that posits that firms move towards the optimum capital 
structure necessitate a joint hypothesis test - whether firms adjust toward target leverage, and 
whether the proxy used for target leverage is the true target leverage. Prior studies use the time-
series mean leverage for each firm, the industry median leverage, an estimated cross-sectional 
leverage, and a tobit estimated leverage using the factors suggested by the static trade-off theory 
as proxies for the target leverage. In this dissertation, I examine whether these proxies are 
equivalent and test the consistency of the proxies with the theorized behavior of the true target 
leverage.  
 
My results indicate that the four proxies we examine have significantly different distributions 
and this holds across most industries. Further, the industry median leverage is the proxy which 
best exhibits behavior consistent with the true target leverage. Firm value is higher for firms 
closer to the industry median and lower for firms away from the industry median. A robustness 
check using K-means cluster analysis confirms the superiority of the industry median leverage 
over the other proxies of target leverage.   
 
          This study complements the previous studies on the pecking order theory and the trade-off 
theory. The main purpose of this study is to investigate three issues that are not considered in the 
previous studies. The adequacy of the specification and the assumptions of the models used in 
testing the trade-off and the pecking order theory. The second issue examined in this study is the 
validity to putting the pecking order and the trade-off theories in a horse race. The final issue 
examined in this study is the factors driving firms to issue (repurchase) debt or equity or 
combination of both and simultaneously the factors affecting the size of issue (repurchase) 
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CHAPTER I 
 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PROXIES FOR TARGET CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
 
Introduction 
 
          While most of the academic literature on the capital structure agrees on the importance of 
the target capital structure role in many corporate financing models, no attention has been given 
to the accuracy of the different proxies in measuring the optimal capital structure. Are the 
different proxies equivalent? If not, which proxy exhibits characteristics that are most consistent 
with the theorized true optimal capital structure.1  
 
          The tax benefit-bankruptcy cost trade-off models (Baxter (1967), DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Robichek and Myers (1966), Scott (1976)) predict that 
firms will seek to maintain an optimal capital structure by balancing the benefits and the costs of 
debt. The benefits include the tax shield whereas the costs include expected financial distress 
costs. Under the agency theoretical models (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Jensen 
(1986), Stulz (1990), Hart and Moore (1995)) firms use the benefits of reducing potential free 
cash flow problems and other potential conflicts between managers and shareholders, to offset 
costs associated with underinvestment and asset substitution problems. These theories predict 
that firms maintain an optimum capital structure where the marginal benefit of debt equal the 
marginal cost. The implication of these theories, the target leverage hypothesis, is that firms have 
target leverage and they adjust their leverage toward the target over time. 
           
          Many empirical studies (Marsh (1982), Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Fisher, Heinkel and Zechner (1989), Mackie-Mason (1990), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Graham (1996a), Hull (1999), Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001)) find support for the target 
leverage hypothesis. 
 
          Recently, the target leverage hypothesis has received renewed attention. Studies emerge in 
which both the static trade-off theory and the pecking order theory are jointly tested. Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) reject the static theory and find strong confirmation for pecking order 
behavior using the impact of the funds of flows deficit on changes in the debt versus a target 
adjustment model. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) examine the firms’ debt-equity choice 
and argue that the residuals of a cross-sectional regression on the debt ratio are deviations from 
target. Fama and French (2002) incorporate dividend choice, which is an important variable in 
the pecking order theory, and jointly test the trade off and pecking order models, they find 
evidence in favor and against each of the two models. Dissanaike, Lambrecht, and Saragga 
(2001) find evidence that the trade-off theory can describe the debt policies of some firms. 
Hovakimian (2003) examines the role of the target leverage in security issues and repurchases, 
                                                 
1 There has been no test of which proxy best serves as the target debt ratio. This study is the first to formally examine 
this issue. 
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and finds that debt reductions are initiated to reduce the deviation from target capital structure 
whereas debt issues, equity issues and equity repurchase are not. 
 
          The studies that test the target leverage hypothesis use alternative proxies for the target 
capital structure. For example, Jalilvand and Harris (1984) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
use the firms’ leverage mean during the study period as a proxy for the target leverage. Auerbach 
(1985), Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Dissanaike, Lambrecht, and Saragga (2001), 
Fama and French (2002) use regression-based target, where the actual debt ratio regressed over 
several firm- and industry-specific factors suggested by the trade-off theory and previous 
empirical studies.2 Hull (1999) and Hovakimian (2003) use the industry median leverage as a 
proxy for the target leverage. 
           
          The need for a target leverage proxy stems from the fact that we cannot observe the true 
target leverage. Such a proxy needs to have characteristics that are consistent with the theorized 
true optimal capital structure. The growing literature that evaluates the trade-off versus the 
pecking order theory has produced evidence both in favor and against each of these theories. The 
studies that test the trade-off theory necessitate a joint hypothesis test - whether the proxy for the 
target leverage used is the true target leverage, and whether firms adjust toward this target. 
Rejecting the hypothesis that firms adjust towards the leverage target may be due to the failure of 
the proxy used to represent the true target, and not because firms do not adjust toward their target 
or vise versa. Such a joint hypothesis has a measurable effect on the estimation of the partial 
adjustment model and debt-equity choice models, and in general, on any hypotheses testing that 
requires the use of a proxy for optimal capital structure.  
           
          Using different proxies for the optimal capital structure implies that these proxies are 
equivalent and have the same distribution. My empirical examinations (parametric and non-
parametric) of these proxies reveal that they have significantly different distributions. This 
implies that using different proxies of target leverage in testing any hypothesis would lead to 
conflicting results. The asymmetry of those different proxies distributions suggest that those 
proxies are not substitutable, thus it is important the find out which proxy has the most consistent 
characteristics with the theorized target leverage. 
          
          The trade-off theory provides clear guidance of the behavior and characteristics of the true 
optimal leverage .The measurable prediction of the trade-off models is that firms will have a 
leverage level at which the firms will maximize their value. That is, when firms move closer to 
their target they will have higher value, ceteris paribus, than if they move away from the target 
leverage ratio. Furthermore, for firms that operate below their target leverage, a positive 
(negative) relation between the leverage ratio (deviation from the target) and the firm value is 
predicted. For firms that operate above their target leverage, a negative (negative) relation 
between the leverage ratio (deviation from the target) and the firm value is expected. Thus, 
among the different proxies, the one that is the most consistent with the true target leverage must 
exhibit such characteristics in any particular year as well as across time and industries. 
           
          To overcome the problem of using a noisy proxy for the target leverage, I employ an 
empirical approach that evaluates the consistency of different proxies with the theorized behavior 
                                                 
2Harris and Raviv (1991) present a comprehensive survey of these factors. 
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of the true target leverage. After controlling for the non-homogeneity in the inter-industry 
characteristics, firms are classified into industries using the Fama and French (1997) 
methodology. My empirical results indicate that the median of the industry leverage is the most 
consistent proxy for the true optimal leverage among the different proxies used in this study. For 
about three-fourths of the industries in my sample, I find a negative relation between the 
deviation from the target leverage and firm value for firms that operate above their industry 
leverage median and a positive relation for firms operate below their industry leverage median. 
On one hand, for about half of the industries such a relation holds using the Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) cross sectional estimated leverage as proxy.3 On the other hand, this relation holds for a 
lower percentage of the industries for the Tobit cross sectional estimated leverage and the firm 
mean leverage as proxies for the target leverage.4  
         
          The empirical evidence indicates that in two-thirds of the industries, firms increase their 
value by moving toward the industry leverage median and exhibit a value reduction by moving 
away from it. Using the firm mean leverage, the Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross sectional estimated 
leverage, and the Tobit cross sectional estimated leverage as proxies, I find that increasing the 
firms’ value by moving toward the target leverage and the reduction in the firms’ value by 
moving away from it hold in about one-third, one-half, and one-fourth of the industries with 
respect to the proxies mentioned above.  
 
          Since the leverage target hypothesis implies that firms’ actual leverage will fluctuate 
around stable long-run target leverage, this yields the mean-reverting property of actual leverage. 
The mean-reverting property suggests that firms will cluster around a particular leverage ratio 
where the cluster with the highest market value should have the smallest deviation from the 
target. I examine this hypothesis using K-means cluster analysis. I find that firms that cluster 
around a particular leverage ratio and have the highest market value are those that are closer to 
the industry median leverage, which confirms the superiority of the industry median leverage 
over the other proxies. 
  
        Numerous empirical studies support my finding. For example, Schwarz and Aronson 
(1967), Scott and Martin (1975), Ferri and Jones (1979), Marsh (1982), Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 
(1984), Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2002), and Welch (2002) observe significant 
industry effects in firms’ debt ratios and the firms’ debt equity choice. Moreover, Scott and 
Johnson (1982), Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989), Kamath (1997), and Graham and Harvey (2001) 
surveys of chief financial officers show that industry-wide ratios have an important influence on 
CFOs financing decision. 
        Another finding of my study is that firms that operate above the target leverage gain 
different value relative to the firms below the target by moving toward the target. This suggests 
that firms will differ in terms of how quickly they adjust toward the target depending on their 
                                                 
3 This relies on the use of year-by-year cross-sectional regression of the actual debt ratio regressed over several firm- 
and industry-specific factors and then averages the coefficients across years, where the time-series standard errors of 
the average coefficients are used to draw inferences.  
4 Since that the leverage ratio is bounded from below by zero this necessitates the use of Tobit regression. This 
estimation relies on the use of year-by-year cross-sectional Tobit regression of the actual debt ratio regressed over 
several firm- and industry-specific factors and then averages the coefficients across years, where the time-series 
standard errors of the average coefficients are used to draw inferences. While the firm mean leverage is the historical 
mean of debt ratio for each firm. 
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position relative to the target leverage. This result is in line of Byoun and Rhim (2002) who find 
evidence that firms above the target leverage have different speed of adjustment toward the 
target leverage than those below their target leverage. 
 
1.1. THE TRADE-OFF THEORY 
 
        Modigliani and Miller (1958) are the first to establish the theoretical foundation of the 
modern research of financing decision-making. Under their famous irrelevance proposition, 
financing decisions do not matter, given perfect capital markets. Since then, huge developments 
in the capital structure theories have emerged.  
 
        The trade-off models have dominated the capital structure literature. The tax benefit-
bankruptcy cost trade-off model predicts that firms operating at a leverage level beyond the 
optimum have higher expected marginal costs of bankruptcy that exceed the marginal tax 
benefits of debt. Thus, moving toward the optimum will increase the firms’ market value. Firms 
operating at leverage levels below the optimum- where the marginal tax benefit of debt is higher 
than the expected marginal cost of bankruptcy- can increase their market value by increasing 
their debt levels. Under such a model, a firm’s profitability will be negatively related to the 
expected financial distress costs since firms with higher and more stable profits will have a lower 
probability of bankruptcy. Large, well-diversified firms have less profit volatility and therefore, 
higher debt ratios relative to small-nondiversified firms.  
 
        The tax-deductibility of interest payments also encourages firms to incur more debt. 
Because the marginal tax rate is directly related to the firm’s earnings level, firms with higher 
earnings are predicted to have more debt. Such a prediction is true as long as firms operate below 
their optimal leverage level. When firms operate above their optimal leverage ratio, increasing 
debt will increase the expected costs of financial distress. Thus, if the expected marginal cost of 
bankruptcy is higher than the marginal tax benefit of increasing debt, managers will decrease the 
firm’s debt as earnings rise. 
 
        Non-debt tax shields also affect the debt-earnings relationship under the trade-off model. 
Firms with high non-debt tax shields are less likely to increase their debt when their earnings 
increase, since they already enjoy the tax benefits of the non-debt tax shields. DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) model predicts that debt is less attractive to firms with high non-debt tax shields. 
Firms with high non-debt tax shields may operate below their optimum leverage level compared 
to firms with the same characteristics but with lower non-debt tax shields.  
 
        Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) introduce a dynamic capital structure model where, 
under the presence of recapitalization costs, a firm’s leverage ratio will vary over time. Thus, 
firms will have lower and upper boundaries of leverage ratios where they will recapitalize. Firms 
below the lower bound will recapitalize because they forego an increased amount of debt tax 
shield if they do not. Firms that operate above the upper bound will also recapitalize due to 
increasing bankruptcy costs and agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders. Firms 
within the boundary will not recapitalize persistently since the benefit of recapitalization will not 
exceed the recapitalization costs. Their model predicts that firms with the same characteristics 
will have the same recapitalization criteria. However, they could have different leverage ratios 
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within common leverage boundaries. Therefore, a firm’s optimal leverage will be a range, rather 
than a point, within each firm tries to remain.   
 
        The agency cost trade-off models (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Easterbrook (1984), Jensen 
(1986), Stulz (1990), Harris and Raviv (1990), Hart and Moore (1995)) consider the possible 
conflicts of interests between the parties involved in the firm such as managers, shareholders, 
and bondholders. 
 
        Debtholder and shareholder conflicts arise due to the risk-shifting problem. If an investment 
yields a high profit, shareholders capture most of the gain, while if the investment fails; 
debtholders bear most of the loss because of the shareholders limited liability. Thus, shareholders 
have an incentive to invest in riskier projects after raising capital in the bond market. Conflicts 
between shareholders and managers arise because managers do not wholly own the firm. 
Therefore, managers will not capture the entire gain when they engage in profit increasing 
activity, whereas they handle the entire cost of these activities. Such conflicts will motivate 
managers to transfer firm resources to their own purposes and to engage in value decreasing 
activity. Increasing debt has the ability to reduce these conflicts. Higher debt levels will reduce 
the free cash flow available to managers, limiting their capacity to engage in value decreasing 
activity and increase their fractional ownership. 
 
        Under the agency cost models, firms identify their optimal capital structure by balancing the 
costs and benefits of an additional dollar of debt. The benefits of debt include the reduction of 
free cash flow problems (Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990)) and the potential reduction in agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders. The costs of debt include: agency conflicts 
between shareholders and bondholders, costs of underinvestment (Stulz (1990) and Myers 
(1977)), and costs of asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Myers (1977) models predict that firms with low growth opportunities (and therefore 
a low possibility of asset substitution) will be more levered. Firms with higher free cash flows 
and limited growth opportunities will have higher debt, which mitigates the cost of the manager-
shareholder conflicts (Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990)). Harris and Raviv’s (1990) model predicts 
that firms with higher liquidation value (tangible assets) are more likely to have more debt in 
their capital structure.  
        
        In summary, the trade-off models predict that higher debt will be associated with higher 
profitability, lower non-debt tax shields, low growth opportunities, high asset tangibility, higher 
free cash flows, and lower expected bankruptcy costs. Lower debt will be associated with low 
profitability, high non-debt tax shields, high growth opportunities, low asset tangibility, lower 
free cash flows, and higher expected bankruptcy costs. In addition, it is predicted that firms will 
increase their value by moving toward their optimal capital structure, while a value reduction 
should be observed if they move farther from their optimal capital structure.  
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1.2. TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
 
1.2.1. The Symmetry of the Different Proxies’ Distributions 
 
    The implicit assumption when using any proxy of the commonly used proxies in the literature 
to examine the leverage target hypothesis is that those proxies are equivalent and substitutable.5 
On other words, this assumption means that those proxies have symmetric distributions. Such an 
assumption can be examined using both parametric and non-parametric tests. Rejecting the 
hypothesis of the symmetric distributions of the different proxies suggest that those proxies are 
not substitutable and the results of using different proxies are not comparable. Even if two 
proxies are close to each other, still there is a need to inspect which proxy has the closest 
characteristics to the target leverage and has more capability to mimic the theorized behavior of 
the true optimal capital structure.  
 
1.2.2. The Relation between the Firm Value and the Deviation from the Target Capital Structure 
 
        The trade-off models predict that the relation between the firm value and the deviation from 
the true optimal capital structure is negative for firms that operate below or above their optimal 
capital structure.6 This implies that the relation between firm value and the actual leverage ratio 
is positive for firms that operate below the optimal leverage and negative for firms that operate 
above the optimal leverage.  
 
        To study the firm value behavior relative to the deviation from each proxy, firms are 
grouped by industry using Fama and French (1997) industry classification. In each industry-year, 
firms above and below the target proxy are divided into two sets (see figure 1, leverage-value 
function). The first set contains firms with a deviation from the target of less than the 50th 
percentile of the deviation distribution (Q1). The second set contains those firms with a deviation 
from the target of more than the 50th percentile of the deviation distribution (Q2).  
 
My motivation for classifying firms into industries is the well-documented evidence that intra-
industry firms are more homogenous in their characteristics, capital structure, and 
recapitalization criteria (Schwartz and Aronson (1967), Bowen, Daly and Huber (1982), Bradley, 
Jarrell, and Kim (1984), Long and Malitz (1985), and Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989)) 
relative to inter-industry firms. For example, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) use this evidence as 
one argument for the presence of an industry-related optimal capital structure. 
  
        Under the dynamics models of capital structure (e.g. Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) 
and Leland (1994)), classifying firms by their deviation from the target leverage is motivated by 
                                                 
5 For example, Marsh (1982), Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Nuri and Archer (2001), 
and Byoun and Rhim (2002) use the firm mean as a proxy for the target leverage in their studies. Hull (1999), 
Hovakimian (2003), Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2002) consider the industry median leverage as a 
proxy for the target leverage. Auerbach (1985), Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Dissanaike, Lambrecht, and 
Saragga (2001), Lie (2001) Fama and French (2002), Korajczyk and Levy (2003) use regression-based proxies for the 
target leverage. 
6 The firm value defines as the market value (book value of assets plus the difference between market value of equity 
and the book value of equity) standardized by the total assets. The deviation from the target proxy defines as the 
absolute value of the difference between the actual debt ratio and the target proxy. 
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the presence of the recapitalization costs, as well as by the substitutability of debt tax shield and 
non-debt tax shield (DeAngelo and Masulis (1980)). For example, suppose that we have two 
firms, where the first firm is somewhat closer to the target leverage than the second firm. These 
two firms could have the same value if the second firm has sufficient non-debt tax shields to 
compensate for the debt tax shield. Thus, it makes more sense to consider firms closer to the 
target leverage and to each other to have similar value relative to firms far way from the target, 
given that the industry-year classification controls for the movement on a given leverage-value 
function and the shift in the leverage-value function. 
 
        Under the true target leverage hypothesis, I anticipate that the average firms value for those 
in Q2 and below the target proxy to be less than that of firms’ that belong to Q1 and are below the 
target proxy. For firms above the target, I expect to find that the average firms value for the firms 
in the Q1 set is higher than that for firms in the Q2 set.  
 
        To examine the second hypothesis - the positive (negative) relation between firm value and 
the actual leverage ratio for firms that operate below (above) the optimal leverage - firms are 
classified into two categories: the first category contains firms above their target leverage proxy 
while the second contains firms below their target leverage proxy. Then, for each category, the 
correlation between firm value and leverage ratio, and firm value and the deviation from the 
target is tested for each industry using the parametric (Pearson) and the nonparametric 
(Spearman) correlations. 
 
1.3. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
        The initial sample consists of all firms on the Compustat database for the period 1981-2000. 
I classify firms into 48 group using Fama-French (1997) industry classifications. As in previous 
studies, financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and non-classifiable establishments (9900-9999) are 
excluded.7 To enter the sample, financial data must be available to calculate the leverage ratio 
(total debt/total assets) and market value (book value of assets plus the difference between 
market value of equity and the book value of equity). Firms that have negative debt or zero total 
assets in any given year are excluded from the analysis in that year. Finally, I require that there 
are at least fifteen firms within the same industry in any given year of the study period.8 This 
restriction allows the statistical tests to have the sufficient degrees of freedom to draw reliable 
inferences. Table 1.1 shows the number of observations in the sample for each industry included 
in the analysis across all years. Applying the above criteria, the final sample has 40 industries 
over the period 1981-2000 and 130,939 firm-year observations. Overall, the number of firms in 
my sample is increases over time (from 5,180 in 1981 to 7,810 firms in 2000). The number of 
firms across industry varies dramatically whereas within a given industry group it shows more 
stability over time. A description of Fama-French (1997) industry group is provided in table 1.2 
and a detailed description of the SIC in each industry group in appendix A1. 
 
                                                 
7 Non-classifiable establishments are excluded to avoid the non-homogeneity in the firms’ characteristics. 
8 Only two industries in my sample have observations close to fifteen in a given year. The other industries have 
sufficient observations to draw inferences from both the parametric and nonparametric tests. 
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Figure 1.1 
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1.3.1. Leverage Ratio Stability over Time 
 
        The mean-reverting property of debt ratio under the leverage target hypothesis implies that 
debt ratio should not vary randomly for a given industry over time. To examine the stability of 
the leverage ratio across years for intra-industry firms, nonparametric and parametric methods 
are employed. The second column of Table 1.3 reports the P-Values of the Kruskal-Wallis test 
for equality of the location parameters of the debt ratio distributions across years for each 
industry.9 The third column reports the P-Value of the ANOVA test for equality of the means of 
the debt ratio across years for each industry. The hypothesis that an industry mean (median) debt 
ratio is the same across the twenty years period of my study is rejected in two-third of the 
industries using the Kruskal-Wallis test and in one-third of the industries using parametric 
(ANOVA) test. 
 
        Though it is possible that the location parameters of the debt ratio distributions across years 
are not the same but very few of them are significantly different, to detect such differences, I use 
the Tukey pairwise comparisons test which allows to jointly perform all possible pairwise 
comparisons of the means using a single level of significance. For example, for each industry, 
the average debt ratio in the year 1981 is compared with the average debt ratio in each other 
year, and so on for all the possible combinations of years. Since, I am comparing means of the 
same industry across 20 years, the possible number of pairwise comparisons associated with the 
ANOVA is 190 pairs for each industry ( jijiH ji ¹=== 1999,...,19822000,...,1981,:0 mm ).
10 
 
        The fourth column of Table 1.3 reports the percentage of pairs that shows a significant 
difference out of all the possible pairs. For example, the ANOVA test for the industry group 
number four (Beer & Liquor) rejects the hypothesis that the average debt ratio is the same across 
the twenty years of my study, but the percentage of pairs that shows a significant difference out 
of all the possible pairs is 3.16%. In other words, there is a significant difference in the average 
debt ratio in only six pairs of all the possible pairs. Thus, the ANOVA test rejects the hypothesis 
that the average debt ratio is the same across the twenty years, because of the significant 
difference in the debt ratio across few years. 
 
        The Tukey pairwise comparisons test reveals that the differences in the average debt ratio 
are not persistent across all years. While the stability of the leverage ratio across all years is 
rejected in 37.5% of the industries, this is due to differences in the leverage ratio across some of 
the years, which at most accounts for only 19% of the twenty years period in my study. In 
general, the results indicate that the intra-industry leverage ratio is stable over time. These results 
are consistent with Bowen, Daly, and Huber (1982) who find that industries tend to retain their 
leverage ratio ranking over time. In addition, these results confirm the earlier finding of Schwartz 
and Aronson (1967) of the remarkable overall stability in the financial structure of industries 
over time. Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), Auerbach (1985) find evidence on mean reversion in 
firms’ debt ratios, and those firms appear to adjust toward debt targets. The key implication of 
leverage ratio stability is that under the trade-off model, the leverage ratio should not vary  
                                                 
9 A P-Value less than 5% indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% significance level.  
10 The number of possible pairwise comparisons of r is ( )!2!2! -rr . 
  
10
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1- Sample Distribution across Industries- Years 
 
The sample period is 1981-2000. Financial firms are excluded. An industry is defined using Fama-French (1997) industry 
classification. To enter the sample, financial data must be available to calculate the leverage (total debt/total assets), Market Value 
(book value of assets plus the difference between market value of equity and the book value of equity). Industries with less than 15 
firms in any given year are excluded to allow for enough degrees of freedom for the statistical tests. The financial data obtained from 
Compustat database. 
Firms frequency by industry-year 
Industry 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1 22 22 27 31 28 28 30 28 26 27 27 27 25 27 28 27 30 29 30 30 
2 130 124 120 122 122 126 138 137 132 127 122 123 128 137 136 149 158 150 139 136 
4 19 18 18 16 17 16 16 15 15 18 16 15 17 17 26 31 34 34 32 30 
6 58 58 53 55 51 57 63 62 65 64 62 62 71 85 92 102 102 99 92 84 
7 108 112 122 130 140 151 162 159 160 154 145 139 152 169 175 187 189 188 171 165 
8 73 69 70 68 65 68 68 71 67 75 76 77 73 76 77 78 81 78 80 78 
9 148 148 152 160 161 170 174 170 158 143 140 144 145 149 153 166 170 164 160 151 
10 112 98 95 95 86 85 83 86 87 90 91 86 102 106 106 115 121 120 111 108 
11 60 54 66 72 76 96 94 106 108 122 150 169 179 182 186 192 177 159 141 132 
12 95 100 111 134 149 160 183 190 190 196 209 237 254 251 250 287 292 282 277 259 
13 71 77 98 113 126 146 164 173 181 184 214 239 271 290 300 357 393 393 412 401 
14 97 93 96 100 104 109 113 126 125 129 130 136 138 144 142 144 138 138 141 136 
15 98 94 97 96 95 98 100 93 89 88 83 83 93 93 95 96 95 91 86 82 
16 80 74 70 73 66 61 62 68 57 52 53 57 60 57 54 55 53 51 48 38 
17 245 235 228 219 214 207 200 196 184 173 167 159 168 172 179 186 183 174 162 146 
18 101 100 95 93 85 90 96 98 92 96 92 87 101 103 105 112 119 117 116 97 
19 118 114 107 105 105 102 99 111 108 110 110 110 120 125 124 133 135 133 125 119 
20 48 45 45 45 41 40 35 39 38 37 38 39 38 40 40 39 40 36 34 32 
21 246 250 249 251 249 250 261 263 257 241 234 231 240 255 264 291 291 282 278 257 
22 110 107 110 113 107 108 106 111 109 109 112 111 113 119 121 125 123 118 118 110 
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Table 1.1–continued 
 
Firms frequency by industry-year 
Industry 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
23 108 106 108 106 106 104 105 107 106 104 101 105 113 126 128 130 130 125 120 107 
24 41 39 36 37 33 32 32 32 31 33 32 31 29 28 27 31 33 31 28 27 
25 17 17 18 16 15 15 15 16 16 17 16 18 17 19 20 20 20 19 19 15 
27 31 29 38 40 49 58 69 73 67 76 75 73 70 64 70 74 65 55 49 45 
28 36 33 33 32 29 29 31 40 41 40 37 37 37 37 33 33 37 37 37 37 
30 398 477 491 481 464 427 402 382 370 368 366 346 353 371 364 372 372 346 322 312 
31 256 255 258 256 255 251 245 238 238 235 230 227 228 229 229 224 224 217 209 197 
32 163 161 179 182 198 202 217 221 228 230 235 245 268 278 299 351 361 358 420 410 
33 45 47 49 52 55 60 65 65 63 66 68 68 64 71 85 104 101 99 92 91 
34 334 339 394 452 471 549 570 567 544 523 528 570 632 697 804 1046 1145 1208 1454 1424 
35 165 179 242 267 284 310 316 325 321 298 297 307 327 349 373 433 452 452 464 443 
36 249 252 287 318 329 339 358 343 328 329 322 328 354 384 426 468 476 487 544 516 
37 129 129 139 153 158 171 173 167 151 147 146 153 161 163 169 189 192 193 203 188 
38 117 113 108 107 107 107 108 106 100 100 101 104 105 111 117 122 121 114 111 107 
39 24 23 22 23 21 24 25 24 22 20 16 20 22 22 24 25 26 25 27 25 
40 166 172 189 188 187 195 196 190 188 182 171 176 194 196 203 227 232 225 228 213 
41 283 289 292 313 313 326 349 354 344 333 331 319 342 366 377 399 403 378 365 349 
42 336 316 328 342 328 361 387 372 361 358 365 377 403 413 421 463 472 453 439 422 
43 142 143 147 157 159 164 160 156 149 144 149 159 160 175 190 210 211 194 182 168 
48 101 101 103 109 112 134 151 165 164 174 177 176 177 174 184 182 171 161 145 123 
All 5180 5212 5490 5722 5760 6026 6221 6245 6080 6012 6034 6170 6544 6870 7196 7975 8168 8013 8211 7810 
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Table 1.2- Industry Classifications  
 
Industries are classified in groups using Fama and French (1997) industry classification. A detail of the 
classification method and the industry SIC is provided in appendix A1. 
 
Code Industry group Code Industry group 
1 Agriculture 23 Automobiles and Trucks 
2 Food Products 24 Aircraft 
4 Beer & Liquor 25 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 
6 Recreation 27 Precious Metals 
7 Entertainment 28 Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 
8 Printing and Publishing 30 Petroleum and Natural Gas 
9 Consumer Goods 31 Utilities 
10 Apparel 32 Communication 
11 Healthcare 33 Personal Services 
12 Medical Equipment 34 Business Services 
13 Pharmaceutical Products 35 Computers 
14 Chemicals 36 Electronic Equipment 
15 Rubber and Plastic Products 37 Measuring and Control Equipment 
16 Textiles 38 Business Supplies 
17 Construction Materials 39 Shipping Containers 
18 Construction 40 Transportation 
19 Steel Works Etc 41 Wholesale 
20 Fabricated Products 42 Retail 
21 Machinery 43 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 
22 Electrical Equipment 48 Miscellaneous 
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Table 1.3-Parametric and Nonparametric Tests of the Stability  
of the Intra-Industry Leverage 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test is a nonparametric test of equality of the location parameters of the 
leverage ratio distributions for intra-industry firms across years. The ANOVA test is a 
parametric test of equality of the means of the leverage ratio for intra-industry firms across 
years. The null hypothesis in both tests is stated as the follows: H0:µ1981= µ1982=…=. 
µ2000. A Tukey pairwise comparisons test allows for simultaneously carrying out all 190-
hypothesis tests at a single, given level of significance. The Tukey pairwise comparisons test 
column report the percentage of years-pairs in which the differences in the means are 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level of significance. 
Kruskal-Wallis Test ANOVA Test Tukey Pairwise Comparisons Test 
Industry group 
P-Value P-Value Percentage 
1 0.36 0.14 6.84% 
2 0.28 0.39 4.21% 
4 0.10 0.00 3.16% 
6 0.00 0.27 2.11% 
7 0.11 0.26 0.00% 
8 0.00 0.00 7.89% 
9 0.00 0.00 11.58% 
10 0.00 0.46 0.00% 
11 0.02 0.18 0.00% 
12 0.00 0.52 2.63% 
13 0.00 0.53 0.00% 
14 0.00 0.49 0.00% 
15 0.00 0.00 2.11% 
16 0.00 0.11 3.16% 
17 0.09 0.51 0.00% 
18 0.29 0.16 0.00% 
19 0.11 0.61 0.00% 
20 0.28 0.36 0.00% 
21 0.00 0.06 2.63% 
22 0.02 0.50 0.00% 
23 0.00 0.00 7.89% 
24 0.65 0.27 0.00% 
25 0.56 0.77 0.00% 
27 0.26 0.67 0.00% 
28 0.12 0.32 4.21% 
30 0.00 0.32 0.00% 
31 0.00 0.00 2.11% 
32 0.00 0.00 7.89% 
33 0.10 0.10 0.00% 
34 0.00 0.05 0.53% 
35 0.00 0.02 10.53% 
36 0.00 0.34 7.89% 
37 0.00 0.16 1.58% 
38 0.00 0.00 1.05% 
39 0.00 0.00 2.11% 
40 0.29 0.36 0.00% 
41 0.00 0.06 4.74% 
42 0.00 0.00 18.95% 
43 0.00 0.45 0.53% 
48 0.00 0.72 0.00% 
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randomly for a given industry over time. Such a result works in favor of the existence of an 
optimal capital structure that firms try to preserve across time. 
 
1.4. TARGET LEVERAGE PROXIES 
 
        In this section, I review the major proxies for the optimal capital structure commonly used 
in the literature and considered in this study. 
 
        Marsh (1982) uses the average debt ratio over the study period for each firm (firm mean, 
hereafter) as a proxy for the target leverage in his study of debt equity choice. Jalilvand and 
Harris (1984) use the firm mean in their study of the target adjustment model. Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999), Nuri and Archer (2001), and Byoun and Rhim (2002) use the firm mean as a 
proxy for the target leverage in their studies of testing the trade-off model vs. the pecking order 
model. Thus, the firm mean is included in this study as a one of the target leverage proxies. 
 
        Hull (1999) uses the industry median leverage as a proxy for the target leverage in his study 
of the consistency of the market reaction to the debt equity swaps and equity issue with the sole 
purpose to reduce debt with the trade-off models. Hovakimian (2003), Hovakimian, Hovakimian, 
and Tehranian (2002) consider the industry median leverage as proxy for the target leverage in 
studying the role of target leverage in the firm decision to issue and repurchase security or to 
issue combination of debt and equity. I include the industry leverage median as one of the 
proxies in this study (industry median, hereafter). 
 
        Auerbach (1985), Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Dissanaike, Lambrecht, and 
Saragga (2001), Lie (2002), Fama and French (2002), Korajczyk and Levy (2003) use 
regression-based proxies for the target leverage. They regress the actual debt ratio over several 
firm- and industry-specific factors suggested by the trade-off theory and previous empirical 
studies. The fact that leverage ratio is bounded by zero necessitates the use of an econometric 
technique such as a Tobit regression to prevent the estimated leverage ratio from being negative 
and to obtain consistent estimators. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) are the first to control 
for this problem using Tobit regression model. I include two regression-based proxies; the first is 
estimated using Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedures (cross-sectional, hereafter) and the second are 
estimated using a Tobit model estimation to account for the fact that zero bound the debt ratio 
from below (Tobit-cross-sectional, hereafter). 
 
        For the regression-based proxies the actual debt ratio is regressed over the following 
independent variables:  
· Growth options: Rajan and Zingales (1995), Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that firms 
with high growth options depend on equity financing more than on debt financing. Their 
argument suggests a negative relation between leverage and growth options. Like Fama and 
French (2002) and Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001)), I use both the ratio of market-to-
book value and the ratio of research and development to total assets as proxies for the firm’s 
growth options.  
· Size: Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that larger firms are more diversified, thus they face 
lower probability of bankruptcy. This suggests that the larger the firm size, the higher the 
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firm’s debt capacity. Thus, size is expected to be positively related to leverage. The 
logarithm of total assets used as proxy firm size.  
· Tangible Assets: In addition to size, Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that tangibility of 
assets, as a measure of collateral, is positively related to leverage. Thus, firms with a higher 
percentage of tangible assets from their total assets will have a higher capacity to raise debt. 
· Non-debt tax shields: according to Modigliani and Miller (1958), the major incentive for 
borrowing is to take advantage of interest tax shields. The presence of other non-debt tax 
shields (depreciation and amortization) mitigates such incentive. The ratio of depreciation to 
total assets is used as a measure of the non-debt tax shields. 
· Profitability: it has been argued that the probability of bankruptcy rises as the volatility of 
earnings increases. Since operating income is independent of the effects of leverage and since 
it represents the income available for interest payments, higher profitable firms expected to 
have higher debt ratio. Following Fama and French (2002), earnings before interest and taxes 
scaled by total assets are used as a proxy for profitability. 
 
        Table 1.4 shows the results of the estimations of both the cross-sectional and the Tobit-
cross-sectional proxies using Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Tobit estimation methods. The 
coefficients of the independent variables represent the means across years. To account for the 
autocorrelation in the annual coefficients, I follow Fama and French (2002) procedure in 
approximating the inflation factor of the standard errors of annual Coefficients.11 The first 
autocorrelations of the slopes are between 0.3 and 0.62 and for a longer lags it decay like an 
AR1. Thus, I require t-statistics above 5.2 and 7.1 to infer reliability at 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
respectively.  
 
        My results support the previous empirical results of Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1985), Long 
and Malitz (1985), Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Hovakimian, Opler 
and Titman (2001), and Fama and French (2002). All the independents variables coefficients’ 
signs are consistent with their predicted sign, except for the market to book ratio in the Fama-
MacBeth regression. Fama and French (2002) also find such a positive relation using the same 
estimation method. 
 
 
1.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
        To study whether the different proxies have symmetric distributions, I report in Tables 1.5 
and 1.6 the parametric and nonparametric tests of the differences in the location parameters of 
each proxy distribution. Both the ANOVA and the Kruskal-Wallis tests reject the hypothesis that 
there are no differences in the location parameters among the four proxies across all the 
industries at 10% significance level.  
 
 
                                                 
11 As Fama and French point out the procedure is a conservative approach to account for the autocorrelations in the 
annual coefficients. 
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Table 1.4-Regressions -Based Target Leverage   
 
The dependent variable is defined as the total debt divided by total assets. The Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
regressions are run for each year of 1981-2000 period. The Tobit model estimation regressions are run for 
each year of 1981-2000 period. The coefficients of the independent variables represent the means across 
years. To count for the autocorrelation in the annual coefficients, I follow Fama and French (2001) procedure 
by approximating the inflation factor of the stranded errors of annual coefficients. To count for the 
autocorrelation in the annual slops. Thus, I require t-statistics above 5.2 and 7.1 to infer reliability at 0.05 and 
0.01 levels respectively. ** and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at 0.01 and 
0.05 levels. 
 
Independent Variables Dependent variable debt ratio 
 Estimation Method 
   Fama-MacBeth Tobit model 
Constant  0.085** -1.708** 
Market To Book Ratio  0.015** -0.036* 
R&D to Total Assets -0.196* -0.455* 
Instrument variable =1 if firm have no R&D  0.076*  0.136** 
Size-Logarithm of Total Assets  0.011*  0.088** 
Tangible Assists to Total Assets  0.158**  0.854** 
Depreciation to Total Assets -0577* -0.463* 
Profitability -0.213** -0.398** 
R-Square  0.221  0.183 
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        However, given the fact that I am interested in knowing which proxies are different, I 
employ the Tukey pairwise comparisons test (parametric) and the Kruskal-Wallis pairwise 
comparisons test (nonparametric) to identify which pairs of proxies are the source of the 
differences. Examining the percentages of significant differences among the different pairs of 
proxies across all the industries obviously reveals that the proxies’ distributions are not 
symmetric. I find that there are no significant differences in the proxies’ distributions in about 
32.5% (30% using nonparametric test) of the industries between the firm mean leverage and the 
industry median leverage. While, there are no significant differences in the proxies’ distributions 
between the firm's mean leverage and the cross-sectional leverage for about 55% (40% using 
nonparametric test) of the industries. For only 15%  (0% using nonparametric test) of the 
industries there are no significant differences in the proxies’ distributions between the firm mean 
leverage and the Tobit cross-sectional leverage. While there are no significant differences in the 
proxies’ distributions between the industry median leverage and the cross-sectional leverage 
proxies’ for about 45% (17.5% using nonparametric test) of the industries. The industry median 
leverage and the Tobit cross-sectional leverage proxies’ show no significant differences in their 
distributions in about 20% (2.5% using nonparametric test) of the industries. Finally, there are no 
significant differences between the cross-sectional leverage and the Tobit cross-sectional 
leverage in about 15%  (0% using nonparametric test) of the industries.  
 
        The overall result shows, there is strong evidence that the different proxies have 
significantly different distributions. Nevertheless, across all industries, the firm mean and cross-
sectional proxies have the closest distributions; this is indicated by both the parametric and 
nonparametric tests.  
          
        The results above suggest that using different proxies of optimal capital structure in 
corporate finance models could lead to different results depending on the proxy used. For 
example, the parametric and nonparametric tests indicate that the distribution of the firm mean 
proxy is to the left of the distribution of the Tobit cross-sectional proxy, suggesting that the firm 
mean as a target proxy yields more over-leveraged firms relative to the Tobit cross-sectional 
proxy.  
 
        Given that the different proxies are not equivalent, I turn now to investigate which proxy 
exhibits characteristics that are most consistent with the theorized true optimal capital structure. I 
first examine the relation between the leverage ratio and the firm value for firms above and 
below their target leverage. Table 1.7 presents the correlations between leverage ratio and firm 
value over time for firms above and below their target leverage, while Table 1.8 presents the 
correlations between the absolute value of the deviation from the target leverage and firm value. 
Table 1.9 shows, for each proxy, the proportions of industries that yield consistent results with 
the prediction of the trade-off model among all the industries. As it is obvious from table 1.9, 
among all the proxies, the industry median is the most consistent with the prediction of the trade-
off model.  
  
18
 
 
 
Table 1.5-Tukey Pairwise Comparisons Test -Mean Differences 
 
 The differences in means among the deferent proxies are conducted using T-test. Proxy1 represents the firm’s leverage mean for 
the study period, proxy2 represents the industry leverage median (An industry is defined using Fama-French (1997) industry 
classification), proxy3 represents the estimated cross-sectional leverage (estimated using Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedures) and 
proxy4 represents the estimated cross-sectional leverage using Tobit model. The Tukey pairwise comparisons test allows for 
simultaneously carrying a joint hypothesis testing at a single given level of significance. * indicate that difference in the means is 
statistically different from zero 0.05 levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry ANOVA P-Value 
Proxy1-Proxy2  
Mean differences 
Proxy1-Proxy 3 
M ean differences 
Proxy1-Proxy4 
Mean differences 
Proxy2-Proxy3 
Mean differences 
Proxy2-Proxy4 
Mean differences 
Proxy3-Proxy4 
Mean differences 
1 0.00  0.07*  0.07*  0.18*  0.01  0.11*  0.11* 
2 0.00  0.01*  0.01  0.12* -0.01*  0.11*  0.12* 
4 0.10 -0.03 -0.01  0.00  0.02  0.03  0.02 
6 0.00 -0.01 -0.01  0.17*  0.00  0.18*  0.18* 
7 0.00  0.04*  0.00  0.16* -0.03*  0.12*  0.15* 
8 0.00  0.00 -0.03  0.11* -0.02  0.11*  0.14* 
9 0.00  0.01 -0.02*  0.11* -0.03*  0.10*  0.13* 
10 0.00  0.08*  0.04  0.18* -0.04  0.10*  0.14* 
11 0.00  0.23*  0.03  0.03 -0.21* -0.20*  0.01 
12 0.00  0.13  0.02  0.21* -0.11  0.08  0.19* 
13 0.00  0.11*  0.05*  0.19* -0.06*  0.08*  0.14* 
14 0.00  0.03 -0.02  0.07* -0.05*  0.04*  0.09* 
15 0.00  0.04*  0.02*  0.16* -0.03*  0.12*  0.15* 
16 0.00 -0.04* -0.04*  0.00  0.00  0.04*  0.04* 
17 0.00  0.01  0.00  0.12*  0.00  0.11*  0.12* 
18 0.00  0.07*  0.02  0.18* -0.05*  0.12*  0.17* 
19 0.00  0.01*  0.00  0.08* -0.01*  0.07*  0.08* 
20 0.00  0.04*  0.00  0.12* -0.04*  0.08*  0.12* 
21 0.00  0.05*  0.03*  0.16* -0.02*  0.10*  0.13* 
22 0.10  0.17  0.07  0.17 -0.09  0.01  0.10 
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Table 1.5 -continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry ANOVA P-Value 
Proxy1- Proxy2 
Mean differences 
Proxy1- Proxy3 
Mean differences 
Proxy1-Proxy4 
Mean differences 
Proxy2-Proxy3 
Mean differences 
Proxy2-Proxy4 
Mean differences 
Proxy3-Proxy4 
Mean differences 
23 0.00  0.03*  0.01  0.09* -0.02*  0.06*  0.08* 
24 0.00  0.01  0.00  0.09*  0.00  0.08*  0.09* 
25 0.00  0.11*  0.08*  0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 
27 0.00  0.33*  0.21*  0.38* -0.12*  0.05  0.17* 
28 0.08  0.09 -0.03  0.04 -0.12 -0.04  0.08 
30 0.00  0.16*  0.10*  0.25* -0.06*  0.09*  0.15* 
31 0.00 -0.01* -0.01*  0.01*  0.00  0.02*  0.02* 
32 0.00  0.03* -0.06*  0.10* -0.09*  0.06*  0.16* 
33 0.00  0.21*  0.09*  0.14* -0.12* -0.06*  0.05* 
34 0.00  0.19*  0.09*  0.22* -0.1*  0.04*  0.14* 
35 0.00  0.12*  0.03  0.16* -0.09*  0.05*  0.13* 
36 0.00  0.65*  0.59*  0.71* -0.06  0.05  0.11 
37 0.00  0.07*  0.03*  0.15* -0.04*  0.07*  0.12* 
38 0.00  0.00 -0.01  0.06* -0.01  0.07*  0.07* 
39 0.00  0.01 -0.01  0.07* -0.02*  0.05*  0.07* 
40 0.00  0.01  0.00  0.13* -0.01  0.12*  0.13* 
41 0.00  0.05*  0.02  0.17* -0.03*  0.12*  0.15* 
42 0.00  0.05*  0.03*  0.16* -0.02*  0.11*  0.13* 
43 0.00  0.05*  0.03*  0.19* -0.02  0.14*  0.16* 
48 0.00  0.47*  0.39*  0.53* -0.08  0.06  0.14* 
%  67.5 45 85 55 80 85  
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Table 1.6 -Kruskal-Wallis Pairwise Comparisons Test -Location Parameters  
 
The differences in the location parameters among the deferent proxies are conducted using Kruskal-Wallis pairwise 
comparisons test. Proxy1 represents the firm’s leverage mean for the study period, proxy2 represents the industry leverage 
median (An industry is defined using Fama-French (1997) industry classification), proxy3 represents the estimated cross-
sectional leverage (estimated using Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedures) and proxy4 represents the estimated cross-sectional 
leverage using Tobit model. The Kruskal-Wallis pairwise comparisons test allows for simultaneously carrying a joint 
hypothesis testing at a single given level of significance. * indicates that differences in the location parameters are statistically 
different from zero at 0.05 levels. Ri-Rj represents the difference between the average ranks. 
 
             
Industry Kruskal-Wallis P-Value 
Proxy 1-Proxy2 
Ri-Rj  
Proxy1-Proxy3 
Ri-Rj 
Proxy1-Proxy4 
Ri-Rj 
Proxy2-Proxy3 
Ri-Rj 
Proxy2-Proxy4 
Ri-Rj 
Proxy3-Proxy4 
Ri-Rj 
1 0.00 91 53 496* 38 587* 550* 
2 0.00 212 472* 279* 260* 300* 267* 
4 0.00 154* 57 214* 97* 368* 270* 
6 0.00 348* 17 183* 331* 217* 847* 
7 0.00 34 102* 232* 987* 235* 342* 
8 0.00 318* 355* 130* 37 161* 656* 
9 0.00 341* 761* 300* 420* 334* 769* 
10 0.00 157 20 215* 138* 199* 136* 
11 0.00 266* 11 220* 264* 456* 194* 
12 0.00 124* 420* 233* 825* 498* 813* 
13 0.00 887* 112 862* 999* 497* 973* 
14 0.00 4 258* 627* 261* 623* 884* 
15 0.00 52 199* 969* 146* 202* 168* 
16 0.00 499* 253* 322* 246* 821* 575* 
17 0.00 108* 776* 373* 306* 814* 509* 
18 0.00 139 761* 365* 900* 226* 126* 
19 0.00 371* 693* 848* 322* 219* 541* 
20 0.00 127* 256* 833* 383* 705* 108* 
21 0.00 175 472* 331* 297* 506* 802* 
22 0.00 67 113 281* 180* 214* 394* 
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Table 1.6-continued 
 
 
Industry Kruskal-Wallis 
P-Value 
Proxy1-Proxy2 
Ri-Rj 
Proxy1-Proxy3 
Ri-Rj 
Proxy1-Proxy4 
Ri-Rj 
Proxy2-Proxy3 
Ri-Rj 
Proxy2-Proxy4 
Ri-Rj 
Proxy3-Proxy4 
Ri-Rj 
23 0.00 321* 224* 203* 97 170* 180* 
24 0.00 142* 95 497* 47 639* 592* 
25 0.00 44* 25 157* 68* 114* 182* 
27 0.00 319* 204 1564* 523* 1245* 768* 
28 0.00 316* 72 686* 388* 371* 758* 
30 0.00 748* 230* 706* 305* 634* 936* 
31 0.00 68 39 152* 29 1456* 484* 
32 0.00 748* 313* 215* 238* 897* 283* 
33 0.00 127* 66 136* 133* 93 429* 
34 0.00 720* 403 184* 679* 199* 998* 
35 0.00 180* 114* 883* 294* 703* 979* 
36 0.00 420* 922* 104* 328* 626* 546* 
37 0.00 964* 73 455* 890* 359* 480* 
38 0.00 513* 536* 147* 23 985* 200* 
39 0.00 23 78* 333* 101* 310* 410* 
40 0.00 614* 974* 324* 360* 855* 421* 
41 0.00 32 902* 827* 934* 824* 917* 
42 0.00 884* 609* 959* 149* 870* 102* 
43 0.00 288* 192 402* 96 373* 382* 
48 0.00 625* 117* 154* 549* 217* 272* 
%  70 60 100 82.5 97.5 100 
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        When the industry median is the target leverage, the Pearson (Spearmen) correlation 
coefficients indicate that in about 93% (95%) of the industries there is significant evidence that 
firms below their target could increase their market value by moving toward their target 
leverage, while in about 65% (75%) of the industries firms above their target suffer a value loss 
by moving away from it. The cross-sectionally estimated proxy turns out to be the second most 
consistent proxy with the predictions of the trade-off model. Finally, the firm leverage mean, as 
proxy of the target leverage is the least consistent proxy using the correlation tests. 
 
        The correlation test of the proxies can be considered a weak-form test, especially for the 
correlation between leverage ratio and the firm value for firms that operate below their target 
leverage, since the firm value, by definition, will increase as the firm increases its leverage. The 
correlation test for firms above their target leverage is a strong-form test. The strong-form test 
reveals that in the majority of the industries, firms above their target suffer a value loss by 
moving away from it when, I use the industry median as optimal capital structure proxy. 
 
        To form a bird’s eye view, I turn to examine the firm value behavior relative to the 
deviation from each proxy. To test whether there are significant differences in firm value as the 
firm moves closer versus farther from their target, I utilize both parametric and nonparametric 
pairwise comparison tests of the firm’s value for firms above and below the target and for each 
set as described in section 2.2. Table 1.10 reports the test results of the Tukey pairwise 
comparisons test of the differences in the average firm value across the two main different sets.  
 
        In Table 1.11, the Kruskal Wallis test of pairwise comparisons is reported. Comparing the 
significant differences in the average firm value across the two sets for the four proxies with the 
predicted relation reveals that the highest consistency with the prediction of the trade-off model 
is obtained by the industry median as proxy, regardless of the testing procedure (parametric or 
nonparametric). 
 
        Table 1.12 presents the test of proportion of the consistency across all the industries. In 
about 65% of the industries, the median mimics the behavior of the true optimal leverage using 
the nonparametric test and 63% of the industries using the parametric test. The firms’ mean 
leverage is consistent in about 30% of the industries using the nonparametric test and in 28% 
using the parametric test. The cross-sectional proxy in about 50% of the industries using the 
nonparametric test and 38% using the parametric test. The Tobit cross-sectional proxy in about 
25% of the industries using the nonparametric test and 18% using the parametric test. Those 
results resemble my previous results in which the industry median leverage has the most 
consistent characteristics with the true optimal capital structure.12  
                                                 
12 I also run all my tests using the market value rather than the market value standardized by total assets. In addition, I 
run the correlation tests for each individual year then I test them across years. The main results were not different. To 
check the sensitivity of my results to the industry classification, I classify industries using two digits SIC grouping and 
rerun all the tests. I find the industry median leverage perform as the best proxy for the target leverage.    
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Table 1.7- Correlation: Leverage Ratio and Firm Value  
 
For each industry – year, firms are classified into two categories: firms above their target leverage proxy and firms below their target 
leverage proxy. For each category, the Pearson and Spearman correlations between the market value standardized by total assets and the 
leverage ratio are calculated across time. The hypothesis for firms below their target is that the correlation coefficient is positive and for 
firms above their target is that the correlation coefficient is negative. **  and  * indicate that the correlation between the market value 
standardized by total assets and the leverage ratio is statistically significant at 0.01 and 0.05 levels. 
 
Industry Firm Mean Industry Median Cross-Sectional Cross-Sectional-Tobit 
 Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
 Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above 
1   0.03 -0.29**  0.03 -0.29** 0.11 -0.13*  0.23** -0.03 0.13* -0.07  0.06 -0.12  0.21** -0.03 0.27**  0.01 
2   0.01 -0.03  0.01 -0.03 0.20** -0.07*  0.30** -0.08** 0.22** -0.03  0.33** -0.01**  0.28**  0.00 0.48**  0.04 
4   0.37** -0.17  0.37** -0.17 0.30** -0.14*  0.34** -0.31** 0.24** -0.07  0.33** -0.09  0.25** -0.01 0.42 -0.05 
6   0.26** -0.16**  0.26** -0.16** 0.11** -0.03  0.20** -0.07 0.14** -0.03  0.25** -0.01  0.02 -0.05 0.54  0.11** 
7   0.27**  0.19**  0.27**  0.19** 0.08** -0.07*  0.15**  0.02 0.15** -0.03  0.28**  0.16**  0.24** -0.06* 0.54  0.24** 
8   0.32** -0.06  0.32** -0.06 0.27** -0.05*  0.37** -0.11* 0.30** -0.03  0.42**  0.04  0.34**  0.00 0.57  0.13** 
9  -0.03 -0.25** -0.03 -0.25** 0.13** -0.05*  0.16** -0.14** 0.11** -0.06*  0.05 -0.23**  0.17** -0.04 0.22 -0.13** 
10   0.04 -0.05  0.04 -0.05 0.10** -0.02  0.18** -0.11** 0.07* -0.02  0.18** -0.07  0.20** -0.01 0.32** -0.03 
11   0.34**  0.15*  0.34**  0.15* 0.01 -0.03* -0.06  0.10** 0.16** -0.05  0.13**  0.04  0.12**  0.03 0.30**  0.26** 
12   0.10** -0.02  0.10** -0.02 0.04 -0.01  0.04* -0.16** 0.05* -0.01  0.03 -0.16**  0.03 -0.01 0.12** -0.10** 
13   0.18** -0.19**  0.18** -0.19** 0.16** -0.06*  0.16** -0.25** 0.05* -0.04  0.14** -0.12**  0.09** -0.03 0.29** -0.03 
14   0.19** -0.13**  0.19** -0.13** 0.25** -0.06*  0.47** -0.26** 0.11** -0.05  0.36** -0.14**  0.15** -0.03 0.58  0.00 
15  -0.08  0.23** -0.08  0.23** 0.17**  0.13**  0.18**  0.21** 0.17**  0.26**  0.20**  0.29**  0.18**  0.12** 0.34  0.24** 
16   0.06  0.01  0.06  0.01 0.28**  0.01  0.32**  0.16** 0.22**  0.06  0.36**  0.16**  0.32**  0.04 0.42  0.19** 
17   0.16**  0.05  0.16**  0.05 0.14** -0.04*  0.26** -0.04 0.20**  0.00  0.29**  0.03  0.41**  0.03 0.60  0.13** 
18   0.14** -0.13**  0.14** -0.13** 0.13** -0.07*  0.29** -0.16** 0.18** -0.02  0.37** -0.04  0.46**  0.02 0.61**  0.08** 
19  -0.01 -0.23** -0.01 -0.23** 0.09** -0.14**  0.14** -0.13** 0.00 -0.16**  0.04 -0.20**  0.09* -0.11** 0.16** -0.06* 
20   0.16* -0.05  0.16* -0.05 0.17** -0.19**  0.12* -0.15** 0.18** -0.15**  0.12* -0.16**  0.15* -0.10* 0.31**  0.05 
21   0.10** -0.19**  0.10** -0.19** 0.12** -0.04*  0.14** -0.18** 0.09** -0.02  0.14** -0.13**  0.12** -0.01 0.34** -0.07** 
22 -0.17** -0.41** -0.17** -0.41** 0.11** -0.01  0.10** -0.26** 0.00 -0.08** -0.03 -0.35** -0.01 -0.07* 0.14** -0.21** 
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Table 1.7 -continued 
 
Industry Firm Mean Industry Median Cross-Sectional Cross-Sectional-Tobit 
 Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
 Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above 
23   0.05  0.13**  0.05  0.13**  0.20**  0.01  0.23** -0.05  0.26**  0.05  0.26**  0.06  0.30**  0.08**  0.43**  0.05 
24  -0.09 -0.47** -0.09 -0.47**  0.19** -0.21**  0.31** -0.28**  0.06 -0.29**  0.16** -0.47**  0.09 -0.21**  0.31** -0.22** 
25  -0.36* -0.38* -0.36** -0.38* -0.07 -0.12* -0.06 -0.06 -0.24** -0.19* -0.26** -0.02 -0.24** -0.19* -0.24**  0.00 
27   0.14* -0.10  0.14* -0.10  0.12** -0.07*  0.05 -0.20**  0.06 -0.06  0.08* -0.09 -0.01 -0.07  0.27**  0.05 
28   0.31**  0.04  0.31**  0.04  0.25** -0.04  0.47** -0.24**  0.23** -0.04  0.36** -0.19**  0.00 -0.03  0.62** -0.09 
30   0.36** -0.02  0.36** -0.02  0.13** -0.07**  0.4** -0.16**  0.04* -0.05**  0.47** -0.01  0.09** -0.02  0.74  0.18** 
31   0.24**  0.06*  0.24**  0.06*  0.11** -0.07**  0.21** -0.09**  0.20**  0.05*  0.41**  0.15**  0.25**  0.10**  0.47  0.15** 
32   0.27** -0.24**  0.27** -0.24**  0.18** -0.07**  0.39** -0.14**  0.05* -0.08**  0.28** -0.08**  0.1** -0.06**  0.51  0.05* 
33   0.10 -0.21**  0.10 -0.21**  0.03* -0.07*  0.00  0.07*  0.09* -0.09*  0.04  0.05  0.03 -0.04  0.24  0.14** 
34   0.03 -0.08**  0.03 -0.08**  0.01* -0.02*  0.10** -0.08**  0.02 -0.02 -0.08** -0.05**  0.01 -0.02  0.09 -0.09** 
35   0.04 -0.17**  0.04 -0.17**  0.01* -0.04*  0.07** -0.18**  0.00 -0.04 -0.04** -0.25** -0.01 -0.02  0.14** -0.16** 
36  -0.05* -0.17** -0.05* -0.17**  0.01* -0.07**  0.07** -0.27**  0.00 -0.07** -0.08** -0.31**  0.01 -0.05**  0.12** -0.17** 
37   0.20** -0.16**  0.20** -0.16**  0.08 -0.06*  0.09** -0.24**  0.01 -0.07*  0.03 -0.28** -0.01 -0.04  0.12** -0.13** 
38   0.27**  0.03  0.27**  0.03  0.29** -0.04  0.33** -0.04  0.4**  0.1**  0.49**  0.11**  0.46**  0.05  0.66**  0.07** 
39   0.02  0.23*  0.02  0.23*  0.41**  0.02*  0.37**  0.13*  0.43**  0.07  0.44**  0.23**  0.30**  0.06  0.43  0.17** 
40   0.05 -0.15**  0.05 -0.15**  0.11** -0.07*  0.21** -0.18**  0.08** -0.1**  0.11** -0.20**  0.20** -0.06**  0.32 -0.09** 
41   0.14** -0.10  0.14** -0.10  0.09** -0.01*  0.22** -0.12**  0.10**  0.00  0.22** -0.02  0.03  0.03  0.52**  0.03* 
42   0.04  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.07** -0.04*  0.07** -0.06**  0.11**  0.01  0.14**  0.06**  0.15**  0.00  0.20**  0.03* 
43 -0.02  0.00 -0.02  0.00  0.10** -0.02*  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.07**  0.11**  0.18**  0.21** -0.01  0.12**  0.12** 
48  0.33**  0.07  0.33**  0.07  0.11** -0.01*  0.38** -0.09**  0.05 -0.01  0.41**  0.18**  0.11**  0.00  0.65**  0.14** 
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Table 1.8-Correlation: Deviation from the Target Leverage Proxy and the Firm Value 
 
For each industry – year firms are classified into two categories: firms above their target leverage proxy and firms below their target 
leverage proxy. For each category, the Pearson and Spearman correlations between the market value standardized by total assets and the 
absolute deviation from the target proxy are calculated across time. The hypothesis for firms below their target is that the correlation 
coefficient is positive and for firms above their target is that the correlation coefficient is negative. **  and  * indicate that the correlation 
between the market value standardized by total assets and the absolute deviation from the target proxy is statistically significant at 0.01 and 
0.05 levels. 
 
Industry Firm Mean Industry Median Cross-Sectional Cross-Sectional-Tobit 
 Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
 Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above 
1 -0.09 -0.22* -0.16 -0.25* -0.06 -0.16** -0.16* -0.09 -0.17** -0.18** -0.24* -0.07 -0.07 -0.15** 0.03 -0.10 
2 -0.09*  0.03 -0.03  0.08 -0.16** -0.10** -0.29** -0.12** -0.08** -0.12** -0.22** -0.15**  0.06 -0.1** 0.11** -0.18** 
4 -0.15 -0.18  0.06 -0.19 -0.22** -0.19* -0.25** -0.25** -0.10 -0.13 -0.20 -0.09  0.10 -0.17* 0.27** -0.17* 
6 -0.08 -0.07 -0.31** -0.14* -0.08* -0.03 -0.20** -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.03  0.01 -0.08* 0.45** -0.02 
7 -0.03 -0.11*  0.03 -0.03 -0.07* -0.07** -0.13**  0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.12** -0.03  0.10** -0.06* 0.34** -0.08** 
8 -0.13** -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.18** -0.06* -0.29** -0.17** -0.02 -0.12** -0.14** -0.15*  0.13** -0.05 0.40** -0.11** 
9 -0.06 -0.03 -0.17** -0.18** -0.10** -0.06* -0.12** -0.17** -0.04 -0.06* -0.18** -0.13**  0.13** -0.07** 0.13** -0.20 
10 -0.07 -0.02  0.05  0.05 -0.12** -0.01 -0.17** -0.08* -0.05 -0.03 -0.16** -0.12*  0.05 -0.02 0.17** -0.14** 
11 -0.10* -0.09 -0.18** -0.10 -0.10* -0.02 -0.14**  0.13** -0.04 -0.06 -0.10* -0.09 -0.12**  0.00 0.32**  0.10** 
12 -0.08** -0.12** -0.15** -0.15** -0.07** -0.01 -0.22** -0.10** -0.03 -0.07** -0.17** -0.10**  0.01 -0.01 0.08** -0.13** 
13 -0.06 -0.06 -0.25** -0.20** -0.17** -0.05* -0.20** -0.22**  0.01 -0.04 -0.17** -0.13**  0.02 -0.04 0.14** -0.10 
14 -0.10** -0.06 -0.17** -0.14** -0.20** -0.07* -0.44** -0.32** -0.06* -0.11** -0.28** -0.28**  0.04 -0.07 0.34** -0.28** 
15  0.04  0.19** -0.01  0.26** -0.11**  0.09** -0.11**  0.13** -0.01  0.16** -0.01  0.08 -0.22**  0.05 0.29**  0.05 
16  0.01 -0.05 -0.08  0.01 -0.16** -0.06* -0.23** -0.12** -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.19** -0.05 0.25** -0.02 
17 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.13** -0.05* -0.24** -0.07** -0.09** -0.05 -0.19** -0.13**  0.29** -0.05* 0.18** -0.19** 
18 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.11* -0.11** -0.08** -0.27** -0.18** -0.06 -0.11** -0.15** -0.19**  0.02 -0.16** 0.23** -0.20 
19 -0.17** -0.10* -0.25** -0.14** -0.04 -0.14** -0.10** -0.15** -0.06* -0.11** -0.09 -0.13** -0.04 -0.10 0.00 -0.13** 
20 -0.08 -0.13 -0.02 -0.15* -0.20** -0.20** -0.14* -0.14** -0.14** -0.14* -0.16 -0.07 -0.03 -0.17** 0.16* -0.05 
21 -0.04 -0.05 -0.11** -0.20** -0.12** -0.04* -0.16** -0.15** -0.04 -0.04 -0.18** -0.09** -0.01 -0.04* 0.09** -0.19 
22 -0.02 -0.06 -0.20** -0.22** -0.12** -0.01 -0.11** -0.24** -0.09** -0.03 -0.16** -0.19** -0.02 -0.07* 0.04 -0.21** 
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Table 1.8- continued 
 
Industry Firm Mean Industry Median Cross-Sectional Cross-Sectional-Tobit 
 Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
 Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above 
23  0.16**  0.13**  0.15**  0.11** -0.18** -0.01 -0.21** -0.08* -0.06 -0.06 -0.17** -0.14**  0.18** -0.03  0.26** -0.11** 
24 -0.23** -0.13 -0.25** -0.18* -0.19** -0.20** -0.31** -0.31** -0.19** -0.21** -0.3** -0.26**  0.08 -0.23**  0.23** -0.31 
25 -0.28* -0.36* -0.10 -0.10  0.12 -0.08  0.15 -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.10  0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.01  0.00 
27 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.10* -0.07* -0.02 -0.22**  0.07 -0.13** -0.08 -0.19* -0.01 -0.08*  0.18**  0.01 
28 -0.09 -0.15  0.01 -0.06 -0.17** -0.04 -0.40** -0.25** -0.09 -0.17** -0.26** -0.23** -0.03 -0.15  0.33** -0.30** 
30 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08** -0.17** -0.1** -0.07** -0.36** -0.17** -0.01 -0.10** -0.19** -0.15** -0.31** -0.06**  0.64** -0.13 
31 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09** -0.09** -0.13** -0.06** -0.25** -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** -0.16** -0.16**  0.14** -0.11**  0.08** -0.21 
32 -0.07* -0.11** -0.35** -0.30** -0.13** -0.07** -0.35** -0.18** -0.05* -0.07** -0.22** -0.08  0.01 -0.08**  0.24** -0.10** 
33 -0.08 -0.10  0.01 -0.11 -0.14** -0.03 -0.11*  0.15** -0.05 -0.07  0.00  0.04  0.03  0.00  0.26**  0.11** 
34 -0.03 -0.01 -0.19** -0.14** -0.04** -0.02* -0.19** -0.02*  0.00 -0.01 -0.1** -0.03  0.00 -0.01 -0.06** -0.10** 
35 -0.06** -0.08* -0.17** -0.15** -0.06** -0.03* -0.19** -0.15** -0.03 -0.02 -0.25** -0.13**  0.00 -0.02 -0.07** -0.17 
36 -0.01 -0.05 -0.15** -0.12** -0.08** -0.05** -0.16** -0.18** -0.04** -0.03 -0.21** -0.12**  0.00 -0.04*  0.03 -0.18 
37 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.22** -0.12** -0.04* -0.25** -0.18** -0.08** -0.02 -0.25** -0.13** -0.01 -0.03 -0.07* -0.14 
38 -0.11** -0.06 -0.25** -0.07 -0.19** -0.10** -0.24** -0.14** -0.06* -0.09** -0.14** -0.14** -0.32** -0.12**  0.43** -0.21** 
39  0.33**  0.18*  0.21*  0.29** -0.36** -0.05 -0.35** -0.01 -0.23** -0.12 -0.27* -0.12 -0.09 -0.06  0.00 -0.06 
40 -0.06 -0.04 -0.15** -0.14** -0.12** -0.07** -0.22** -0.17** -0.12** -0.04 -0.18** -0.15**  0.00 -0.06**  0.16** -0.19 
41 -0.03 -0.02 -0.12** -0.11** -0.09**  0.00 -0.22** -0.11** -0.08**  0.00 -0.19** -0.10** -0.18** -0.02  0.23** -0.18 
42 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.10** -0.03* -0.12** -0.03 -0.02 -0.04* -0.07** -0.05 -0.01 -0.03  0.00 -0.07** 
43 -0.07 -0.02 -0.14** -0.08* -0.12** -0.02 -0.06*  0.06* -0.04  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.05 -0.03  0.12**  0.02 
48 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06* -0.02 -0.30** -0.14** -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.10*  0.04 -0.01  0.62** -0.09** 
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Table 1.9-Test of Proportions- Correlations 
 
Each cell represents the proportion of significant correlation coefficients consistent with the predictions of the trade-off 
model for each proxy. In Panel A, columns 2, 3 and 4 report the proportions of consistency between market value 
standardized by total assets and leverage ratio using Pearson correlation coefficients. Columns 5,6 and 7 report the 
proportions of consistency between market value standardized by total assets and leverage ratio using Spearman correlation 
coefficients. In Panel B, columns 2, 3 and 4 report the proportions of consistency between market value standardized by total 
assets and the absolute deviation from the target proxy using Pearson correlation coefficients. Columns 5,6 and 7 report the 
proportions of consistency between market value standardized by total assets and the absolute deviation from the target 
proxy using Spearman correlation coefficients. **  and  * indicate that the proportion of the proxy is statistically greater than 
0.5 at 0.01 and 0.05 levels. < and << Indicate that the proportion of the proxy is statistically less than the proportion of 
industry median proxy at 0.01 and 0.05 levels. 
 
Panel A: Consistency of the correlation coefficients between the firm value and the leverage ratio 
Pearson Spearman Proxy  Below Above Both Below Above Both 
Firm Mean 0.25 0.23 0.00<<   0.53 0.45 0.18<< 
Industry Median 0.88** 0.75** 0.65**   0.88** 0.68** 0.65 
Cross-Sectional 0.73** 0.30 0.15<<   0.73** 0.43 0.23<< 
Cross-Sectional-Tobin 0.68** 0.23 0.13<<   0.58* 0.28 0.20<< 
Panel B: Consistency of the correlation coefficients between the firm value and the absolute deviation from the target proxy  
Pearson Spearman Proxy  Below Above Both Below Above Both 
Firm Mean 0.28 0.18 0.13<< 0.50 0.55* 0.45<< 
Industry Median 0.93** 0.65** 0.60** 0.95** 0.75** 0.73 
Cross-Sectional 0.40 0.43 0.23<< 0.73** 0.60** 0.55< 
Cross-Sectional-Tobin 0.45 0.48 0.05<< 0.48 0.38 0.23<< 
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Table 1.10- Tukey Pairwise Comparisons Test -Firm Value 
 
For each industry – year firms are classified into two categories: firms above their target leverage proxy and firms below 
their target leverage proxy. The absolute deviation from the target (|the proxy target minus the actual leverage ratio|) for 
each category is calculated. For each category, firms are further divided into two sets. The first set contains those firms 
with a deviation from the target of less than the 50th percentile of the deviation distribution (Q1); the second set contains 
those firms with a deviation from the target of more than the 50th percentile of the deviation distribution (Q2). To test if 
there are significant differences in the firm market value, as it stands closer relative to further away from their target. The 
Tukey pairwise comparisons test jointly testing for the differences in the average market value standardized by total assets 
among the different sets at a 5% level of significance. Each cell reports the differences in the means. * indicates that 
difference in the means is statistically different from zero 0.05 levels. 
 
Industry                       Firm Mean          Industry Median                Cross-Sectional       Cross-Sectional-Tobit 
Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above  
Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 
1  0.08 -0.820 -0.14 -0.26* -0.480 -0.17  0.09 -0.31 
2  0.14 -0.28 -0.44* -0.16* -0.17* -0.18*  0.90 -0.72 
4 -0.16 -0.24* -0.83* -0.83* -0.56 -0.53  0.76 -0.45* 
6 -0.11 -0.12 -0.24* -0.11* -0.86 -0.13*  0.16 -0.14* 
7  0.10 -0.24* -0.11* -0.93* -0.75 -0.63* -0.33* -0.84* 
8 -0.19 -0.44 -0.89* -0.95* -0.61* -0.10* -0.93* -0.07* 
9 -0.58 -0.10 -0.13* -0.16* -0.95* -0.83*  0.18* -0.07* 
10 -0.18 -0.15 -0.42* -0.63* -0.36* -0.32  0.41 -0.41* 
11 -0.13 -0.75* -0.07 -0.41* -0.41* -0.34* -0.99*  0.13* 
12 -0.95* -0.65* -0.31* -0.37* -0.13 -0.27*  0.03 -0.05 
13 -0.57* -0.53* -0.30* -0.57* -0.57 -0.14* -0.25* -0.25* 
14 -0.11* -0.28* -0.38* -0.24* -0.16* -0.23* -0.43* -0.15* 
15 -0.02  0.20 -0.17*  0.06 -0.10  0.38 -0.33* -0.83 
16  0.07 -0.15* -0.25* -0.10 -0.05 -0.08 -0.27* -0.05 
17  0.00 -0.18 -0.83* -0.47* -0.75* -0.47*  0.11* -0.41* 
18  0.06  0.10 -0.11 -0.15* -0.13 -0.26* -0.28* -0.23* 
19 -0.69* -0.92* -0.23 -0.63* -0.42* -0.49* -0.13 -0.19 
20 -0.05 -0.24* -0.18 -0.29* -0.27* -0.12 -0.12 -0.31* 
21 -0.46* -1.15* -0.52* -0.28 -0.39* -0.21 -0.06 -0.22 
22 -0.13 -0.70 -0.11* -0.21* -0.13* -0.12*  0.10 -0.02* 
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Table 1.10- continued 
 
Industry       Firm Mean             Industry Median         Cross-Sectional      Cross-Sectional-Tobit 
Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above 
 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 
23  0.17*  0.16* -0.38* -0.89* -0.37* -0.37  0.14* -0.30 
24 -0.30*  0.15 -0.48* -0.18* -0.46* -0.26*  0.23 -0.41* 
25 -0.70 -0.38* -0.12* -0.33*  0.18 -0.31 -0.15 -0.49 
27  0.19 -0.55* -0.41* -0.25* -0.05 -0.32* -0.32*  0.03 
28 -0.19* -0.04 -0.11* -0.10* -0.17* -0.19*  0.14 -0.20* 
30 -0.57* -0.45* -0.44* -0.21* -0.07 -0.14*  0.12* -0.13* 
31  0.00 -0.48 -0.11* -0.47 -0.69* -0.88* -0.13* -0.99* 
32 -0.49* -0.63* -0.10* -0.59* -0.05* -0.57* -0.04* -0.58* 
33 -0.61* -0.30 -0.07 -0.14 -0.06 -0.18 -0.17*  0.32* 
34 -0.05  0.50 -0.01 -0.03  0.08 -0.30 -0.24  0.08 
35 -0.17* -0.28* -0.13 -0.38 -0.60 -0.16 -0.39 -0.01 
36 -0.59 -0.08* -0.10* -0.19* -0.06* -0.62  0.60 -0.09* 
37 -0.11 -0.10 -0.19* -0.06 -0.21* -0.09  0.07 -0.03 
38 -0.06* -0.13* -0.17* -0.12* -0.12* -0.10*  0.26* -0.09* 
39  0.19  0.12 -0.11*  0.09 -0.10* -0.71* -0.14 -0.49 
40 -0.09*  0.04 -0.14* -0.42* -0.15* -0.83*  0.11* -0.87* 
41 -0.54* -0.29* -0.62* -0.43* -0.67*  0.47*  0.78* -0.11 
42 -0.23 -0.18 -0.12* -0.10* -0.48 -0.08* -0.21 -0.09* 
43 -0.10* - 0.50* -0.38* -0.61* -0.20 -0.08  0.42 -0.28* 
48 -0.18   0.82 -0.74 -0.77 -0.12 -0.41  0.39*  0.04 
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Table 1.11-Kruskal-Wallis Pairwise Comparisons Test - Firm Value 
 
For each industry – year firms are classified into two categories: firms above their target leverage proxy and firms below their 
target leverage proxy. The absolute deviation from the target (|the proxy target minus the actual leverage ratio|) for each 
category is calculated. For each category, firms are further divided into two sets. The first set contains those firms with a 
deviation from the target of less than the 50th percentile of the deviation distribution (Q1); the second set contains those firms 
with a deviation from the target of more than the 50th percentile of the deviation distribution (Q2). To test if there are 
significant differences in the firm market value, as it stands closer relative to further away from their target. The Kruskal-
Wallis pairwise comparisons test jointly testing for the differences in the mean/ median market value standardized by total 
assets among the different sets at a 5% level of significance. Each cell reports the differences in the mean rank. * indicate that 
difference in the location parameters is statistically different from zero at 0.05 levels. 
 
Industry Firm Mean Industry Median Cross-Sectional Cross-Sectional-Tobit 
Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above 
 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 
1  -4  -15* -22  -14 -27*   4   1  -23 
2   16  -9 -234*  -60* -165*  -70* -33  -143* 
4   7  -15 -25*  -14 -12  -5  -27*  -11 
6  -62*  -29* -107*  -16 -15   5  -97*  -3 
7  -12  -14 -94*   19 -96*  -9  -142*  -54 
8   12  -17 -115*  -63* -62*  -60*  -110*  -63* 
9  -60*  -79* -105*  -157* -139*  -93*  -68  -203* 
10   14  -11 -74*  -74* -114*  -63*  -57  -114* 
11  -33* - 19 -27 -161* -78*  -35  -149   77* 
12  -75* - 44* -121*  -121* -182*  -86*  -144*  -161* 
13  -135*  -71* -254*  -190* -218*  -85*  -171*  -144* 
14  -51*  -69* -254*  -179* -184*  -156*  -155*  -200* 
15  -2   34 -57*   56* -11   29  -74   6 
16 - 2  -16 -94*  -44* -19  -25  -42*  -10 
17  -22  -53* -277*  -54 -218*  -109*  -87*  -247 
18  -10  -28 -80*  -94* -63*  -98*  -45*  -95* 
19  -60*  -37 -42  -69* -57*  -60*   12  -66* 
20   3  -14 -7  -31 -17  -14  -21  -11 
21  -82*  -142* -218*  -163* -260*  -89*  -75  -298 
22  -63*  -77* -55*  -140* -97*  -114*  -29  -138 
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Table 1.11- continued 
 
Industry Firm Mean Industry Median Cross-Sectional Cross-Sectional-Tobit 
Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above 
 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 Q2-Q1 
23   38   22  -83*  -28  -86*  -77* -74  -77 
24  -25*  -2  -52*  -45*  -48*  -31* -21  -56* 
25  -2  -11*   13  -3    1   7  0    2 
27   6  -9  -23  -35    0  -21 -36*    32 
28  -12   0  -58*  -35*  -42*  -28 -39*  -65 
30  -82*  -110  -682*  -192*  -373*  -157* -768  -194* 
31  -85*  -82*  -231*  -93*  -176*  -202* -71  -275 
32  -146*  -87*  -414*  -194*  -271*  -95* -148*  -145* 
33   3  -7  -9   49*   6   20 -79*    69 
34  -245*  -130*  -56   59  -390   26 -151  -290* 
35  -137*  -91  -206*  -194*  -451  -134* -82  -307 
36  -160*  -109*  -38  -342*  -351  -207* -223  -335* 
37  -36  -87  -141*  -121*  -188*  -74* -55*  -104* 
38  -62*  -63  -167*  -96*  -141  -80* -147*  -177* 
39   9   8  -30*  -4  -25*  -24  0  -21 
40  -83*  -36  -190*  -102*  -159  -106* -78  -197* 
41  -99*  -68  -349*  -120*  -327  -107* -241*  -352 
42  -26  -51  -230*  -122*  -165  -137* -27  -243* 
43  -51*  -51  -47   29   24   43 -61   3 
48  -13  -19  -227*  -65*  -79  -35 -309*  -76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
32
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.12-Test of Proportions- Firm Value Differences 
 
For each industry – year firms are classified into two categories: firms above their target leverage proxy and firms 
below their target leverage proxy. The absolute deviation from the target (|the proxy target minus the actual leverage 
ratio|) for each category is calculated. For each category, firms are further divided into two sets. The first set contains 
those firms with a deviation from the target of less than the 50th percentile of the deviation distribution (Q1); the second 
set contains those firms with a deviation from the target of more than the 50th percentile of the deviation distribution 
(Q2). To test if there are significant differences in the firm market value, as it stands closer relative to further away 
from their target. Tukey pairwise comparisons test and Mann-Whitney U Test comparisons test of the mean/ median 
market value standardized by total assets between Q2 and Q1 below and above the target proxy are performed. The 
proportion in each cell represents the proportions of significant tests consistent with the predictions of the trade-off 
model (Q2 < Q1) for each proxy. **  and  * indicate that the proportion of the proxy is statistically greater than 0.5 at 
0.01 and 0.05 levels. < and << Indicate that the proportion of the proxy is statistically less than the proportion of the 
industry median proxy at 0.01 and 0.05 levels. 
 
Test of Proportions 
Consistency of correlation coefficients between market value and leverage ratio 
Parametric- Tukey pairwise comparisons test Nonparametric- Kruskal-Wallis pairwise comparisons test Proxy  Below Above Both Below Above Both 
Firm Mean 0.38 0.50 0.28<< 0.50 0.48 0.30<< 
Industry Median 0.78** 0.75** 0.63 0.83** 0.73** 0.65 
Cross-Sectional 0.58* 0.58* 0.38<< 0.58* 0.65** 0.50< 
Cross-Sectional-Tobin 0.30 0.58* 0.18<< 0.50 0.53 0.25<< 
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       An attention-grabbing observation from those tests emerges; firms moving toward the target 
from above gain different value relative to firms moving toward the target from below. For 
example, the industry group number four could gain in value of 0.63 if it is above the target and 
move toward it. On the other hand, the gain in value is 0.42 if it is below the target and move 
toward it. This implies that firms above and below the target should adjust toward the target with 
different speeds since they have a different amount of value gain. For example, the partial 
adjustment model, which is commonly used for testing the trade-off model, assumes that firms 
above and below the target leverage have the same speed of adjustment. The implication of my 
result indicates that it is necessary to control for the firm location relative to the target leverage 
when testing the trade off model using the partial adjustment model. Recently, Byoun and Rhim 
(2002) find evidence that firms have different speed of adjustment toward the target leverage 
when they are above as opposed to when they are below their target leverage.13 
 
1. 6. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
 
        The leverage target hypothesis yields the mean-reverting property of actual leverage. 
Intuitively, if firms have an optimal leverage ratio and have tendency to adjust toward it, it is 
more likely to find firms clustering closer to that target. The main prediction of the trade-off 
model is that firms closer to their optimal leverage will maximize their value. Thus, the cluster 
with the highest market value should have the smallest deviation from the target. 
 
        We utilized K-Means Cluster Analysis to check the robustness of my previous results. This 
procedure attempts to identify relatively homogeneous groups of cases based on selected 
characteristics. For each industry-year, K-means clustering is performed using the debt ratio to 
classify firms into four clusters. Each cluster contains a group of firms that have the closest 
leverage ratio to each other (the minimum distance) and the farthest distance from the other three 
groups. In total, there are 3,200 clusters across all industries and years. I calculate the average 
firm value and the average debt ratio for each industry-year-cluster. For each industry-year, I 
keep the cluster with the highest average firm value, leaving us with 800 clusters out of the 
3,200. For each one of these clusters, the deviation of the cluster leverage from each target proxy 
is calculated and the target proxy with the closest distance from the cluster leverage is identified. 
The results show that 60.1% of the clusters that have the maximum average firm value are 
closest to the industry median leverage, 11.9% are closest to the firm mean leverage, 20% are 
closest to the cross-sectional leverage and 8% are closest to the Tobit cross-sectional leverage. 
Overall, the results confirm the robustness of my findings that is the industry median leverage as 
proxy is superior to the other proxies.  
                                                 
13 Byoun and Rhim (2002) use the firm mean as proxy for the target leverage. 
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1.7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
        The evaluation of the consistency of the target leverage proxies with the behavior of the true 
optimal leverage reveals that the industry median is a superior proxy to the alternative proxies 
used in the literature for the target leverage. This result implies that there is some degree of bias 
against the trade-off model when other than the industry median is used as proxy for the target 
leverage. 
 
        Numerous empirical studies support my finding. Schwarz and Aronson (1967), Scott and 
Martin (1975), Ferri and Jones (1979), Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) observe significant 
industry effects in debt ratios. Different industries found to develop an optimal financial structure 
conditioned by the intensity of their operational risks and by the characteristics of the industry 
asset structure. The stylized facts concerning industry characteristics and capital structure shows 
that firms within the same industry are more similar than those in different industries and that 
industries tend to retain their relative leverage ratio ranking over time (Bowen, Daly, and Huber 
(1982)). 
 
        Marsh (1982) finds that firms are most likely to issue debt (equity) when they expect that 
other firms will issue debt (equity). Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2002) find that 
industry debt ratio is an important determinant of the debt equity choice, and Welch (2002) 
shows that the industry debt ratio appears to be the best predictor of a firm’s debt ratio. 
 
        In Scott and Johnson’s (1982) survey of chief financial officers of the Fortune 1000 
corporations, over 50% of the CFOs stated that industry-wide ratios have an important influence 
on their financing decision. Other surveys of Chief Financial Officer’s show that some managers 
claim to pursue a target adjustment model while others claim to follow alternative financing 
models ((Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989), Kamath (1997)). Graham and Harvey (2001) find that 
most firms claim to have target leverage but achieving the target is not of primary importance. 
 
        The investor’s behavioral literature provides a theoretical explanation of this result as well. 
In his famous book, “The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money”, Keynes (1936) 
argues that the behavior of investors in financial markets is like newspaper beauty contests in 
which readers were asked to choose the six prettiest faces from 100 photographs. The winner 
was the person whose preferences were closest to the average preferences of all participants. 
Keynes reasoned that contest participants, like financial investors, do not choose faces that they 
personally find the most attractive, but instead are guided by their expectations of other people’s 
expectations. With a large number of investors trying to guess the optimal capital structure for a 
particular firm, the question is not what you think is the optimal. Nor is the question what you 
believe other investors think of as optimal. You are trying to guess what the other investors are 
guessing. Alternatively, as Keynes writes: "We devote our intelligence to anticipating what 
average opinion expects the average opinion to be" (Keynes, 1936). Since each investor’s guess 
about the optimal debt ratio is bounded by the minimum and maximum debt ratio of the industry, 
the average opinion will be concentrated around the industry mean or median. 
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        Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks (1991) use behavioral explanations to explain people’s 
buying decisions in mutual fund markets. They also describe the so-called “herd migration 
behavior,” that may explain the debt-equity ratios of firms. They note that animals are aware of 
the safety of traveling in groups. According to Patel et al., “financial players also may migrate in 
herds”. Firms should balance the gains of reaching the optimal capital structure against the costs 
of “leaving the herd,” that is, of getting too far out of line with the industry. Even though a firm 
may benefit by moving its debt ratio towards its optimum, and this optimum may be both firm 
specific and time varying, the firm may also incur a cost or penalty from the market because it 
deviates from the herd. For example, bankers often will not lend to borrowers whose debt ratio is 
higher than the industry average debt ratio.  
 
        The results hold even within the information asymmetry framework. Within this 
framework, managers are able to determine the optimal debt ratio that will maximize the firm 
value from their own perspective. Investors who are less informed relative to the manager will 
perceive the optimal capital structure to be the industry debt ratio. Under this assumption, the 
market reaction (investors) to debt ratio increases and decreases will depend on the relative 
position of the firm leverage ratio, compared to its peers in the industry. The manager will find 
that moving toward the optimal debt ratio, as the investors perceive it, will increase the firm 
value. 
 
        Another supporting evidence to my findings comes from the market reaction to pure capital 
structure changes. Hull (1999) studies the market reaction to debt equity swaps and equity issue 
with the sole purpose to reduce debt. Using the industry leverage median as proxy for the target 
leverage, he finds a supporting evidence of the target leverage hypothesis. The market reaction is 
less negative for firms that reduce their debt and move toward their target leverage relative to the 
firms that reduce their debt and move away from their target leverage.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE TRADE-OFF THEORY AND THE PECKING ORDER THEORY: ARE THEY 
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE? 
 
Introduction 
 
         The growing literature of evaluating the efficiency of the trade-off theory versus the 
pecking order theory has produced mixed evidence. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find more 
supportive evidence for the pecking order theory versus the trade-off theory. Hovakimian, Opler, 
and Titman (2001) examine the firms’ debt-equity issuance (reduction) choice and find that 
deviation from the target leverage plays a more significant role in the repurchase decision than in 
the issuance decision of securities. Among their conclusions, is that their results are consistent 
with the pecking order model in the short-run and reversion to the target leverage in the long-run. 
Byoun and Rhim (2002) find that both of the theories explain significant variations in the firms’ 
total debt. Fama and French (2002) find evidence in favor and against both of the theories. Frank 
and Goyal (2003) find evidence inconsistent with the pecking order theory especially for small 
firms. Lemmon and Zender (2002) find no supporting evidence for the trade-off theory, yet the 
costs of adverse selection were not able to explain the pecking order financing behavior that they 
documented. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) find that the deviation from the target capital structure 
has a significant role in the firm choice of which type of security to issue or repurchase. In 
addition, their findings support the Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) results that firms 
adjust toward the target leverage more actively than suggested by Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999). Hovakimian (2003) examines the role of the target leverage in security issues and 
repurchases, and finds that debt reduction is initiated to reduce the deviation from target capital 
structure whereas debt issue, equity issue, and equity repurchase are not driven by this 
motivation.  
 
           On one hand, the pecking order theory predicts that firms with low and moderate leverage 
will issue debt to finance their deficit whereas firms with a high leverage( those who exhausted 
their debt capacity) will issue equity. On the other hand, the trade-off theory suggests that firms 
in a financing deficit and below their optimal target leverage (low leverage) will issue debt to 
adjust toward their optimal leverage and they will issue equity if they are above their optimal 
leverage (high leverage). Thus, what we empirically capture as rate of adjustment toward the 
target leverage could be due to the pecking order behavior, whereas what we empirically capture 
as the ability of the financing deficit to explain the changes in debt could be due to the trade-off 
behavior.  
 
          This study complements the previous studies on the pecking order theory and the trade-off 
theory. The main purpose of this study is to investigate three issues that are not considered in the 
previous studies. The adequacy of the specification and the assumptions of the models used in 
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testing the trade-off and the pecking order theory. The second issue examined in this study is the 
validity to putting the pecking order and the trade-off theories in a horse race. The final issue 
examined in this study is the factors driving firms to issue (repurchase) debt or equity or 
combination of both and simultaneously the factors affecting the size of issue (repurchase) .14 
 
          Previous empirical works on the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory that use the 
partial adjustment model and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) model (the pecking order model 
hereafter) have two implicit assumptions.15 The first assumption is the symmetric behavior 
assumption. Under the partial adjustment model, firms adjust toward their leverage target with 
the same rate regardless if they are above or below the target leverage. This implies that the cost 
and benefit of being above the target leverage is identical to the one of being below the target. 
However, the trade-off theory does not predict such a behavior.   
 
          Under the pecking order model, a symmetric behavior of firms in a financing deficit 
(shortage of internal sources of funds to finance their new investment) or a financing surplus 
(excess of internal sources of funds over their new investment) is predicted (see Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers, 1999). In other words, firms in financial deficit use debt to finance their new 
investment whereas firms in financing surplus end up paying down debt rather than repurchasing 
equity.  
 
          The second assumption is the homogeneous coefficient assumption. The partial adjustment 
model employed to examine the trade-off theory assumes that firms within the same industry and 
across industries adjust toward their target capital structure with the same rate. Such an 
assumption ignores the fact that there are significant differences in the characteristics of firms 
within the same industry and across industries that affect the rate of adjustment. The non-time-
varying coefficient assumption under the pecking order model assumes that firms within the 
same industry and across industries finance their external financing needs with the same 
proportion of debt over time, ignoring the degree of information asymmetry, firm’s debt 
capacity, equity market condition and other firms’ characteristics which significantly affect the 
amount of debt that a firm can issue.  
 
           Theoretically, the trade-off theory is more adaptable since it is able to accommodate the 
determinants of debt financing suggested by the pecking order theory. The pecking order theory 
implies that adverse selection costs and debt capacity are supposed to be the only relevant factors 
that explain the debt financing and these factors overwhelm the factors that determine the 
optimal leverage in the trade-off theory (Myers (1984)). I investigate the possibility that firms do 
not view the pecking order and the trade-off theory as mutually exclusive. It is also important to 
understand the factors that affect both the rate of adjustment and the proportion of debt financing 
(reduction) relative to the financing deficit (surplus) in the context of both of the theories.  
                                                 
14 The combination issues in earlier studies either excluded (Marsh (1982) and Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), 
Hovakimian (2003)) or reclassified as debt or equity issues using some criteria (Mackie-Mason (1990)). Hovakimian, 
Hovakimian, Tehranian (2002) study the case of combined debt equity financing using probit regressions 
(combination issue vs. equity issue and combination issue vs. equity issue). Hovakimian (2003) study the determinants 
of debt vs. equity choice and debt reduction vs. equity repurchases choice. 
15  Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) model states that financing deficit-surplus suppose to explain the changes in debt. 
The model specified as: D Dt=a0+ a1 Fin + e. The partial adjustment model states that deviation from the target 
leverage suppose to explain the changes in debt. The model specified as: D Dt=a0+ a1 (Dt*-Dt-1) + e. 
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          Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) conclude that the choice of the form of financing 
should be examined separately from the choice of the size of financing. Using a two stage 
Bivariate Probit – Tobit model, I examine simultaneously the factors affecting the firms’ choice 
of the form of financing (repurchase) and the size of issue (repurchase) . Unlike the previous 
empirical work on the debt-equity issuance (repurchase) choice, in this study the firms’ choice of 
the form of financing (repurchase) is conditional on the firms external funds needs (financing 
surplus). In addition, unlike the previous empirical work on the pecking order and the trade-off 
theory, which overlooked the role of the short-term debt, this study considers the role of the 
short-term debt under both the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory.16  
 
           The specification problems of the static model employed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) are illustrates the failure of the model in providing evidence in favor of the pecking order 
theory. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) fundamental assumption of a symmetrical behavior is 
rejected across all industries. Debt reduction closely tracks the financing surplus, while the 
equity issues closely tracks the financing deficit. This study documents that the better fit of the 
financing surplus group rather than the financing deficit group is the reason for the good fit of 
their model, as measured by R-square. In addition, the bias in the financing deficit coefficient 
due to the equity issues as illustrated by Chirinko and Singha (2000), is not the only source of 
bias in the model’s coefficients. The evidence that some firms substitute debt for equity, while 
they are in financing deficit, leads to a negative bias in the financing deficit coefficient. Whereas 
for firms that substitute equity for debt, the financing deficit coefficient suffer from a positive 
bias.   
 
          Firms that use equity or more equity (as proportion of the financing deficit) financing are 
those which have higher market to book ratio, smaller size, lower profitability, lower tangible 
assets, lower marginal tax rate, greater net loss carry forward, higher probability of bankruptcy, 
higher information asymmetry problem, and higher stock prices run up.17 Firms that use their 
financing surplus to repurchases debt or more debt (as proportion of the financing surplus) 
repurchase are those which have, on average, higher market to book ratio, greater non-debt tax 
shields, higher probability of bankruptcy, higher information asymmetry problem, and higher 
stock prices run up.18 
 
          The modified pecking order model, which allows the financing coefficient to vary with the 
firms characteristics, provides empirical evidence that not only the pecking order theory’s factors 
affect the financing deficit-surplus coefficient, but also the trade-off theory factors play a 
significant role in determining the proportion of debt to be issued or repurchased. In addition, the 
market-timing hypothesis has a significant impact on the proportion of debt to be issued or 
repurchased. 
 
                                                 
16 Barclay and Smith (1995) document positive relation between debt maturity and firm size. Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1994) find that net short-term debt issues by small firms are less sensitive to the business cycle. 
17 More equity finance indicates firms that issue both debt and equity, where equity financing represents between 
50% and 100% of their financing deficit. 
18 More debt repurchases indicates firms that repurchases both debt and equity, where debt reduction represents 
between 50% and 100% of the financing surplus. 
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          The symmetrical rate of adjustment assumption is rejected across all industries; firms tend 
to adjust faster toward the target leverage when they are above the target relative when they are 
below the target leverage. This study documents evidence consistent with the notion that firms 
adjust toward the target on the long-run, while the pecking order factors and the market-timing 
hypothesis contribute to the short-run deviation from the target leverage. Firms that overshoot 
their target leverage from below are those characterized by, low growth options, higher sales, 
higher tangible assets, higher marginal tax rate, lower net loss carry forward, lower R&D, less 
financial distress, higher information asymmetry, higher financing deficit relative to their assets 
and higher stock prices decline. Firms that are below the target leverage and move away from 
their target are those characterize by smaller size, lower sales, high growth options, lower 
tangible assets, lower marginal tax rate, higher net loss carry forward, higher R&D, higher stock 
price run up, lower information asymmetry, more financial distress and lower deficit. 
 
          For the firms group above their target leverage, firms with smaller size, lower sales, high 
growth options, lower tangible assets, lower marginal tax rate, higher R&D, higher information 
asymmetry, more financial distress, higher stock price run up and higher financing surplus are 
those which overshoot their target. Firms that move away from their target are the firms that 
have a larger size, low growth options, high tangible assets, high financing deficit, and a decline 
in their stock prices.  
 
         The modified partial adjustment model, which allow the rate of adjustment to vary with the 
firms characteristics, suggests that the pecking order factors and the market-timing hypothesis 
play a significant role in accelerating or slowing the rate of adjustment toward the target 
leverage. Higher information asymmetry accelerate (slow) the rate of adjustment toward the 
target leverage for firm that adjust from below (above), while higher stock prices run up slow 
(accelerate) the rate of adjustment toward the target leverage for firm that adjust from below 
(above).  
 
          The examination of the factors that affect the choice of financing (repurchasing) form and 
the size of issue (repurchase) also support the notion that the trade-off and the pecking order 
theory are not mutually exclusive. The market to book ratio is negatively (positively) related to 
both the probability of issuing debt (equity) and the size of issue. The tangible assets are 
positively related to both the probability of issuing debt and the size of issue and negatively 
related to the likelihood of issuing equity. The financing deficit has a positive impact on the 
likelihood of issuing debt or equity, also it has a positive impact on the size of both the equity 
and the debt issues for firms that issue a combination of debt and equity, but it has a negative 
impact on the pure debt and equity issues. This suggests that firms with a large financing deficit 
do not tend to substitute debt for equity or equity for debt.  
          The two-stage model finds evidence in support of the trade-off theory; firms that are better 
off issuing equity (ending closer to the target leverage by issuing equity) are most likely to issue 
equity instead of debt. The size of debt (equity) issue is positively (negatively) related to the 
actual deviation from the target leverage, suggesting that debt (equity) issue size is an increasing 
(decreasing) function of the distance from the target leverage for firms below their target 
leverage and a decreasing (increasing) function for firms above their target leverage. In addition, 
the higher the marginal tax rates the higher the likelihood of issuing debt rather than equity. 
Higher marginal tax rate discourages firms that issue pure equity from repurchasing debt, and 
  
40
encourages firms that issue pure debt to repurchase equity. The net loss carry forward 
encourages firms to substitute debt for equity and discourages firms from substitute equity for 
debt. This suggests that firms suffering from a net loss carry forward, attempt to reduce their 
interest payment obligation by reducing the debt levels through equity issue. 
 
        The market-timing hypothesis finds a strong support for both the choice and the size of the 
financing form. Stock price run up increases (decreases) the likelihood of issuing (repurchasing) 
equity, while the size of equity issue (repurchase) relative to the financing deficit (surplus) is an 
increasing (decreasing) function of the stock prices run up. Higher stock prices increase the 
likelihood of debt repurchases and encourage firms to repurchase more debt and to substitute 
debt for equity. 
 
2.1. THE PECKING ORDER THEORY 
 
          The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984)) and its extensions 
(Lucas and McDonald (1990)) are based on the idea of asymmetric information between 
managers and investors. Managers know more about the true value of the firm and the firm’s 
riskiness than less informed outside investors. If the information asymmetry results in an 
underpricing of the firm’s equity and the firm is required to finance a new project by issuing 
equity, the underpricing may be so severe that new investors capture most of the net present 
value (NPV) of the project, resulting in a net loss to existing shareholders. Thus, managers who 
work in the best interest of the current shareholders will reject the project. To avoid the 
underinvestment problem, managers will seek to finance the new project using a security that is 
not undervalued by the market, such as internal funds or riskless debt. Therefore, this affects the 
choice between internal and external financing. The pecking order theory is able to explain why 
firms tend to depend on internal sources of funds and prefer debt to equity if external financing is 
required. Thus, a firm’s leverage is not driven by the trade-off theory, but it is simply the 
cumulative results of the firm’s attempts to mitigate information asymmetry. 
 
          The pecking order theory predicts that the financing deficit is the main determinant of debt 
issue and firms will use external financing only if internal funds are not sufficient to finance the 
firm’s growth opportunities. 
 
 If external funds are needed, the pecking order theory predicts that: 
1. Firms will issue the safest security it can, given that the cost of financial distress is ignored, 
where safe security is defined as security not affected by revelation of managers’ inside 
information (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). This implies that firms will first issue debt and 
then equity. 
2. Firms will issue equity when the cost of financial distress is significantly high and the degree of 
underpricing is not too low. 
 
         This prediction suggests that firms with moderate debt levels and lower costs of financial 
distress use more debt financing relative to equity financing. On the other hand, firms with high 
debt ratios use more equity financing relative to debt financing. As Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) point out, the behavior of firms in a financing deficit that subsequently have a financing 
surplus is supposed to be symmetric. In other words, firms that use debt to finance their growth 
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opportunities when they are in a financing deficit will reduce debt when they have a financing 
surplus rather than carry out equity repurchases. This leads to a negative relation between 
leverage and firm profitability (earnings or free cash flows) under the pecking order hypothesis. 
The pecking order theory fundamentally relies upon information asymmetry and adverse 
selection costs, yet there is no reason to believe that the distribution of the information 
asymmetry is uniformly distributed across time (Goswami, Neo, and Rebelled (1995). However, 
Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993), Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) and Eisfeldt (2001) argue that 
that adverse selection cost varies counter-cyclically. Therefore, the predictions of the pecking 
order theory strongly depend upon the existence of information asymmetry and the associated 
adverse selection costs.  
 
2.2. THE PECKING ORDER MODEL 
 
          Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) as well as the subsequent empirical work that use their 
model, define financing deficit-surplus as.19  
ttttttt ELTDCWCIDivFin D+D=-D++=
±    (1) 
Fint    Financing deficit-surplus. 
Divt   Cash dividends at time t. 
 
I t           Net investment at time t. 
 
tWCD
  
Net increase in working capital at time t. 
 
Ct    Cash flow after interest and taxes at time t. 
tLTDD
   
Net debt issued at time t (long-term debt issuance – long-term debt reduction)  
 
tED     Net equity issued in time t. 
Where a positive value of Fint indicates a financing deficit and a negative one indicates financing 
surplus. In contrast to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Frank and Goyal (2003) find that the 
current portion of long-term debt does not belong to the definition of financing deficit-surplus. 
 
          The financing deficit-surplus as it is defined in equation (1) is concerned with modeling 
the long-term debt financing since the short-term debt is included in the working capital changes. 
Since the pecking order theory predicts that firms will issue securities in order of their sensitivity 
to the information asymmetry problem, firms expect to use short-term debt, long-term debt, and 
equity as a last resort. This implies that short-term debt should be exhausted before firms issue 
long-term debt. Thus, this study is concerned with modeling both long-term and short-term debt 
financing.  
 
Using the balance sheet, we can rewrite it as: 
 
                                                 
19 For example, Frank and Goyal (2003), Lemmon and Zender (2002), Nuri and Archer (2001), and Byoun and Rhim 
(2002). 
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Current assets Current liability  
 Debt 
Net Capital Stock             Short-Term 
debt             Long-Term 
Debt  Total Equity  
             Net Equity  
             Retained 
Earnings Net Assets Net As ets 
 
Rearranging the balance sheet items leads to: 
+(Current assets- Current liability) + Debt (Short-term+ Long-term) 
+Net Capital Stock (A) + Equity 
 + Retained Earnings 
Net Assets  Net Assets  
tttt WCAREEQD +=++  
 
The sources and uses identity at time t is written as: 
tttttt WCAREEQSTDLTD D+D=D+D+D+D                        (2) 
ttttttt FinREWCAEQSTDLTD =D-D+D=D+D+D             (3) 
D  The change in a variable from time t-1 to t. 
LTDt Long-Term debt. 
STDt Short-Term debt. 
tA  Net assets (Investment). 
tD  Total debt (long-term + short-term debt). 
tEQ  Net Equity. 
tWC  Working capital (excluding short-term debt). 
tRE  Retained earning. 
Fint Financing deficit-surplus. 
  
         The behavioral equation (3) states that the total financing of investment can be met by 
internal funds or / and debt or / and   equity, allowing for the substitutability between debt and 
equity or between short-term and long-term debt. In addition, the financing surplus can be used 
to reduce debt, equity, or both. 
 
          The pecking order theory predicts that, debt typically grows when investment exceeds 
internal funds and falls when investment is less than internal funds. So the managers’ problem in 
each period is to decide which changes they will make in each financing resources, given the size 
of their financing deficit-surplus and the market conditions. The financing deficit-surplus in 
equation (3) is equivalent to the previous studies, except that I am modeling long-term and short-
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term financing, and therefore the changes in the short-term debt are excluded from the financing 
deficit-surplus variable.  
 
The primary model used by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)  
ttt FinD eaa ++=D 10                     (4) 
Splitting the total debt financing to long-term debt and short-term debt yields: 
ttt FinLTD ndd ++=D 10                 (5) 
ttt FinSTD xll ++=D 10                  (6) 
Where 
000 ald =+      ,   111 ald =+           (7) 
tt xn ,  Error terms.  
Given the balance sheet constraint, the equity equation is determined by  
ttt FinEQ hbb ++=D 10                    (8) 
tt he ,  Error terms. 
 
          The simplest form of the pecking order theory predicts that 0a  is not different from zero 
and 1a  is close to one. This implies that 1b  will be close to zero, and given the balance sheet 
constraint the following will hold;  
000 =+ ba       and  111 =+ ba       (9) 
 
           Chirinko and Singha (2000) illustrate how Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) model 
generates misleading inferences when evaluating the patterns of external financing and conclude 
that alternative tests are needed to discriminate among the competing hypotheses of the trade-off 
model and the pecking order model. The main critiques of the model are:  
1. It is not be useful for testing the pecking order model at high leverage ratios when the debt 
capacity is very exhausted. 
2. Equity issues could drive a negative bias in the financing coefficient. 
3. The test based on their model is a joint hypothesis of ordering and proportions. 
4. In addition, they show that firms that have an optimal capital structure and use their financing 
deficit-surplus to adjust toward the target will produce high coefficient of the pecking order 
model, leading to incorrect inference that this financing patterns is consistent with the 
pecking order model.  
All recent empirical work have ignored Chirinko and Singha (2000) critique of the failure of the 
model to test the pecking order theory and have drawn conclusions against or in favor of the 
pecking order theory using this model.  
 
2.2.1. Data and Sample Selection 
 
          The initial sample consists of all firms on the Compustat database for the period 1980-
2001. As in previous studies, financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), regulated utilities (SIC 4900-
4999) and non-classifiable establishments (9900-9999) are excluded. To enter the sample, 
financial data must be available for all the of following variables: total assets, long-term debt, 
short-term debt, retained earnings, book value of equity, market value of equity, depreciation, 
  
44
investments tax credits, net loss carry forward, R&D, advertising expenses, working capital 
items, net sales, tangible assets, earnings before interest and taxes, daily stock prices on the 
CRSP data base, and the marginal tax rates.20 Firms that have negative debt or zero total assets in 
any given year are excluded from the analysis. The financing deficit-surplus is calculated from 
the balance sheet using equation 3. Table 2.1 shows the number of observations, annual averages 
of the ratios of financing deficit-surplus to assets, net debt issued to assets, and net equity issued 
to assets. Applying the above criteria, the final sample has 89,591 firm-year observations.  
 
          Figure 2.1 shows the roles of net debt, net equity, and financing deficit-surplus relative to 
the total assets, whereas figure 2.2 shows the roles debt issue (repurchase), equity issue 
(repurchase) and the financing deficit (surplus) relative to total assets for the 1981-2001 period.  
 
Fig 2.1 shows that net equity issuance track the financing deficit- surplus more closely then debt. 
Moreover, in the early 1990s firms, on average, issue net equity more than their financing deficit, 
which suggests that firms substitute debt for equity.21 
 
Fig. 2.1 shows that my data closely represents Frank and Goyal (2003) data for the same period, 
(see Frank and Goyal (2003) ,figure 1 page 230), even though that I am using the balance sheet 
to construct the data, whereas they use the cash statement by sources and use of funds.22 On the 
other hand, Fig. 2.2 shows that debt reduction tracks the financing surplus much more closely 
than the equity repurchase. While, net equity issuance tracks the financing deficit much more 
closely than the net debt issuance during the 1990s relative to the 1980s. 
 
2.3. THE SYMMETRICAL BEHAVIOR ASSUMPTION 
 
          As Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999) point out, the symmetric behavior of firms in 
financing deficit and financing surplus is supposed to be observed. In other words, firms in 
financing deficit use debt to finance their investments and reduce debt, rather then repurchase 
equity, when they are in financing surplus. Thus, the sign of the independent variable (Fint) does 
not matter. To examine the validity of the symmetric behavior assumption under the pecking 
order model, a spline regression model is employed to test the zero difference of the financing 
coefficient when firms are in financing deficit or surplus. The model controls for shifts in the 
slope and shifts in the intercept as following: 
 
tttt DFinFinDLTD zbbbb ++++=D 132110   (10) 
tttt DFinFinDSTD tllll ++++=D 132110    (11) 
 
 
                                                 
20 The marginal tax rates are the simulated marginal tax rates (Graham (1996a, 1996b)) for the 1980-2001 period. John 
Graham kindly made this data available for academic uses. 
21 Frank and Goyal (2003) who did not control for the financing deficit and financing surplus, find that equity issuance 
track the financing deficit-surplus more closely than debt for 1971-1998 period. 
22 The use of the balance sheet to construct the data avoid the problem generated by the major change in standard 
forms of reporting corporate cash flows in 1988. Moreover, using the balance sheet to construct the data and applying 
the criteria of the availability of the financial data items yield significantly higher number of observations comparing 
to the use of the cash statements of sources and use of funds. 
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Table 2.1- Sample Distribution across Years  
 
The sample period is 1980-2001. Financial firms, regulated utilities, and non-classifiable 
establishments are excluded. N indicates the number of observation in each year. The 
ratios of financing deficit-surplus to assets, net debt issued to assets, and net equity 
issued to assets for each year is reported. The financing deficit-surplus is the sum of 
investment and changes in working capital (excluding short-term debt) minus cash flow 
after interest, taxes, and dividends. Net debt issued includes long-term debt and short-
term debt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year N 
Financing 
deficit to 
assets 
Net debt 
issued to 
assets 
Net equity issued 
to assets 
1980 3058 0.05 0.02 0.03 
1981 3231 0.06 0.03 0.04 
1982 3192 0.04 0.02 0.02 
1983 3390 0.08 0.01 0.07 
1984 3460 0.06 0.03 0.03 
1985 3425 0.06 0.02 0.03 
1986 3517 0.08 0.03 0.05 
1987 3614 0.07 0.02 0.04 
1988 3531 0.05 0.03 0.02 
1989 3424 0.06 0.02 0.03 
1990 3437 0.03 0.00 0.03 
1991 3557 0.05 -0.02 0.07 
1992 3871 0.07 -0.01 0.08 
1993 4332 0.11 0.00 0.11 
1994 4646 0.11 0.02 0.08 
1995 5031 0.13 0.03 0.11 
1996 5559 0.17 0.02 0.15 
1997 5538 0.13 0.03 0.10 
1998 5267 0.10 0.04 0.05 
1999 5074 0.11 0.03 0.09 
2000 4953 0.15 0.00 0.14 
2001 4484 0.08 -0.02 0.09 
Total  89591 0.09 0.02 0.07 
  
46
 
 
To control for the non-homogeneity of the firms’ characteristics across industries and the 
temporal distribution of informational asymmetry, Fama and French industry classification is 
used to classify industries into nine groups.23 For example, firms in industries that exhibit high 
cyclicality in the short-run demand are expected to have higher level of informational asymmetry 
regarding the short-run prospects. 
 
          The model (equations (10) and (11) scaled by total assets) is estimated using Fama-
MacBeth’s (1973) methodology at the industry level and across industries.24 This estimation 
method uses the average of a series of annual cross-sectional regressions as the point estimate 
and use the time series of standard errors to draw inferences.25  
 
          Table 2.2 presents the empirical results of the model where the dependent variables are the 
changes in total debt, long-term debt, and short-term debt respectively. Columns 2 to 4 show the 
estimation results of the original model (equations, 4, 5 and 6 scaled by total assets); the 
financing coefficient varies across industries and the short-term debt plays a significant role as 
source of external financing in the majority of the industries. Columns 5 to 9 present the 
estimation results of the test for the hypothesis of the symmetric behavior assumption under the 
pecking order model.  
 
          Three clear results emerge from this test; first, the symmetric behavior is significantly 
rejected at the industry level as well as across all industries. Second, firms have the tendency to 
reduce debt by a significantly higher proportion when they have financing surplus comparing to 
the proportion of debt issued when they have financing deficit. For example, for each dollar of 
the financing surplus, firms use 0.747 cents to reduce their total debt whereas for each dollar of 
the financing deficit firms’ use 0.285 cents of debt to fill their external financing needs. Finally, 
the explanatory power, as measured by adjusted R-Square, increases when control for firms in 
financing deficit or financing surplus. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23  Appendix A2 provides a details description of these groups. 
24 Frank and Goyal (2003) use Fama-MacBeth method as alternative estimation method. They find that their 
conclusions are not sensitive to the use of deferent estimation methods. 
25 As Fama and French (2002) point out, the Fama-MacBeth method overcomes the problems of the correlation of 
residuals across firms and the bias in the standard errors of the regression slops due to the correlation of residuals 
across years. In addition, the standard errors of the average slops across year are robust to heretoscedasticity. 
D  The change in a variable from time t-1 to t. 
LTDt Long-term debt. 
STDt Short-term debt. 
tFin  Financing deficit-surplus. 
D1   Indicator variable takes the value 1 if tFin <0 (Financing Surplus) and 0 otherwise  
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Figure 2.1-Financing Deficit-Surplus by Year 
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The figure plots annual averages of the ratios of financing deficit-surplus to assets, net debt issued to assets, and 
net equity issued to assets for the period between 1980 and 2001.The sample include companies on the 
Compustat database. Financial firms and regulated utilities are excluded.  
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Figure 2.2- Financing Deficit and Financing Surplus by Year 
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The figure plots annual averages of the ratios of financing deficit (surplus) to assets, debt issuance (reduction) to 
assets, and equity issuance (repurchase) to assets for the period between 1980 and 2001.The sample include 
companies on the Compustat database. Financial firms and regulated utilities are excluded.  
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Table 2.2-Tests of Pecking Order Model- Symmetrical Behavior Assumption 
 
The sample period is 1980-2001. Financial firms, regulated utilities, and non-classifiable 
establishments are excluded. Industries are classified using Fama-French industry 
classification. The dependent variable is the change in total debt, long-term debt, and short-
term debt, respectively. The independent variable is the sum of investment and changes in 
working capital (excluding short-term debt) minus cash flow after interest, taxes, and 
dividends. D1 is an indicator variable takes the value 1 if the firm has financing surplus and 
zero otherwise. Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedures use to estimate the model. The total assets 
scale all variables. ** and * indicate that the coefficient is statically different from zero at 0.01 
and 0.05 levels. 
 
Industry Group Constant Fint Adj-R2 Constant D1 Fint Fint * D1 Adj-R2 
Dependent variable: D  Total Debt 
Consumer Nondurable -0.011* 0.667** 0.636 0.018* -0.016*  0.479** 0.410** 0.695 
Consumer Durables -0.012* 0.638** 0.631 0.017* -0.019*  0.457** 0.413** 0.701 
Oil, Gas and Coal -0.018* 0.594** 0.627 0.012* -0.028*  0.458** 0.302** 0.672 
Chemicals and Allied Products -0.008 0.267* 0.260 0.032** -0.030*  0.143** 0.663** 0.402 
Manufacturing -0.013* 0.393** 0.383 0.024** -0.036**  0.235** 0.477** 0.500 
Telephones and Television -0.003 0.532** 0.577 0.021* -0.030*  0.452** 0.405* 0.630 
Wholesale & Retail -0.025* 0.521** 0.505 0.023** -0.023*  0.287** 0.580** 0.653 
Everything Else -0.027* 0.612** 0.612 0.024* -0.032*  0.344** 0.467** 0.683 
All Groups  -0.020* 0.497** 0.506 0.026** -0.038*  0.285** 0.463** 0.621 
Dependent variable: D  Long Term Debt 
Consumer Nondurable -0.007 0.488** 0.428 0.007 -0.002  0.379** 0.242* 0.470 
Consumer Durables -0.008* 0.484** 0.461 0.007 -0.010  0.393** 0.196* 0.505 
Oil, Gas and Coal -0.016 0.475** 0.412 0.008 -0.039*  0.397** 0.139** 0.459 
Chemicals and Allied Products -0.008 0.234* 0.221 0.020* -0.015*  0.154** 0.481** 0.332 
Manufacturing -0.009* 0.304** 0.281 0.014* -0.020*  0.208** 0.337** 0.358 
Telephones and Television -0.006 0.482** 0.489 0.012* -0.030*  0.440** 0.274* 0.528 
Wholesale & Retail -0.020* 0.413** 0.367 0.014* -0.011  0.247** 0.425** 0.485 
Everything Else -0.024* 0.535** 0.488 0.016* -0.020*  0.317** 0.374** 0.542 
All Groups -0.016 0.409** 0.381 0.016* -0.021*  0.257** 0.347** 0.468 
Dependent variable: D  Short Term Debt 
Consumer Nondurable -0.004 0.179* 0.146 0.011* -0.014*  0.100** 0.167* 0.196 
Consumer Durables -0.004 0.154* 0.147 0.010* -0.009*  0.064** 0.217* 0.221 
Oil, Gas and Coal -0.002 0.120* 0.119 0.004  0.010  0.061* 0.163* 0.202 
Chemicals and Allied Products  0.000 0.033 0.051 0.012* -0.015* -0.011* 0.183** 0.126 
Manufacturing -0.004 0.089* 0.072 0.010** -0.016**  0.027* 0.140** 0.113 
Telephones and Television  0.002 0.050 0.065 0.009*  0.00  0.012 0.131 0.144 
Wholesale & Retail -0.005 0.108* 0.098 0.009** -0.012*  0.040** 0.155* 0.156 
Everything Else -0.003 0.077* 0.054 0.008* -0.012*  0.026* 0.093* 0.083 
All Groups -0.003 0.088* 0.068 0.010** -0.017**  0.028* 0.116** 0.102 
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Table 2.3- Tests of Pecking Order Model- the Power of the Test 
 
The sample period is 1980-2000. Financial firms, regulated utilities, and non-classifiable 
establishments are excluded. An industry group is defined using Fama-French industry 
classification. Firms are classified in two main groups: financing deficit firms (Fin >0) and 
financing surplus firms (Fin <0). The dependent variable is the change in long-term debt 
and short-term debt, respectively. The independent variable is the sum investment, change 
in working capital (excluding short-term debt) minus cash flow after interest, taxes, and 
dividends. Fama-MacBeth procedures use to estimate the model for each financing group 
separately. The total assets scale all variables. ** and * indicate that the coefficient is 
statically different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels.  
 
    
 
 
Industry Group Constant Deficit Adj-R2 Constant Surplus Adj-R2 
Dependent variable: D  Total Debt  
Consumer Nondurable 0.018*  0.479** 0.384  0.002 0.889** 0.767 
Consumer Durables 0.017*  0.457** 0.394 -0.002 0.870** 0.751 
Oil, Gas and Coal 0.012  0.458** 0.388 -0.017 0.760** 0.736 
Chemicals and Allied Products 0.032**  0.143 0.118  0.002 0.807** 0.639 
Manufacturing 0.024**  0.235* 0.162 -0.012 0.713** 0.676 
Telephones and Television 0.021  0.452** 0.430 -0.008 0.857** 0.762 
Wholesale & Retail 0.023**  0.287* 0.210  0.000 0.866** 0.820 
Everything Else 0.024*  0.344** 0.265 -0.008 0.811** 0.761 
All Groups 0.026**  0.285* 0.215 -0.012 0.747** 0.738 
Dependent variable: D  Long Term Debt 
Consumer Nondurable 0.007  0.379** 0.253  0.006 0.622** 0.448 
Consumer Durables 0.007  0.393** 0.295 -0.003 0.589** 0.478 
Oil, Gas and Coal 0.008  0.397** 0.247 -0.031 0.536* 0.485 
Chemicals and Allied Products 0.020*  0.154 0.110  0.005 0.635** 0.482 
Manufacturing 0.014*  0.208* 0.127 -0.006 0.545** 0.462 
Telephones and Television 0.012  0.440** 0.390 -0.017 0.713* 0.566 
Wholesale & Retail 0.014*  0.247* 0.160  0.003 0.672** 0.555 
Everything Else 0.016  0.317** 0.202 -0.004 0.692** 0.591 
All Groups 0.016*  0.257* 0.164 -0.005 0.604** 0.530 
Dependent variable: D  Short Term Debt 
Consumer Nondurable 0.011*  0.100* 0.058 -0.004 0.267* 0.174 
Consumer Durables 0.010*  0.064* 0.033  0.001 0.281* 0.248 
Oil, Gas and Coal 0.004  0.061* 0.031  0.014 0.224 0.194 
Chemicals and Allied Products 0.012* -0.011* 0.019 -0.003 0.172* 0.137 
Manufacturing 0.010**  0.027* 0.011 -0.006 0.167* 0.125 
Telephones and Television 0.009  0.012 0.016  0.009 0.143 0.225 
Wholesale & Retail 0.009**  0.040* 0.017 -0.003 0.194* 0.173 
Everything Else 0.008*  0.026* 0.010 -0.004 0.119* 0.112 
All Groups 0.010**  0.028* 0.009 -0.007 0.143* 0.113 
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Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999) use the explanatory power of the model as one criterion to 
evaluate the pecking order model versus the trade-off model. To investigate if the explanatory 
power of their model is driven by a better fit of the model for firms in financing deficit or 
surplus, I split the sample into two main groups: financing deficit group and financing surplus 
group. As Table 2.3 shows the explanatory power of the model is driven by the better fit of the 
financing surplus group rather than the financing deficit.  
 
          Since the pecking order theory predicts that debt issuance supposes to track the financing 
deficit more closely. Whereas the symmetric behavior assumption implies that debt issuance and 
debt reduction, suppose to track the financing deficit (surplus) in the same manner. The above 
results work against Shyam-Sunders and Myers’ (1999) conclusion that the pecking order model 
provides superior fit of the data relative to the trade-off model. 
 
2.4. THE PROPORTIONS OF DEBT FINANCING AND THE FIRMS ATTRIBUTES 
 
         The pecking order theory implies that firms can issue only one type of security at different levels 
of debt capacity. This makes it difficult to apply the pecking order model to all firms, regardless of 
their debt capacity and attributes. Another problem with the pecking order model is that it ignores the 
factors affect the firms’ demand of debt. These factors are important because they may limit the 
demand of debt for firms with a low debt capacity. For example, managers of low debt capacity firms 
could issue equity rather than debt if they feel that equity is highly overvalued by investors. In 
addition, managers of small firms that have a low financial distress will not be able to use debt to meet 
their financing deficit due to the high floatation cost of debt. Thus, the pecking order model does not 
explain why low debt capacity firms will issue equity or why firms will issue combination of debt and 
equity in the same time or why firms substitute debt for equity or equity for debt. Moreover, the 
pecking order theory assumes that some of these financing behaviors do not exist. 
 
         Some of these questions are in the line of Chirinko and Singha (2000) critique, yet 
Chirinko and Singha (2000) overlooked these empirical questions, where they assume the 
symmetric behavior and consider the case where firms issue debt and equity in the same time 
without considering the possibility of debt-equity substitution. To address these questions, this 
study analyzes the factors that characterize the short-run financing deficit–surplus using 
univariate and multivariate analysis.  
 
2.4.1. The Modified Pecking Order Model 
 
         The pecking order theory has no explanation of why firms would issue debt to repurchase 
equity or issue equity to reduce debt. In addition, the mixed results documented in the recent 
literature suggest that the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory are not mutually 
exclusive (e.g. Fama and French (2002) and Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001)). Thus, an 
examination of the factors that affect the proportion of debt financing (reduction) within the 
context of both theories is needed. The pecking order theory implies that adverse selection costs, 
debt capacity and equity market conditions are supposed to be the only relevant factors that 
explain the financing coefficient. If these factors overwhelm the factors that determine the 
optimal leverage in the trade-off theory as Myers (1984) suggests, we suppose to find that the 
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factors related to the trade-off theory add no information in explaining the financing deficit-
surplus coefficients. 
 
         The pecking order model is modified to allow the financing coefficient to be a function of 
the firm’s characteristics. This will enable us to examine the factors affecting the proportion of 
debt financing (reduction) relative to the financing deficit (surplus) and to evaluate the 
consistency of those factors with the prediction of the pecking order and the trade-off theory. 
Such a model relaxes the assumptions of the pecking order model (the symmetric behavior, and 
the non-varying time coefficients). In addition, it accommodates the determinants of the use of 
debt suggested by both theories and control for the factors other than the adverse selection cost 
(e.g. debt capacity, equity market conditions and growth options). 
For each financing deficit–surplus group the modified model is  
ttit DefD eaa ++=D 0         (13) 
iiititii
ititiiii
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--     (14) 
M/B Market to book ratio of ith firm. 
Tang Tangible assets to total assets of ith firm. 
Info Information asymmetry proxy of ith firm. 
MTR Marginal tax rate at time t-1 of ith firm. 
D1 Indicator variable takes the value of 1 if the firm has net loss carry forward at time t-
1 of ith firm. 
RDAD The sum of R&D and the advertising expenses relative to total assets of ith firm. 
NDTS Non-Debt tax shield, the sum of depreciation and investment tax credits relative to 
total assets of ith firm. 
D2 Indicator variable takes the value of 1 if the Altman’s (1986) Z > 3, 0 otherwise. 
AbDev Absolute value of the deviation from the target leverage at time t-1 of ith firm. 
D3 Indicator variable takes the value of 1 if the firm is above its target leverage, 0 
otherwise. 
Size  The logarithm of the total assets of ith firm. 
St  The ratio of stock prices at time t relative to time t-1 of ith firm. 
 
Investment inefficiencies  
 
          Investment inefficiencies are caused by the conflicts of interest between managers, 
shareholders, and bondholders. Myers (1977,1984) models suggest that due to the 
underinvestment problem, firms with high growth options may use less debt to preserve their 
debt capacity (to avoid either foregoing future investment opportunity or financing them with 
more risky securities). In addition, as suggested by Myers (1977) firms with high growth options 
may employ short-term debt to overcome the underinvestment problem. Thus, we expect to find 
firms with higher growth options, as measured by the market to book ratio (M/B), to use less debt 
financing as proportion of their financing deficit. Thus, a negative relation between the 
proportion of long-term debt financing and the growth options, and a positive relation between 
the proportion of short-term debt financing and the growth options is predicted. The opposite 
relation is predicted for firms having a financing surplus.  
 
  
53
         Yet, the trade-off theory implies that such a relation is predicted if lenders are not willing to 
accept the growth options as collateral for long-term debt. Because executing those options are 
optional and lenders have no control over the mangers after they received loan. Thus, the 
potential moral hazard problem increases the lender incentive not to finance high growth options 
firms that have a lack of high tangible collateral. 
 
Debt Capacity   
 
         The pecking order theory predicts that firms will issue equity as a last resort. Specifically, 
when firms exhausted their debt capacity and the degree of underpricing is not too high. Thus, 
firms’ debt capacity plays significant role in the choice and the size of debt financing. To control 
for the firms’ debt capacity, I use the tangible assets (the ratio of plant and equipment to total 
assets as a measure of tangible assets (Tang)). Firms with higher tangible assets expected to have 
higher debt capacity, lower costs of financial distress. MacKie-Mason (1990) uses the tangible 
assets as control variable for the moral hazard problem, where managers take their investment 
decisions after the debt has been issued. His argument is that debt should be cheaper when firms’ 
value depends heavily on investment already in place. The trade-off theory predicts that tangible 
assets can be viewed as debt collateral. Thus, firms with greater tangible assets have the ability to 
issue more debt. These competing hypotheses agree on that the higher the tangible assets of a 
firm, the most likely to use more debt financing as proportion of their financing deficit. In 
addition to the tangible assets, firms’ size is also used as control variable for the debt capacity. 
Since most likely large firms are well diversified and more profitable relative to small firms. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) find that the pecking order model fits better for large firms. They argue 
that such a result is inconsistent with the prediction of the pecking order theory since those large 
firms are less likely to suffer from information asymmetry. Their argument could be true, unless 
the firm size can proxy for debt capacity and financial distress. Under such assumption, large 
firms are expected to have higher debt capacity and lower cost of financial distress, which enable 
them to issue more debt. 
 
Information asymmetry 
 
         The main prediction of the pecking order theory is that firms with high information 
asymmetry rely more on issuing debt to finance their external financing needs, given that the 
financial distress cost is low. Short–term debt, which is less sensitive to the information 
asymmetry problem relative to long-term debt (Flannery (1986)), should constitute a higher 
proportion of the debt financing if the information asymmetry is uniformly distributed over time. 
Under such assumption, we expect to find a higher impact of information asymmetry on the 
proportion of short-term debt financing. Following Bhagat and Thompson (1985), Blackwell and 
Spivey (1990), Krishnaswami, Spindt, Subramaniam (1999), and Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999), the residual volatility in daily stock returns is used as a metric of 
information asymmetry. The residual volatility in daily stock returns is the standard deviation of 
the value weighted market adjusted return residuals, calculated on the daily base for each firm-
year (Info). The pecking order theory predicts that the coefficient on the Info variable to be 
positive for the financing deficit group.  
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Optimal capital structure  
 
         The pecking order theory states that firms do not have well-defined target leverage. In 
addition, Myers (1984) suggests that the adverse selection costs overwhelm the forces that 
determine the optimal leverage in the trade-off theory. While, the trade-off theory predicts that in 
addition to the internal fund deficit (surplus), other factors such as the deviation from the target 
leverage, marginal tax rates, net loss carry forward, financial distress and non-debt tax shields 
sources may affect the proportion of debt financing (reduction). 
 
         If the proportion of debt financing (reduction) is chosen to minimize the deviation from 
target leverage, we expect to find that the firms’ deviation from the target leverage has a 
significant impact on the proportion of debt financing (reduction). To examine this hypothesis, I 
use the absolute value of the actual leverage deviation from the target leverage in the previous 
year. Since the trade-off theory predicts that firms below the target are most likely to use more 
debt financing and firms above the target to use less debt financing. I add the interaction of the 
deviation from the target leverage (AbDev) with indicator variable (equal 1 if the firms are above 
their target leverage and 0 otherwise) to test this hypothesis. Thus, for the financing deficit 
(surplus) group, a positive (negative) coefficient for AbDev variable and a negative (positive) 
coefficient for AbDev+ AbDev*D3  is predicted. 
 
         The trade-off theory predicts that firms with high marginal tax rate (MTRt-1) have greater 
incentive to issue debt due to the tax-deductibility of interest payments. DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) argue that non-debt tax shields, depreciation and investment tax credit (NDTS), can 
substitute for the interest deductibility. MacKie-Mason (1990) argues that non-debt tax shields 
do not always crowd out interest deductibility. Specifically, profitable firms could have large 
non-debt tax shields, high marginal tax rate, and issue more debt. Highly distressed firms, close 
to tax exhaustion, are most likely to avoid debt financing since non-debt tax shield crowd out the 
associated debt tax shield. Thus, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) model predicts that the relation 
between the debt financing and the non-debt tax shields is negative, whereas MacKie-Mason 
(1990) argument indicates that this relation is positive for profitable firms and negative for 
highly distressed firms. On the other hand, the ability of the firms to carry forward their net 
operating losses can affect the amount of debt financing. Firms that have a net loss carry forward 
(NLCF) have a disincentive to use more debt financing as proportion of their deficit relative to 
firms that do not experiencing a loss. 
 
         Like Graham (1996a), I use the marginal tax rate and the marginal tax rate interaction with 
and indicator variables for firms that have NLCF at time t-1; the trade-off theory predicts a 
positive relation between the MTRt-1 and the proportion of debt financing. Firms with NLCF are 
expected to use debt less aggressively than firms without NLFC, thus a negative sign of 
11 * DMTRt-  is predicted. To test MacKie-Mason’s (1990) prediction that non-debt tax shield 
does not crowd out interest deductibility for profitable firms, like MacKie-Mason (1990) and 
Graham (1996a), I interact the non-debt tax shield (NDTS) with indicator variable that takes the 
value 1 if the firm’s Altman’s Z (1968) is greater than three. Altman’s Z equals the sum of 3.3 
times earnings before interest and taxes plus sales plus 1.4 times retained earnings plus 1.2 times 
working capital divided by total assets. This interacted term allows separating the profitability 
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and debt substitution aspects of non-debt tax shields. If MacKie-Mason’s (1990) argument holds, 
a negative sign for NDTS and a positive one for 2* DNDTS  are expected.  
 
         In addition to depreciation and investment tax credit, research and development and 
advertising expenses (RDAD) provide other sources of non-debt tax shields to firms. Myers 
(1977) argues that these sources create assets that can be viewed as options, which are subject to 
managerial discretion and higher agency cost. Whether these sources reflect the agency cost of 
discretionary assets or non-debt tax shields, the relation between this variable and the proportion 
of debt financing should be negative for the financing deficit group and positive for the financing 
surplus group. 
 
Market timing hypothesis  
 
         If firms timing their equity issue (reduction) with a favorable market conditions, we expect 
to find that such a behavior to affect the proportion of debt financing (reduction) relative to the 
financing deficit (surplus). Lucas and MacDonald (1990) model predicts that managers with 
superior private information will delay equity issue until their stock prices rises. Korajczyk, 
Lucas, and MacDonald (1990) find evidence supporting this prediction, where firms’ equity 
issuance finds to cluster following stock prices run up. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) 
find evidence that stock prices run up (decline) play significant role in the firms’ choice of equity 
issuance and repurchase decision. Baker and Wurlger (2002) find supporting evidence for the 
market-timing hypothesis. The ratio of stock price (St) at current period relative to the previous 
one is used to test the market-timing hypothesis26.  
 
         If firms timing their equity issue (reduction) with a favorable market conditions, we expect 
to find a negative sign of St for the financing deficit group. While the opposite sings for the 
financing surplus group are expected. To examine this hypothesis a second model is estimated 
where the St variable is added to explanatory variables.  
 
         2.4.1.1. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
 
         To investigate the factors that characterize the short-run financing behavior patterns at the 
firms level, firms are classified into two main groups. The financing deficit group (Fint > 0) and 
financing surplus group (Fint < 0). This classification is motivated by the previous results, which 
reject the symmetrical behavior of firms under financing deficit and surplus. For each firm the 
proportion of debt financing (reduction) is calculated using the following equation: 
it
it
it
Fin
D
,
,
, a=
D
                         (12) 
For each group firms are classified into four subgroups as following   
1-Financing deficit subgroups 
                                                 
26 Taggart (1977) and Jalilvand and Harris (1984) use similar proxy of the stock prices run up. Marsh (1982) and 
Frank and Goyal (2003) use the abnormal stock return as proxy for the stock prices run up. I also tried the abnormal 
return as proxy for the stock price run up, the results dose not change. 
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0, £ita  
Pure equity financing (firms that issue equity and firms that issue equity and 
reduce debt, where equity financing represents at least 100% of the financing 
deficit).  
5.00 , £< ita  
More equity financing (firms that issue both debt and equity, where equity 
financing represents between 50% and 100% of the financing deficit). 
15.0 , << ita  
More debt financing (firms that issue both debt and equity, where debt 
financing represents between 50% and 100% of the financing deficit). 
1, ³ita  
Pure debt financing (firms that issue debt and firms issue debt and reduce 
equity, where debt financing represents at least 100% of the financing 
deficit).  
2-Financing surplus subgroups 
0, £ita  
Pure equity reduction (firms that reduce equity and firms that issue debt and 
reduce equity, where equity reduction represents at least 100% of the 
financing surplus).  
5.00 , £< ita  
More equity reduction (firms that reduce both debt and equity, where equity 
reduction represents between 50% and 100% of the financing surplus). 
15.0 , << ita  
More debt reduction (firms that reduce both debt and equity, where debt 
reduction represents between 50% and 100% of the financing surplus). 
1, ³ita  
Pure debt reduction (firms that reduce debt and firms that reduce debt and 
issue equity, where debt reduction represents at least 100% of the financing 
surplus).  
      
         Table 2.4 reports descriptive statistics for each subgroup. The sample distribution of the 
proportion of debt financing shows that 66% of the firms fall into the financing deficit group. Of 
those, 40% use debt to finance more than half of their external financing needs, 25% use equity 
to finance more than half of their external financing needs, 20% use pure equity to finance their 
deficit (including firms that substitute equity for debt). Finally, 15% of the firms in financing 
deficit group issue pure debt to finance their deficit (including firms that substitute debt for 
equity). Table 2.4 confirms Chirinko and Singha (2000) critiques to Shyam-Sunders and Myers 
(1999) model where equity issue creates a degree of negative bias in their test. In addition to that, 
this study results indicate that substituting equity for debt lead to positive bias and substituting 
debt for equity lead to more bias that is negative. For example, the Consumer Nondurable 
industry group has a financing deficit coefficient of 0.479; this high coefficient is driven by the 
fact that 69% of the firms in this industry use more debt (as proportion of their financing deficit) 
to finance their deficit. On the other hand, the Chemicals and Allied Products industry group has 
financing deficit coefficient of 0.143; this low coefficient is driven by the fact that 61% of the 
firms in this industry use more equity (as proportion of their financing deficit) to finance their  
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Table 2.4- The Distribution of the Proportion of Debt Financing 
 
Firms are classified in two main groups: financing deficit firms (Fin >0) and financing surplus firms (Fin <0). For each firm 
the financing coefficient is calculated using the following equation: a=D tt FinD . Where Dt is the total debt at time t, Fint is 
the sum investment, change in working capital (excluding short-term debt) minus cash flow after interest, taxes, and 
dividends. For financing deficit group firms classified in three sets as the following: 0£ta , pure equity financing, 
5.00 £< ta , more equity financing 15.0 << ta , more debt financing and 1³ta , pure debt financing. While, for the 
financing surplus group these values present, pure equity reduction, more equity reduction, more debt reduction, and pure 
debt reduction, respectively. Panel A reports the mean of ta  for each subgroup. Panel B reports the percentage of observation 
in each subgroup and the number of observations in each industry group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Financing Deficit Firms Financing Surplus Firms 
 
Pure 
equity 
financing 
More 
equity 
financing 
More 
debt 
financing 
Pure debt 
financing All 
Pure 
equity 
reduction 
More 
equity 
reduction 
More 
debt 
reduction 
Pure debt 
reduction All 
Panel A Mean 
Consumer Nondurable -0.71 0.18 0.88 1.35 0.65 -0.90 0.15 0.90 1.30 0.85 
Consumer Durables -0.83 0.20 0.88 1.31 0.61 -0.95 0.18 0.88 1.33 0.92 
Oil, Gas and Coal -0.84 0.21 0.86 1.30 0.53 -0.85 0.15 0.89 1.35 0.92 
Chemicals and Allied Products    -0.43 0.11 0.84 1.44 0.31 -1.02 0.15 0.84 1.44 0.80 
Manufacturing -0.62 0.14 0.86 1.32 0.40 -0.93 0.14 0.88 1.41 0.93 
Telephones and Television -0.67 0.23 0.83 1.32 0.53 -1.03 0.22 0.87 1.48 0.90 
Wholesale & Retail -0.56 0.13 0.86 1.29 0.42 -0.91 0.12 0.89 1.38 0.90 
Everything Else -0.66 0.17 0.85 1.28 0.49 -0.95 0.13 0.88 1.38 0.92 
All industries  -0.62 0.15 0.86 1.32 0.46 -0.94 0.14 0.88 1.39 0.91 
Panel B % Of Observations N % Of Observations N 
Consumer Nondurable 14% 17% 46% 23%  4059 7% 14% 48% 31% 3132 
Consumer Durables 15% 15% 48% 22%  3053 6% 11% 51% 32% 2205 
Oil, Gas and Coal 15% 22% 45% 18%  2996 5% 14% 48% 33% 1576 
Chemicals and Allied Products 27% 34% 29% 10%  4294   11% 19% 48% 22% 1749 
Manufacturing 23% 25% 38% 14%  16797 6% 16% 53% 25% 9293 
Telephones and Television 15% 23% 48% 14%  2244 8% 13% 46% 33% 687 
Wholesale & Retail 21% 27% 38% 14%  15658 6% 16% 51% 27% 7096 
Everything Else 18% 24% 44% 14%  6991 6% 14% 52% 28% 3520 
All industries  20% 25% 40% 15%  56092 7% 15% 51% 27% 29258 
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Table 2.5- the Proportion of Debt Financing- the Firms Attributes 
 
Firms are classified in two main groups: financing deficit firms (Fin >0) and financing surplus firms (Fin <0). For each firm 
the financing coefficient is calculated using the following equation: a=D tt FinD . Where Dt is the total debt at time t, Fint 
is the sum investment, change in working capital (excluding short-term debt) minus cash flow after interest, taxes, and 
dividends. For financing deficit group firms classified into four subgroups as the following: 0£ta , pure equity financing, 
5.00 £< ta , more equity financing 15.0 << ta , more debt financing and 1³ta , pure debt financing. Size is the logarithm 
of the total assets. Sales are the logarithm of the net sales. Marginal tax rate is the simulated MTR provided by John 
Graham. Tang is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Net Loss Carry forward the ratio of firms net loss carry forward 
to total assets. Non-debt tax shield is the ratio of deprecation and investment tax credit to total assets. RDAD is the ratio of 
R&D and advertising expenses to total assets. Altman Z equals the sum of 3.3 times earnings before interest and taxes plus 
sales plus 1.4 times retained earnings plus 1.2 times working capital divided by total assets. Market-to-Book ratio is the 
ratio of market value (book value of assets plus the difference between market value of equity and the book value of equity) 
to total assets. Information asymmetry computed as the standard deviation of the value weighted market adjusted return 
residuals, calculated on the daily base for each firm-year. St is a proxy for stock prices run up –decline calculated as the 
ratio of the stock price at time t relative to the price at time t-1. Devt the firms’ deviation form the industry leverage median 
at time t. ** and * indicate that difference in the means is statistically different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels.     
 
 Financing Deficit Firms 
 Mean Mean differences 
Characteristics 
Pure 
equity 
financing 
More 
equity 
financing 
More debt 
financing 
Pure debt 
financing (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (1)-(4) (2)-(3) (2)-(4) (3)-(4) 
Size  4.527 4.624  5.237 5.382 -0.097** -0.711** -0.856** -0.613** -0.759** -0.145** 
Sales  4.307 4.291  5.224 5.454  0.016 -0.917** -1.147** -0.932** -1.163** -0.230** 
Tangible Assets  0.258 0.256  0.358 0.369  0.002 -0.101** -0.111** -0.103** -0.113** -0.010** 
Marginal tax rate  0.179 0.182  0.266 0.278 -0.004 -0.087** -0.099** -0.083** -0.096** -0.012** 
Net Loss Carry forward  0.208 0.207  0.085 0.061  0.001  0.123**  0.147**  0.122**  0.146**  0.024* 
Non debt tax shield  0.050 0.040  0.035 0.029  0.010  0.015*  0.021*  0.005  0.011**  0.006 
RDAD   0.088 0.090  0.037 0.030 -0.002  0.051**  0.058**  0.053**  0.060**  0.007** 
Altman Z  -0.079 1.995  2.459 3.523 -2.074** -2.538** -3.602* -0.464 -1.528* -1.064** 
Market-to-Book ratio  2.622 2.630  1.524 1.329 -0.008  1.098**  1.293**  1.106**  1.301**  0.195** 
Information asymmetry 0.616     0.514       0.800       0.915       0.102     -0.184**      -0.299**     -0.286**      -0.401**     -0.115 
St   1.870     1.300       0.821       0.704       0.570*      1.049**      1.166*       0.479**       0.596*       0.117* 
Dev t-Dev t-1  -0.067**    -0.076* -0.062* -0.060       
  
59
Table 2.6- the Proportion of Debt Repurchases- the Firms Attributes 
 
Firms are classified in two main groups: financing deficit firms (Fin >0) and financing surplus firms (Fin <0). For each firm 
the financing coefficient is calculated using the following equation: a=D tt FinD . Where Dt is the total debt at time t, Fint is 
the sum investment, change in working capital (excluding short-term debt) minus cash flow after interest, taxes, and 
dividends. For financing surplus group firms classified into four subgroups as the following: 0£ta , pure equity reduction, 
5.00 £< ta , more equity reduction 15.0 << ta , more debt reduction and 1³ta , pure debt reduction. Size is the logarithm 
of the total assets. Sales are the logarithm of the net sales. Marginal tax rate is the simulated MTR provided by John Graham. 
Tang is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Net Loss Carry forward the ratio of firms net loss carry forward to total 
assets. Non-debt tax shield is the ratio of deprecation and investment tax credit to total assets. RDAD is the ratio of R&D and 
advertising expenses to total assets. Altman Z equals the sum of 3.3 times earnings before interest and taxes plus sales plus 1.4 
times retained earnings plus 1.2 times working capital divided by total assets. Market-to-Book ratio is the ratio of market 
value (book value of assets plus the difference between market value of equity and the book value of equity) to total assets. 
Information asymmetry computed as the standard deviation of the value weighted market adjusted return residuals, calculated 
on the daily base for each firm-year. St is a proxy for stock prices run up –decline calculated as the ratio of the stock price at 
time t relative to the price at time t-1. Devt the firms’ deviation form the industry leverage median at time t. ** and * indicate 
that difference in the means is statistically different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels.     
 
 
Financing surplus group 
 Mean Mean differences 
Attribute 
Pure 
equity 
reduction 
More 
equity 
reduction 
More debt 
reduction 
Pure debt 
reduction (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (1)-(4) (2)-(3) (2)-(4) (3)-(4) 
Size  5.790  4.963  5.012 5.063  0.826**  0.777**  0.727** -0.049 -0.099** -0.050 
Sales  5.896  4.992  5.182 5.259  0.904**  0.715**  0.637** -0.189** -0.267** -0.078* 
Tangible Assets  0.331  0.281  0.352 0.339  0.050** -0.021** -0.009 -0.071** -0.058**  0.013** 
Marginal tax rate  0.277  0.255  0.280 0.276  0.022** -0.002  0.001 -0.025** -0.021**  0.004 
Net Loss Carry forward  0.070  0.075  0.098 0.117 -0.005 -0.028 -0.047** -0.024 -0.042** -0.019 
Non debt tax shield  0.051  0.049  0.056 0.057  0.002 -0.005* -0.006** -0.008** -0.008** -0.001 
R& D to Assets  0.049  0.059  0.032 0.043 -0.010**  0.018**  0.007*  0.028**  0.017** -0.011** 
Altman Z   2.132      2.227     -1.698       -1.145     -0.095      3.830**      3.278**      3.925**      3.373** -0.552 
Market-to-Book ratio  1.246 1.411  1.696  1.822 -0.165**     -0.450**     -0.576**     -0.285**     -0.411** -0.126 
Information asymmetry  0.470  0.498  0.685 0.721 -0.028 -0.216** -0.252** -0.187** -0.223** -0.036 
St   0.735      0.792      1.320 1.672      -0.057     -0.585*     -0.937* -0.528*v     -0.880* -0.352 
Dev t-Dev t-1  -0.014**     -0.007**     -0.017* 0.003       
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deficit. The positive bias is more severe for the financing surplus group where 27% of the firms 
fall into the pure debt reduction subgroup. Thus, it is clear that Shyam-Sunders and Myers 
(1999) model has a major weakness as a test of the pecking order theory. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 
characterize firms in the financing deficit and surplus subgroups.  
 
         Firms that use pure equity and more equity financing as proportion of their financing 
deficit are, on average, those which have higher market to book ratio, smaller size, lower 
profitability, lower tangible assets, lower marginal tax rate, greater net loss carry forward, higher 
probability of bankruptcy, lower information asymmetry problem, and higher stock prices run 
up. Firms that use pure debt reduction and more debt reduction as proportion of their financing 
surplus are the firms which have, on average, higher market to book ratio, greater non-debt tax 
shields, higher probability of bankruptcy, higher information asymmetry problem, and higher 
stock prices run up. Those results are in the line of Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman’s (2001) 
findings that equity issuer firms are less profitable, small, have high stock prices, higher market 
to book ratio. While their univariate analysis indicates that the deviation from the target is more 
import factor in security repurchase then in security issuances, my results show that firms choose 
a combination of security issue (repurchase) to minimize the deviation from the target. The 
difference in the deviation from the target leverage between two consecutive years indicates that 
firms almost across all subgroups are getting closer to the target. 
 
         The univariate analysis indicates that the cost of adverse selection is not the main factor 
that characterizes the high proportion of debt financing. The information asymmetry proxy finds 
to be higher for firms that issue pure debt relative to firms that issue pure equity. The debt 
capacity factors significantly characterize the high proportion of debt financing. More important, 
the factors suggested by the trade-off theory, agency cost and market-timing hypothesis are quite 
important in determining the proportion of securities to be issued or repurchases.  
 
         2.4.1.2. Empirical Results- Multivariate Analysis 
 
         Table 2.8 presents the estimation results of the model for the financing deficit group and 
the financing surplus group. In support for Myers (1977,1984) and Jensen and Meckling (1986), 
and Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) models, firms with a higher growth options use less long-term 
debt financing as proportion of their financing deficit. In addition, the growth options coefficient 
has a positive sign for short-term debt financing, which support Myers (1977) solution of the 
underinvestment problem, where high growth options firms may role over short-term debt to 
overcome this problem. On the other hand, the financing surplus group confirms these results. 
Higher growth options firms tend to reduce their long-term debt by a higher proportion of their 
financing surplus relative to short-term debt. 
 
         The firms’ debt capacity proxy, the tangible assets (or size), is positively related to the 
proportion of long-term debt financing. Whereas, the size is negatively related to the proportion 
of short-term debt financing. This results on the line of Barclay and Smith (1995) findings of the 
positive relation between debt maturity and firm size. This also can be explained by the limited 
ability of small firms to access the capital market due to the high flotation cost of long-term debt.  
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Table 2.7- Correlation Matrix 
 
 In the correlation matrix, the correlation coefficients below the diagonal present 
the correlation among the independent variables for the financing deficit group. 
While, the correlation coefficients above the diagonal present the correlation 
among the independent variables for the financing surplus group. M/B is the 
market to book ratio. Tang is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Info is a 
metric proxy of information asymmetry computed as the standard deviation of the 
value weighted market adjusted return residuals, calculated on the daily base for 
each firm-year. MTR is the marginal tax rate at time t-. RDAD is the summation of 
R&D and the advertising expenses relative to total assets. NDTS is the non-debt 
tax shield, the sum of depreciation and investment tax credits relative to total 
assets. AbDev is the absolute value of the deviation from the target leverage at 
time t-1. St is a proxy for stock prices run up –decline calculated as the ratio of the 
stock price at time t relative to the price at time t-1. Size is the logarithm of the 
total assets. 
 
Correlations M/B Tang Info MTRt-1 RDAD NDTS St Size AbDev 
M/B  -0.049  0.007 -0.031  0.164 -0.024  0.131 -0.127 -0.003 
Tang -0.204  -0.056  0.050 -0.171  0.218 -0.022  0.257  0.014 
Info  0.021 -0.030  -0.114  0.038  0.065  0.162 -0.129 -0.104 
MTRt-1 -0.175  0.130 -0.056  -0.064 -0.075  0.045  0.169  0.070 
RDAD  0.183 -0.173  0.044 -0.203   0.027  0.012 -0.085 -0.005 
NDTS -0.030  0.207  0.038 -0.063  0.087  -0.010 -0.047 -0.060 
St  0.188 -0.042  0.140  0.024  0.008 -0.043  -0.008  0.009 
Size -0.119  0.278 -0.062  0.200 -0.120 -0.016 -0.005   0.020 
AbDev -0.013  0.010 -0.006  0.044 -0.007 -0.005  0.003  0.013  
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Table 2.8- The Modified Pecking Order Model 
 
The dependent variables are the changes in long-term debt and short–term debt scaled by total assets. The Fama-
MacBeth (1973) regressions are run for each year of 1980-2001 periods. M/B is the market to book ratio. Tang is 
the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. . Info is a metric proxy of information asymmetry computed as the 
standard deviation of the value weighted market adjusted return residuals, calculated on the daily base for each 
firm-year. MTR is the marginal tax rate at time t-1. D1 is an indictor variable takes the value of one if the firm has 
net loss carry forward at time t-1. RDAD is the summation of R&D and the advertising expenses relative to total 
assets. NDTS is the non-debt tax shield, the sum of depreciation and investment tax credits relative to total assets. 
D2 is an indictor variable take the value of one if the Altman’s (1986) Z > three, zero otherwise. AbDev is the 
absolute value of the deviation from the target leverage at time t-1. D3 is an indictor variable takes the value of one 
if the firm is above its target leverage, 0 otherwise. Size is the logarithm of the total assets .St is a proxy for stock 
prices run up –decline calculated as the ratio of the stock price at time t relative to the price at time t-1. ** and * 
indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
Financing deficit group Financing surplus group Independent 
variable D  Long Term Debt D  Short Term Debt  D  Long Term Debt  D  Short Term Debt  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant -0.005** -0.005**  0.009**  0.009** -0.003** -0.004** -0.005** -0.005** 
M/B -0.021** -0.021**  0.002**  0.001*  0.067**  0.064**  0.007  0.005 
Tang  0.345**  0.341**  0.028  0.030  0.046  0.042  0.002  0.001 
Info  0.008**  0.010**  0.026**  0.029**  0.017  0.009  0.026**  0.031** 
MTRt-1  0.753*  0.709*  0.179**  0.131**  1.209*  1.278*  1.500  1.541 
MTRt-1* D1 -0.197* -0.207*  0.079*  0.059* -0.118* -0.132* -0.147 -0.143 
RDAD -0.209** -0.211** -0.040 -0.045 -0.591* -0.591*  0.497  0.506 
NDTS -0.115* -0.119*  0.050*  0.049*  1.032**  1.044** -0.686** -0.687** 
NDTS* D2  0.140*  0.149* -0.152** -0.130* -0.404** -0.435**  0.223**  0.221** 
AbDev  0.015*  0.016*  0.006  0.006 -0.174* -0.191*  0.222  0.233 
AbDev* D3 -0.062** -0.062** -0.010* -0.009*  0.303**  0.311** -0.041 -0.031 
Size  0.063**  0.050** -0.009* -0.007*  0.073**  0.072**  0.036*  0.031** 
St  -0.004*  -0.015**   0.011*   0.005 
Adj-R2  0.369  0.371  0.101  0.111  0.768  0.770  0.263  0.266 
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However, the tangible assets have no significant role in affecting the proportion of long-term or 
short–term debt reduction, whereas size is positively related to the proportion of long-term or 
short–term debt reduction. 
 
         Consistent with the pecking order model, after controlling for the debt capacity, the 
information asymmetry is positively related to the proportion of long-term debt financing. In 
addition, the information asymmetry effect on the proportion of short-term debt financing is 
positive and slightly higher in magnitude relative to the proportion of long-term debt financing. 
On the other hand, the information asymmetry shows no significant role in affecting the 
proportion of long-term debt reduction, while it has a significant positive effect on the proportion 
of short-term debt reduction. One possible explanation is the degree of sensitivity of the short-
tem debt to information asymmetry, which could lead to less misspricing of the short-term debt 
relative to long-term debt and that is why firms will tend to reduce short-term debt rather the 
long-term-debt.    
 
         I find a significant support for the hypothesis that higher marginal tax rate lead firms to use 
more debt financing. In addition, firms that have NLCF use long-term debt less aggressively 
relative to firms without NLCF, while firms with NLCF use more aggressively short-term debt 
financing. This could occur because firms with NLCF are not able to access the long-term debt 
market as easy as they might take a bank loan. On the other hand, the marginal tax rate has a 
positive impact on the proportion of long-term reduction. Firms that are more profitable tend to 
reduce their long-term debt by a higher proportion relative to less profitable firms (firms that 
have NLCF). On the other hand, neither the MTRt-1 nor the interaction between MTRt-1   and 
NLCF has an effect of the proportion of short-term debt reduction. 
 
         The sign and the magnitude of the coefficient on the NDTS support MacKie-Mason (1990) 
argument, a positive sign for 2* DNDTS , where non-debt tax shields does not crowded out 
interest deductibility for profitable firms and it does for highly distress firms. This is consistent 
with the notion that highly distress firms utilize the non-debt tax shield more than less distressed 
firms. In addition, for highly distressed firms the non-debt tax shields variable is positively 
related to the proportion of short-term debt financing. This suggests that those firms have low 
ability to access the long-term debt market. When firms have financing surplus, highly distress 
firms tend to reduce their long-term debt by a higher proportion relative to healthy firms.   
 
         The other source of the non-debt tax shields, the sum of R&D and the advertising expenses 
relative to total assets (RDAD), negatively affect the proportion of long–term debt financing or 
reduction and has no significant effect on the short-term debt financing or reduction. 
 
          In support of the trade-off theory, firms below their target leverage tend to issue more debt 
as proportion of their financing deficit when they have financing deficit and reduce less debt 
when they have financing surplus. Firms above their target leverage tend to issue less debt as 
proportion of their financing deficit and reduce more debt when they have financing surplus. 
 
Finally, to investigate the market-timing hypothesis (model 2), firms with high stock price tend 
to issue less debt when they have a financing deficit and to reduce more debt when they have a 
financing surplus. This implies that firms in financing deficit issue more equity when they have 
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stock prices run up. Whereas firms that have a financing surplus tend to repurchase more equity 
if they have a stock prices decline. Korajczyk, Lucas, and MacDonald (1990) and Hovakimian, 
Opler, and Titman (2001) and Baker and Wurlger (2002) find evidence supporting this 
prediction. 
 
         In general, the multivariate analysis indicates that, after controlling for the debt capacity, 
the information asymmetry problem is not the only determinant of the proportion of debt 
financing or debt reductions. The factors suggested by the trade-off models play a significant 
role in the firm decision of how much to use debt to fill their financing deficit or how much to 
reduce debt in allocating their financing surplus. Finally, the deviation from the target leverage 
plays a significant role in determined the proportion of debt financing or reduction. 
 
2.5. THE TRADE-OFF THEORY 
 
         The previous results of the factors affecting the proportion of debt financing (reduction) 
imply that the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory are not mutually exclusive. Firms 
may strive for a target debt ratio range and within this range the pecking order behavior may 
describe incremental decisions or, over time, firms may switch between target adjustment and 
pecking order behavior. Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) and Leland (1994,1998) models 
show how market frictions can lead firms to deviate from their target leverage. Hovakimian and 
Opler and Titman (2001) conclude that the different effect of profitability on the debt ratio and 
the debt-equity issue choice appear to be consistent with a pecking order behavior in the short-
run and revision to the target in the long-run. This leads to the possibility that firms do not view 
the pecking order and trade-off theories as mutually exclusive (Fama and French (2002)). For 
example, firms below their target leverage with high information asymmetry are most likely to 
issue debt, given that they have a high debt capacity, thus, accelerating their rate of adjustment. 
If these firms have stock price run up, managers find themselves better off issuing equity, even 
though this decision leads to a temporary deviation from the target leverage.  
 
         In this section, I investigate the assumptions of the partial adjustment model and the factors 
affecting the rate of adjustment toward the target leverage. In addition, I investigate whether the 
pecking order factors contribute to the short-run deviation from the target leverage. 
 
2.6. THE PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT MODEL 
 
         The general form of the standard partial adjustment model used in the literature to examine 
the adjustment process toward a leverage target relies on the changes in debt that is partially 
absorbed by the difference between debt target, Dt*, and lagged debt, Dt-1              
( ) ttttt DDDD eaa +-+=- -- 1*101 (15) 
Dt    Total debt at time t. 
Dt*              Optimal debt level at time t. 
1a  Adjustment rate coefficient.  
te     
 Error term. 
Where 
01 =a  Reflects no adjustment to the target. 
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10 1 << a  Reflects partial adjustment to the target due to a positive cost of adjustment. 
11 =a  Reflects a full adjustment to the target (the adjustment is costless). 
 
     The parameter a1 may be interpreted in terms of the relative cost of being away from the 
optimal leverage and the cost of recapitalization (adjusting). If the cost function of 
recapitalization and the cost function of being away from the optimal debt can be approximated 
by quadratic terms, then the total loss function can be written as 
( ) ( )212* --+-= tttt DDDD jfl           (16) 
 
         The first term measures the cost of being away from the target, and the second term 
measures the cost of adjustment (recapitalization). The problem now is to minimize the loss 
function. Taking the first derivative,  
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( )1*11 -- -=- tttt DDDD a             (17) 
 
         The adjustment rate coefficient a1 depends on the ratio of the marginal cost of being away 
from the target to the marginal cost of adjustment. Obviously, the higher the adjustment cost, the 
slower the rate of adjustment. A full adjustment will occur if the cost of adjustment is too low or 
the cost of being away is to high. Further, firms will not adjust their debt toward the optimal 
leverage if the cost of being away from the optimal leverage is zero.  
Splitting the total debt to long-term debt and short-term debt yields 
( ) ttttt DDLTDLTD ndd +-+=- -- 1*101  (18) 
( ) ttttt DDSTDSTD xll +-+=- -- 1*101   (19) 
000 ald =+      ,   111 ald =+                         (20) 
LTDt Long-term debt level. 
STDt Short-term debt level. 
Dt    Total debt level. 
Dt*              Target debt level. 
1d  The contribution of long-term debt in the total adjustment rate coefficient. 
1l  The contribution of short-term debt in the total adjustment rate coefficient. 
tt xn ,     Error terms. 
 
Scaling all variables by the total assets yields a comparability of the both the pecking order and 
the trade off model. 
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2.7. THE SYMMETRICAL RATE OF ADJUSTMENT ASSUMPTION 
 
         The two main implicit assumptions of the partial adjustment model are: first, firms above 
and below the target have the same rate of adjustment toward the target –the symmetric rate of 
adjustment assumption. Second, the adjustment rate coefficient is non-time varying (the same 
across industries, across firms within the same industry and over time).  
 
         Because the driving forces behind the trade-off theory are taxes, bankruptcy costs, non-debt 
tax shields and agency costs, one can expect that interesting differences exist between different 
industries regarding the adjustment rate toward the optimal capital structure. To control for the 
industry effect, firms are classified into industries groups using Fama-French industry 
classification. To check the symmetric rate of adjustment assumption, I use indicator variables as 
following: 
( ) ( ) ttttttt DDDDDDTDTD Vffff +-+-++=- --- 11*31*21101        (21) 
( ) ( ) ttttttt DDDDDDLTDLTD ndddd +-+-++=- --- 11*31*21101  (21a) 
( ) ( ) ttttttt DDDDDDSTDSTD xllll +-+-++=- --- 11*31*21101   (21b) 
TDt Total debt. 
LTDt Long-term debt level. 
STDt Short-term debt level. 
Dt    Total debt level. 
Dt*              Target debt level. 
1D  Indicator variable takes the value 1 if the firm above the target and 0 
otherwise 
tt xn ,     Error terms. 
         Table 2.9 presents the empirical results of the model, where the dependent variables are the 
changes in total debt, long-term debt, and short-term debt respectively. The estimation results of 
the equations, 21, 21a,and 21b show that the adjustment rate varies across industries and long-
term debt plays significant role in the adjustment process across all industries, whereas the 
contribution of the short-term debt in the adjustment process vary across industries. Moreover, 
the assumption of the symmetric rate of adjustment is rejected across all industries. Firms have 
tendency to adjust faster toward the target when they are above the target relative to being below 
the target. When controlling for the firm position relative to the target leverage, the explanatory 
power measured by adjusted R-square is improved across all industries indicating that the model 
provides a better fit of the data.  
 
2.8. FACTORS AFFECTING THE RATE OF ADJUSTMENT 
 
       The partial adjustment model assumes that the adjustment rate is the same across industries, 
firms and over time. To allow the adjustment rate to vary across firms and to capture the pecking 
order and the trade-off theory factors’ that affect the rate of adjustment, I allow the rate of 
adjustment to be a function of the factors suggested by both theories: 
( ) tttitt DDDD eaa +-+=- -- 1*01                                         (23) 
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where  
M/B Market to book ratio of ith firm. 
Tang Tangible assets to total assets of ith firm. 
Info Information asymmetry proxy of ith firm. 
St Stock prices ratio between t and t-1 of ith firm.  
MTR Marginal tax rate at time t-1 of ith firm. 
D1 Indicator variable takes the value of 1 if the firm has net loss carry forward at 
time t-1 of ith firm. 
RDAD The sum of R&D and the advertising expenses relative to total assets of ith 
firm. 
NDTS Non-Debt tax shield, the sum of depreciation and investment tax credits 
relative to total assets of ith firm. 
Dis Absolute value of the distance from the target leverage at time t-1 of ith firm. 
Fin Firms’ financing deficit-surplus of ith firm.  
D2 Indicator variable takes the value of 1 if Fin>0 (firms are in financing deficit), 
0 otherwise. 
D3 Indicator variable takes the value of 1 if Fin<0(firms are in financing surplus), 
0 otherwise. 
Size The logarithm of total assets of ith firm. 
 
 
       The trade-off theory predicts that firms’ profitability, tangible assets, size, financing deficit 
size and the distance from the target leverage (due to higher cost of being away from the target) 
are positively related to the rate of adjustment for firms that adjustment from below. At the same 
time, non-debt tax shields, expected bankruptcy cost, growth options, financing surplus size, and 
the net loss carry forward are negatively related to the rate of adjustment for this group of firms. 
Accordingly, firms’ profitability, tangible assets, size, and financing deficit size are negatively 
related to the rate of adjustment for firms that adjust from above, whereas, non-debt tax shields, 
expected bankruptcy cost, growth options, financing surplus size, and the net loss carry forward 
are positively related to the rate of adjustment for this group of firms. 
 
       The agency cost models predict that the M/B has a negative impact on the rate of adjustment 
for firms operates below the target leverage and a positive one for firms above the target 
leverage. Firms’ size and tangible assets serve as proxy for the firms’ debt capacity and financial 
distress, thus a positive sign for the coefficients are expected. For firms below their target, the 
MTR is predicted to have a positive impact on the rate of adjustment, whereas firms with a net 
loss carry forward (NLCF) have fewer incentives to adjust. On the other hand, for firms above 
their target leverage, the opposite effect is supposed to be observed. Non-debt tax shields sources 
(NDTS and RDAD) are expected to reduce the rate of adjustment for firms below their target, 
since they already enjoy a high non-debt tax shields, and to accelerate it for firms above their 
target. The finance deficit-surplus variables are introduced to capture the contribution of external 
financing needs (surplus) to the adjustment process. 
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Table 2.9- Tests of Partial Adjustment Model- the Symmetrical Rate of Adjustment Assumption 
 
The sample period is 1980-2001. Financial firms are excluded. Industries are classified using Fama-
French industry classification. The dependent variable is the change in total debt, long-term debt, 
and short-term debt, respectively. The independent variable is the deviation from the target leverage, 
where the target leverage measured by the industry leverage median. D1 is an indicator variable 
takes the value 1 if the firm is above its target leverage and zero otherwise. Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
procedures use to estimate the model. The total assets scale all variables. ** and * indicate that the 
coefficient is statically different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry Group Constant ( )1* -- tt DD  Adj-R2 Constant 1D  ( )1* -- tt DD  ( ) 11* DDD tt --  Adj-R2 
Dependent variable: D  Total Debt 
Consumer Nondurable 0.016* 0.342** 0.283 -0.006** 0.060** 0.306** 0.131** 0.356 
Consumer Durables 0.016 0.379** 0.278 -0.002 0.060** 0.301** 0.204** 0.358 
Oil, Gas and Coal 0.040** 0.351** 0.291     -0.006* 0.077** 0.318** 0.103** 0.377 
Chemicals and Allied Products 0.026** 0.311* 0.213 -0.015** 0.032** 0.246** 0.102** 0.259 
Manufacturing 0.019** 0.338** 0.263  0.001 0.048** 0.309** 0.100** 0.312 
Telephones and Television 0.059** 0.323* 0.251 -0.023** 0.071** 0.354** 0.120* 0.336 
Wholesale & Retail 0.026** 0.428** 0.361  0.001 0.063** 0.402** 0.109** 0.429 
Everything Else 0.029** 0.400** 0.351 -0.001 0.061** 0.423** 0.080* 0.398 
All Groups 0.025** 0.422** 0.365 -0.003* 0.064** 0.395** 0.081** 0.418 
Dependent variable: D  Long Term Debt 
Consumer Nondurable 0.013* 0.258** 0.205 -0.003* 0.043** 0.237** 0.083** 0.256 
Consumer Durables 0.013 0.277** 0.198  0.000 0.042** 0.231** 0.139** 0.269 
Oil, Gas and Coal 0.033* 0.284** 0.205     -0.005* 0.058** 0.270** 0.071** 0.266 
Chemicals and Allied Products 0.024** 0.237* 0.156 -0.015** 0.022** 0.195** 0.067* 0.203 
Manufacturing 0.017** 0.263** 0.190  0.003* 0.037** 0.232** 0.095** 0.230 
Telephones and Television 0.051** 0.322* 0.248 -0.022** 0.064** 0.336** 0.100* 0.330 
Wholesale & Retail 0.022** 0.348** 0.283  0.002 0.050** 0.327** 0.079** 0.343 
Everything Else 0.026** 0.371** 0.315  0.001 0.056** 0.368** 0.050* 0.369 
All Groups 0.022** 0.368** 0.306 -0.002* 0.055** 0.336** 0.078** 0.356 
Dependent variable: D  Short Term Debt 
Consumer Nondurable 0.003 0.085* 0.075 -0.003* 0.018** 0.068** 0.048** 0.117 
Consumer Durables 0.003 0.101* 0.093 -0.002* 0.018** 0.070** 0.066** 0.114 
Oil, Gas and Coal 0.007 0.068 0.082 -0.001 0.019** 0.047** 0.031* 0.131 
Chemicals and Allied Products 0.003 0.074* 0.086  0.000 0.010** 0.051** 0.035* 0.110 
Manufacturing 0.003 0.074* 0.055 -0.002* 0.011** 0.077** 0.005 0.071 
Telephones and Television 0.008 0.000 0.052     -0.002 0.007* 0.018** 0.020* 0.080 
Wholesale & Retail 0.004* 0.080* 0.088  0.000 0.013** 0.075** 0.030** 0.115 
Everything Else 0.003 0.029 0.054 -0.001 0.004* 0.056** 0.030* 0.074 
All Groups 0.003* 0.055* 0.104 -0.001* 0.009** 0.059** 0.004 0.150 
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Firms below the target and in need for external funds are supposed to issue debt. This will 
positively affect their rate of adjustment (a positive sign of Fin*D2). If these firms have a 
financing surplus then this will reduce their rate of adjustment (a negative sign of Fin*D3), 
unless, they use their financing surplus to repurchase equity.    
 
       If fixed costs constitute a major portion of the total costs of changing capital structure, firms 
with optimal leverage will alter their capital structure only if they are sufficiently far away from 
the optimal capital structure. Thus, the likelihood of adjustment is a positive function of the 
distance between optimal and actual leverage. To test this hypothesis, I use the distance from the 
target leverage (Dis); the expected sign of this variable is positive for the firms above or below 
their target leverage. 
 
       If firms follow the trade-off theory in the long-run, they may deviate from the target in the 
short-run due to the pecking order theory factors. On other words, firms view the trade-off and 
the pecking order theory as not mutually exclusive. We expect to find that these factors 
contribute positively or negatively in the rate of adjustment. For example, firms below the target 
and have high information asymmetry ( Info ) are expected to use debt financing under the 
pecking order theory such behavior will contribute positively in the rate of adjustment toward the 
target. Also, if firms timing their equity issue with a favorable market conditions, the stock price 
run up (St) will contribute positively in the rate of adjustment if they are above their target 
leverage and negatively if they are below their target leverage. 
 
2.8.1. The Short-Run Rate of Adjustment and the Firms’ Attributes - Univariate Analysis 
          
         According to the trade-off theory, firms have a target leverage at which their value is 
maximized. That is, when firms move closer to their target they have higher value, on average, 
than if they would have move away from the target leverage. Thus, managers find it beneficial to 
adjust toward this target in the long-run. However, in the short-run firms could deviate from the 
target leverage due to different reasons. For example, if firms have a high future growth options 
and they would like to preserve their debt capacity to finance such a future growth, firms those 
below the target have less incentive to adjust toward the target in the short-run. Accordingly, 
firms above the target leverage tend to reduce their debt leading to higher rate of adjustment or 
even over shooting the target. Stock prices run up or decline is another factor that could make 
firms deviate from target leverage. If firms find out that the market overvalues their equity, this 
encourage them to issue equity leading firms below the target to move away from the target 
leverage or toward the target leverage for firms above the target. 
 
         This raise the possibility that moving away from or overshooting the target leverage is 
driven by the pecking order theory factors, market conditions, and agency costs. To investigate 
what characterize firms that adjust or overshoot or move away form their target leverage in the 
short-run, firms are classified in two main groups: firms above the target and firms below the 
target. For each firm (i), the short-run rate of adjustment is calculated using the following 
equation: 
it
itit
itit
DD
DD
,
,1
*
,
,1, a=
-
-
-
-
                         (22) 
For each group firms are classified in three subgroups as the following   
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1-Below the target leverage subgroups. 
1, >ita  Firms that over adjust. 
10 , £< ita  Firms that move toward the target. 
0, <ita  Firms that move away from the target. 
2- Above the target leverage subgroups. 
1, >ita  Firms that over adjust. 
10 , £< ita  Firms that move toward the target. 
0, <ita  Firms that move away from the target.  
 
         Table 2.10 reports the mean of the adjustment rate and the number of observations for each 
subgroup. About 48% of the firms that operate below the target leverage adjust toward the target, 
20% over adjust, and the rest move away from the target. For firms that operate above the target, 
42% of those adjust toward the target, 22% over adjust, and 36% move away from the target.  
 
         Table 2.11 reports a summary statistics of the firm’s characteristics in each of the above 
subgroups. For the firms group that are below the target, firms with low growth options, higher 
sales, higher tangible assets, higher marginal tax rate, lower net loss carry forward, lower R&D, 
less financial distress, higher information asymmetry, higher deficit relative to their assets and 
higher stock prices decline are the firms which overshoot their target. Firms with smaller size, 
lower sales, high growth options, lower tangible assets, lower marginal tax rate, higher net loss 
carry forward, higher R&D, higher stock price run up, more financial distress and lower deficit 
are the firms which move away from their target.  
 
       For the firms group that are above their target, firms with smaller size, lower sales, high 
growth options, lower tangible assets, lower marginal tax rate, higher R&D, higher information 
asymmetry, more financial distress, higher stock price run up and higher financing surplus are 
the firms which overshoot their target. While firms that move away from their target are the 
firms which have a larger size, low growth options, high tangible assets, high financing deficit, 
and a decline in their stock prices.       The above results suggest that in addition to the trade-off 
factors, the pecking order theory factors characterize the firms who deviate from their target 
leverage (move away or overshoot). Higher information asymmetry, higher debt capacity, lower 
stock price run up, lower growth options, and higher financing deficit are associated with firms 
that overshot their target form below or firms that move away from their target from above. 
Whereas, lower information asymmetry, lower debt capacity, higher stock price run up, higher 
growth options, and lower financing deficit are associated with firms that overshot their target 
form above or firms that move away from their target from below.  
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Table 2.10- The Short-Run Rate of Adjustment 
 
Firms are classified in two main groups: Firms below their target leverage and Firms above their target 
leverage. For each firm the adjustment coefficient is calculated using the following equation: 
a=-- -- 1
*
1 tttt DDDD . Where Dt is the total debt at time t, D
* is the target leverage at time t. Where the target 
leverage measured by industry leverage median. For firms above their target leverage, firms classified into 
three subgroups as the following: 0<ta , firms move away from the target, 10 £< ta , firms adjust toward the 
target, 1>ta , firms overshoot the target. The same sub-grouping applies to firms above their target leverage. 
Panel A reports the mean of ta  for each subgroup. Panel B reports the percentage of observation in each 
subgroup and the number of observations in each industry group.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Below the target group Above the target group 
 
Firms 
move away 
from the 
target 
Firms 
adjust 
toward the 
target 
Firms 
overshoot 
the target 
All 
Firms 
move away 
from the 
target 
Firms 
adjust 
toward the 
target 
Firms 
overshoot 
the target 
All 
Panel A Mean 
Consumer Nondurable -0.49 0.34 1.70 0.30 -0.83 0.44 1.83 0.31 
Consumer Durables -0.54 0.36 1.79 0.30 -0.82 0.43 1.87 0.33 
Oil, Gas and Coal -0.55 0.32 1.87 0.32 -0.87 0.36 2.05 0.27 
Chemicals & Allied Products -0.47 0.23 2.03 0.25 -0.82 0.34 1.99 0.15 
Manufacturing -0.50 0.28 1.85 0.27 -0.75 0.39 1.88 0.25 
Telephones and Television -0.52 0.36 1.80 0.38 -0.80 0.36 1.91 0.26 
Wholesale & Retail -0.55 0.30 1.87 0.32 -0.80 0.38 1.90 0.25 
Everything Else -0.51 0.33 1.80 0.37 -0.78 0.40 1.89 0.32 
Total -0.52 0.31 1.84 0.31 -0.80 0.39 1.90 0.26 
Panel B % Of Observations N % Of Observations N 
Consumer Nondurable   36%   45%   19% 3738    34% 43%  23% 3553 
Consumer Durables   36%   43%   21% 2767    34% 42%  24% 2491 
Oil, Gas and Coal   34%   45%   21% 2292    37% 38%  25% 2280 
Chemicals and Allied Products  33%   49%   18% 3018    40% 42%  18% 3025 
Manufacturing   33%   48%   19% 12089    36% 43%  21% 12601 
Telephones and Television   32%   46%   22% 1258    40% 33%  27% 1373 
Wholesale & Retail   30%   50%   20% 11620    37% 41%  22% 10917 
Everything Else   31%   48%   21% 5019    34% 42%  24% 5131 
Total   32%   48%   20% 41801    36% 42% 22% 41371 
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Table 2.11- the Short-Run Rate of Adjustment- the Firms Attributes 
 
Firms below and above their target leverage are classified in three subgroups, firms move 
away from the target; firms adjust toward the target and firms that overshot the target. The 
firms’ characteristics and the differences in those characteristics are reported for each 
subgroup. Size is the logarithm of the total assets. Sales are the logarithm of the net sales. 
Marginal tax rate is the simulated MTR provided by John Graham. Tang is the ratio of 
tangible assets to total assets. Net Loss Carry forward the ratio of firms net loss carry forward 
to total assets. Non-debt tax shield is the ratio of deprecation and investment tax credit to total 
assets. RDAD is the ratio of R&D and advertising expenses to total assets. Altman Z equals the 
sum of 3.3 times earnings before interest and taxes plus sales plus 1.4 times retained earnings 
plus 1.2 times working capital divided by total assets. Market-to-Book ratio is the ratio of 
market value (book value of assets plus the difference between market value of equity and the 
book value of equity) to total assets. Information asymmetry computed as the standard 
deviation of the value weighted market adjusted return residuals, calculated on the daily base 
for each firm-year. St is a proxy for stock prices run up –decline calculated as the ratio of the 
stock price at time t relative to the price at time t-1. Financing deficit-surplus is the firm’s 
Financing deficit-surplus relative to total assets. ** and * indicate that difference in the means 
is statistically different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels.     
 
 
 
 
Mean differences 
Attributes 
Firms move 
away from the 
target 
(1) 
Firms adjust 
toward the 
target 
(2) 
Firms 
overshoot the 
target 
(3) (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (2)-(3) 
Below the target group 
Size  4.710  5.304  5.385 -0.594** -0.675** -0.081** 
Sales  4.635  5.121  5.347 -0.486** -0.712** -0.226** 
Tangible Assets  0.280  0.366  0.371 -0.086** -0.091** -0.005 
Marginal tax rate  0.239  0.248  0.261 -0.009** -0.022** -0.013** 
Net Loss Carry forward  0.106  0.063  0.086  0.044**  0.020** -0.023** 
Non debt tax shield  0.057  0.047  0.046  0.010  0.011  0.001 
RDAD  0.069  0.042  0.039  0.027**  0.029**  0.003 
Altman Z   1.111  2.381  3.175 -1.270** -2.063** -0.794* 
Market-to-Book ratio  2.216  1.729  1.627  0.487**  0.589**  0.101** 
Information asymmetry  0.535  0.589  0.694 -0.054* -0.159* -0.105** 
St   1.431 1.100  0.833  0.331*  0.598**  0.267* 
Financing deficit-surplus  0.074  0.125  0.257 -0.051** -0.183** -0.132** 
Above the target group 
Size  5.265  5.087  4.844  0.178**  0.422**  0.244** 
Sales  5.164  5.129  4.938  0.035  0.226**  0.191** 
Tangible Assets  0.373  0.348  0.315  0.025**  0.058**  0.033** 
Marginal tax rate  0.243  0.244  0.235 -0.001  0.009**  0.009** 
Net Loss Carry forward  0.149  0.174  0.156 -0.025** -0.007  0.018 
Non debt tax shield  0.053  0.058  0.055 -0.005** -0.002  0.003** 
RDAD  0.046  0.050  0.055 -0.004** -0.008** -0.004 
Altman Z   4.464  2.105  1.658  2.359**  2.806**  0.447 
Market-to-Book ratio  1.561  1.548  1.797  0.013 -0.236** -0.249** 
Information asymmetry  0.759  0.824  0.809 -0.065* -0.050*  0.015 
St   0.550  1.230  1.582 -0.680** -1.032** -0.352 
Financing deficit-surplus  0.131 -0.042 -0.074  0.173**  0.204**  0.032** 
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2.8.2. Empirical Results – Multivariate Analysis      
 
        Table 2.12 reports the estimation results of the model using the Fama-MacBeth method. 
The model is estimated for firms above and below their target. For the long-term debt 
contribution in the total rate of adjustments, high growth options tend to reduce the rate of 
adjustment for firms below their target leverage and to accelerate it for firms above their target 
leverage. However, high growth options increase the total rate of adjustment through the short-
term debt contribution in the total rate of adjustments for firms below the target leverage. 
 
The expected sign of the growth options on the rate of adjustment for the short-term debt is the 
opposite of the expected one, for firms that above their target. The tangible assets have a positive 
impact on the rate of adjustment in the long-term debt model and in the short-term debt model 
for firms that adjust from below. For these firms, size has a positive impact on the contribution 
of the long-term debt in the total rate of adjustments and a negative impact on the contribution of 
the short-term debt in the total rate of adjustments. 
 
       For firms that adjust from above, the tangible assets has insignificant impact on the short-
term debt contribution in the total rate of adjustments, while it is negatively significant for the 
contribution of the long-term debt in the total rate of adjustments. In the same time, size shows a 
positive significant effect on the long-term debt contribution in the total rate of adjustment. 
 
       Higher information asymmetry contributes positively in the rate of adjustment for firms 
below their target and negatively for firms above their target. This is consistent with the effect of 
the pecking order behavior within the context of the trade-off theory. Yet, the information 
asymmetry has no significant impact on the short-term debt contribution in the total rate of 
adjustments. The market equity conditions play a significant role in the rate of adjustments. 
Stock prices run up reduce the rate of adjustments for firms below the target and increase the rate 
of adjustments for firms above the target.  
 
       As predicted, the non-debt tax shields sources are negatively (positively) affecting the long-
term debt contribution in the total rate of adjustments rate for firms below (above) their target, 
but these factors have no effect in the short-term debt contribution in the total rate of adjustments 
rate. 
 
        Firm with a high marginal tax rate adjust faster toward the target relative to firms that have 
a net loss carry forward, when they are below their target leverage; while when these firms are 
above their target leverage, high marginal tax rate decreases the rate of adjustment toward the 
target relative to those which have a net loss carry forward. Yet, marginal tax rate has no 
significant effect on the short-term debt model except for firms that operate below their target 
leverage. 
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Table 2.12- The Factors Affecting the Rate of Adjustment 
 
Firms are classified in two main groups: firms below their target leverage and firms 
above their target leverage. The dependent variables are the changes in long-term debt 
and short–term debt scaled by total assets. The Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions are 
run for each year of 1980-2001 periods. The rate of adjustment allowed being a function 
of the firms’ attributes. M/B is the market to book ratio. Tang is the ratio of tangible 
assets to total assets. Info is a metric proxy of information asymmetry computed as the 
standard deviation of the value weighted market adjusted return residuals, calculated on 
the daily base for each firm-year. St is a proxy for stock prices run up –decline calculated 
as the ratio of the stock price at time t relative to the price at time t-1. MTR is the 
marginal tax rate at time t-1. D1 is an indictor variable takes the value of one if the firm 
has net loss carry forward at time t-1. NDTS is the non-debt tax shield, the sum of 
depreciation and investment tax credits relative to total assets. RDAD is the summation 
of R&D and the advertising expenses relative to total assets. Dis is the absolute value of 
the distance from the target leverage at time t-1. Fin is the firms’ financing deficit-
surplus. D2 is an indictor variable takes the value of one if Fin>0 (firms are in financing 
deficit), zero otherwise. D3 is an indictor variable takes the value of 1 if Fin<0 (firms are 
in financing surplus), 0 otherwise. Size is the logarithm of the total assets. ** and * 
indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Below the target leverage group Above the target leverage group 
Independent variable  
D Long Term 
Debt 
D Short Term 
Debt 
D Long Term 
Debt 
D Short Term 
Debt 
Constant  0.015**  0.007**  0.019**  0.003* 
M/B -0.053**  0.007*  0.051*  0.031* 
Tang  0.232**  0.069** -0.057** -0.022 
Info  0.060**  0.043 -0.016*  0.005 
St -0.010** -0.007**  0.080**  0.010* 
MTRt-1  0.314*  0.257** -0.303* -0.009 
MTRt-1* D1 -0.231*  0.773  0.464** -0.371 
NDTS -0.112*  0.236  0.267* -0.509 
RDAD -0.494**  0.027  0.074*  0.216 
Distance   0.073** -0.051  0.112* -0.014 
Fin* D2  1.621**  0.197** -0.921** -0.189* 
Fin* D3 -1.002* -0.561*  0.328**  0.106* 
Size  0.029** -0.002*  0.022**  0.004 
Adj-R2  0.484  0.150  0.587  0.186 
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Firms farther away from the target have tendency to adjust faster toward the target using long-
term debt regardless if they are above their target or below their target. However, the distance 
from the target leverage has no significant effect on the rate of adjustment of the short-term debt. 
Finally, the financing deficit plays a significant role in increasing the rate of adjustment for firms 
below the target and reducing it for firms above the target. On the other hand, the financing 
surplus plays a significant role in increasing the rate of adjustment for firms above the target and 
reducing it for firms below the target. 
 
        Putting together, the factors affecting the proportion of debt financing and those affecting 
the rate of adjustment indicate that the trade-off model and the pecking order model are not 
mutually exclusive. Managers tend to adjust toward target leverage but this does not prevent 
them from deviating from this target to take advantage of the market equity conditions and the 
information asymmetry problem. Consistent with this conclusion, the trade-off theory factors 
play significant role in determining the proportion of debt financing (reduction relative to the 
financing deficit (surplus). 
 
2.9. THE FINANCING (REPURCHASES) CHOICES AND THE SIZE OF ISSUE 
(REPURCHASES) 
 
        The previous literature of examining the pecking order and the trade-off theory through the 
debt versus equity choice and securities repurchases choice (Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 
(2001), Hovakimian (2003) and Korajczyk and Levy (2003)) does not control for the firms’ 
financing deficit or surplus when they issue or repurchases securities. In addition, the 
combination issue (repurchases) of debt and equity has given almost no attention in the literature. 
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) find evidence that the factors affecting the choice of the 
form of financing are different then those affect the choice of the size of financing (repurchases). 
Such finding required studying those factors separately, but simultaneously. Thus, this section 
focuses on studying the factors affecting the firms’ choice of issue (repurchases) equity, debt, 
and the combination of both and simultaneously the composition of combination issue 
(repurchases). 
 
2.9.1. The Model 
 
        Because the choice of financing method is interdependent, a two stage Bivariate Probit-Tobit 
model is used. The first stage examines the factors affecting the firms’ choice of the form of 
financing (repurchases). The second stage examines the factors that affect the size of issue 
(repurchases) given that the firm decides to use a particular form of financing (repurchases). The 
model setup is as the following: 
1,1
*
,1 ea += ii xy (24a) 
2,2
*
,2 eb += ii xy  (24b) 
Equation (24a) is the selection function of issuing debt or not and equation (24b) is the selection 
function of issuing equity or not. The ii xx ,2,1 , denotes vectors of exogenous variables (for the i
th 
firm) and the ba ,  are vectors of parameters. The observed outcomes are defined by the binary 
indicator variables y1 and y2. The model is completed with the size of issue (repurchase) equation 
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3,3 el += ii xz    (24c) 
iz  is the size of debt issue (repurchases) relative to the financing deficit (surplus) for the i
th 
firm and ix ,3  is  vector of exogenous variables. The error terms 21 ,ee and 3e  are distributed 
according to the trivariate normal distribution with zero means, variances equal 2s and 
correlation coefficients 1312 , rr ; and 23r ; respectively. The correlation coefficient 12r  may be 
negative, for example, when unobservable factors that encourage firms to issue debt also could 
lead them not to issue equity. The bivariate probit model utilizes a maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) method to allow the error terms to be correlated across equations. The 
parameter 12r  estimates the correlation between the error terms of the bivariate probit equations. 
If the MLE estimate of the correlation coefficient 12r  is significant, then the bivariate probit 
estimation is more efficient than that of independent probit equations (Meng and Schmidt 
(1985)). 
 
        At the second estimation stage, the Tobit issue (repurchases) size equations incorporate the 
probability of the limit and nonlimit observations from the first stage estimation and takes in 
consideration the correlation across equations, which may arise because of unobservables 
(captured by 3e ) may be correlated with the unobservables 21 ,ee that influence the choice of the 
form of financing.27 That is, the correlation coefficients 2313 , rr  may not equal zero.  
 
          2.9.1.1. The Model- Security Issuance Decision  
 
The model specifications for the financing choice are  
1,1
*
,1 ea += ii xy   (25a) 
2,2
*
,2 eb += ii xy   (25b) 
3,3 el += ii xz            (25c) 
11 =y   If the firm issues debt and 0 if not.  
12 =y  If the firm issues equity and 0 if not. 
iz  the size of debt issue relative to the financing deficit for the i
th firm. 
z is bounded by 0 form below and 1 from above when 1,1 21 == yy (double censoring) and 
bounded by 1 form below (lower tail censoring) when 0,1 21 == yy .  
 
        The bivariate probit process for both decisions is influenced by the x vector variables, which 
include the standard sets of variables used in the previous empirical work on the debt equity 
choice. Specifically, market to book ratio (M/B), firms tangible assets (Tang), size of the 
financing deficit-surplus (Fin), sources of non-debt tax shields (NDTS, RDAD), profitability 
(MTR), net loss carry forward (NLCF), stock prices run up / decline (St), Firm size (Size), and the 
projected deviation from the target leverage (PDev).28 Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) 
introduce the projected deviation from the target leverage (PDev) in their study of the debt equity 
                                                 
27 The two stage estimation method introduced by Heckman (1976), Lee (1976) and Amemiya (1978,1979). 
28 For studies that use these factors, see for example, Marsh (1982), Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), 
Hovakimian (2003) and Korajczyk and Levy (2003).  
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choice. This variable measures the projected differences between the absolute deviation from the 
target leverage if firm issues debt and the absolute deviation from the target if firms issue the 
same amount of equity ( etTLevetTLev ED argarg --- ). 
 
        Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman’s (2001) projected deviation approach has strong intuitive 
appeal. However, since I am interested in studying the proportion of debt financing (reduction) 
rather than the choice of financing, modification of their measure of the projected deviation from 
the target leverage is needed. The modified measures are   
etTLevetTLevPDev ED argarg ** ---=              (26) 
For the financing deficit group 
deficitFinancingTAIssuee
deficitFinancingDebtIssuee
Lev D
+
+
=
Pr
Pr*      (26a) 
deficitFinancingTAIssuee
DebtIssuee
Lev E
+
=
Pr
Pr*           (26b) 
 
  
Where the firms target leverage is measured by the industry leverage median. If firms take in 
consideration their target leverage when they decide their choice of the financing form, we 
expect that the PDev variable is negatively (positively) related to the probability of debt (equity) 
financing, since that a positive value of PDev indicate that the firms will ended up closer to the 
target if they issue equity.  
 
1987,16
543210
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SizeStNLCFMTR
NDTSRDADPDevFinTangBMy
  (27a) 
2987,16
543210
*
2 )/(
haaaa
aaaaaa
++++
++++++=
- iiiit
iiiiii
SizeStNLCFMTR
NDTSRDADPDevFinTangBMy
   (27b) 
 
11 =y   If the firm issues debt and 0 if not.  
12 =y  If the firm issues equity and 0 if not. 
 
M/B Market to book ratio of ith firm. 
Tang Tangible assets to total assets of ith firm. 
Fin Financing deficit to total assets of ith firm. 
PDev Projected deviation from the target leverage of ith firm.  
RDAD The sum of R&D and the advertising expenses relative to total assets of ith firm. 
NDTS Non-Debt tax shield, the sum of depreciation and investment tax credits to total 
assets of ith firm. 
MTR Marginal tax rate at time t-1 of ith firm. 
NLCF Net loss carry forward at time t-1 to total assets of ith firm. 
St Stock prices ratio between t and t-1 of ith firm.  
Size The logarithm of total assets of ith firm. 
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      To investigate whether the firm characteristics that affect the choice of the financing form 
also affect the amount of funds that they issue, the second stage regression is modeled as the 
following  
 
[ ]
2987,16
54321021 )/(1,1|
pqqqq
qqqqqq
++++
++++++===
- iiiit
iiiiii
SizeStNLCFMTR
NDTSRDADDevFinTangBMyyzE
 (28a) 
 
[ ]
2987,16
54321021 )/(0,1|
kffff
ffffff
++++
++++++===
- iiiit
iiiiii
SizeStNLCFMTR
NDTSRDADDevFinTangBMyyzE
(28b) 
 
  iz        the size of debt issue relative to the financing deficit for the i
th firm.  
 11 =y   If the firm issues debt and 0 if not.  
 12 =y  If the firm issues equity and 0 if not. 
M/B Market to book ratio of ith firm. 
Tang Tangible assets to total assets of ith firm. 
Fin Financing deficit to total assets of ith firm. 
Dev Actual deviation from the target leverage of ith firm.  
RDAD The sum of R&D and the advertising expenses relative to total assets of ith firm. 
NDTS Non-Debt tax shield, the sum of depreciation and investment tax credits to total 
assets of ith firm. 
MTR Marginal tax rate at time t-1 of ith firm. 
NLCF Net loss carry forward at time t-1 to total assets of ith firm. 
St Stock prices ratio between t and t-1 of ith firm.  
Size The logarithm of total assets of ith firm. 
 
 
       While the choice of financing is assumed to be function of the projected deviation from the 
target, the issue size (repurchases) is assumed to be function of the actual deviation from the 
target leverage (Dev). The expected signs of these variables are discussed earlier in this study. 
 
            2.9.1.1. The Model- Security Repurchase Decision 
 
The model specifications for the security reduction choice are  
1,1
*
,1 ea += ii wq   (29a) 
                                                    2,2
*
,2 eb += ii wq  (29b) 
3,3 el += ii ur             (29c) 
11 =q   If the firm reduces debt and 0 if not.  
12 =q  If the firm reduces equity and 0 if not. 
ir  is the size of debt reduction relative to the financing surplus for the i
th firm. 
 
r is bounded by 0 form below and 1 from above when 1,1 21 == qq (double censoring) and 
bounded by 1 form below (lower tail censoring) when 0,1 21 == qq .  
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11 =q   If the firm reduces debt and 0 if not.  
12 =q  If the firm reduces equity and 0 if not. 
 
M/B Market to book ratio of ith firm. 
Tang Tangible assets to total assets of ith firm. 
Fin Financing surplus to total assets of ith firm. 
PDev Projected deviation from the target leverage of ith firm.  
RDAD The sum of R&D and the advertising expenses relative to total assets of ith firm. 
NDTS Non-Debt tax shield, the sum of depreciation and investment tax credits to total 
assets of ith firm. 
MTR Marginal tax rate at time t-1 of ith firm. 
NLCF Net loss carry forward at time t-1 to total assets of ith firm. 
St Stock prices ratio between t and t-1 of ith firm.  
Size The logarithm of total assets of ith firm. 
 
For the financing surplus group a positive value of PDev indicates that the firms will end up 
closer to the target if they repurchase more equity. Thus, we expect that the choice of debt 
(equity) repurchase to be negatively (positively) related to PDev. 
etTLevetTLevPDev ED argarg ** ---=              (31) 
 
surplusFinancingTAIssuee
surplusFinancingDebtIssuee
Lev D
-
-
=
Pr
Pr*      (31a) 
surplusFinancingTAIssuee
DebtIssuee
Lev E
-
=
Pr
Pr*         (31b) 
 
      To investigate whether the firm characteristics that affect the security reduction choice also 
affect the amount of funds that they reduce, the second stage regression is modeled as the 
following  
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ir  is the size of debt reduction relative to the financing surplus for the i
th firm. 
11 =q   If the firm reduces debt and 0 if not.  
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12 =q  If the firm reduces equity and 0 if not. 
 
M/B Market to book ratio of ith firm. 
Tang Tangible assets to total assets of ith firm. 
Fin Financing surplus to total assets of ith firm. 
Dev Actual deviation from the target leverage of ith firm.  
RDAD The sum of R&D and the advertising expenses relative to total assets of ith firm. 
NDTS Non-Debt tax shield, the sum of depreciation and investment tax credits to total 
assets of ith firm. 
MTR Marginal tax rate at time t-1 of ith firm. 
NLCF Net loss carry forward at time t-1 to total assets of ith firm. 
St Stock prices ratio between t and t-1 of ith firm.  
Size The logarithm of total assets of ith firm. 
 
 
 
2.9.2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
                Table 2.13 presents the two-stage model estimation results for the financing deficit 
group. Columns 2 to 5 show the partial derivative of the probability of issuing debt given that the 
firms already issued equity, the probability of issuing equity given that the firms already issued 
debt, the probability of issuing pure debt or pure debt and reduce equity, and the probability of 
issuing pure equity or pure equity and reduce debt, respectively. Columns 6 and 7 present the 
determinants of: the size of debt issue given that the firm issued a combination of debt and 
equity, and the size of debt issue given that the firm issued pure debt, respectively. The 
significant negative correlation, -0.283, between the bivariate probit equations indicates that 
unobservable factors that encourage firms to issue debt lead them not to issue equity and vice 
versa. At the same time, the correlations between the Bivariate Probit model equations and the 
Tobit equations indicate that unobservable factors that encourage firms to issue debt also lead 
them to issue higher amount of debt and lower amount of equity.  
      
        The market to book ratio is negatively (positively) related to both the probability of issuing 
debt (equity) and the size of issue. Unlike Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman who find a positive 
relation between the issue size of long-term debt and market to book ratio, my results indicate 
that such a relation is negative. This might occur due to controlling for the firms’ financing 
deficit-surplus status. This result is consistent with notation that high growth options firms have 
lower probability to issue debt and when they issue debt, higher growth options lead them to 
issue debt by smaller size issues relative to firms with a low growth options. 
 
       Tangible assets are positively related to both the probability of issuing debt and the size of 
issue. Yet, the magnitude of this impact is much higher for the probability of debt financing 
relative to that of equity financing. This result is consistent with the prediction of the pecking 
order theory, in which firms with high debt capacity are most likely to issue debt rather than 
equity, and when they issue debt the higher the debt capacity the higher the size of issue. The 
tangible assets are negatively related to the likelihood of issuing equity. as predicted by the trade-
off theory. 
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Table 2.13- The Financing Choices and the Size of Issue  
 
Bivariate Probit –Tobit two stage method estimation .The dependent variables in the first 
stage are: y1 equal 1 if the firm issues debt and 0 otherwise and y2 equal 1 if the firm issues 
equity and 0. In the second stage, Z is the size of debt issue relative to the financing deficit. 
The coefficients represent the partial derivative evaluated at the mean of the independent 
variables. M/B is the market to book ratio. Tang is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. 
Deficit is the sum investment, change in working capital (excluding short-term debt) minus 
cash flow after interest, taxes, and dividends relative to total assets. Dev is the deviation from 
the target leverage at time t-1. RDAD is the summation of R&D and the advertising expenses 
relative to total assets. NDTS is the non-debt tax shield, the sum of depreciation and 
investment tax credits relative to total assets. MTR is the marginal tax rate at time t-1. NLCF 
is the ratio of firms net loss carry forward to total assets. St is a proxy for stock prices run up 
–decline calculated as the ratio of the stock price at time t relative to the price at time t-1. Size 
is the logarithm of the total assets. ** and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically 
different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels. 
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E[Z|y1=1,y2=1] 
 
E[Z|y1=1,y2=0} 
 
M/B -0.054**  0.064** -0.041**  0.056** -0.049** -0.083** 
Tang  0.256** -0.031*  0.209** -0.024*  0.135**  0.236* 
Deficit   0.441**  0.579*  0.384**  0.467*  0.149** -1.089** 
PDev -0.386**  0.343** -0.300**  0.255**   
Dev      0.392**  0.818** 
RDAD -0.407*  0.304** -0.345**  0.193** -0.270** -0.647** 
NDTS -0.317* -0.094 -0.243* -0.103 -0.238*  0.083 
MTRt-1  0.223** -0.266*  0.177** -0.214**  0.163**  0.488** 
NLCF -0.012*  0.018**     -0.010*  0.016** -0.001  -0.046* 
St -0.013**  0.025** -0.005**  0.014** -0.017* -0.029* 
Size  0.028* -0.004  0.023*  0.001  0.020*  0.055* 
12r  -0.283**   
13r       0.613**  0.794** 
23r      -0.588** -0.367** 
R2      0.133  0.143 
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        The financing deficit has a positive impact on the likelihood of issuing debt or equity; 
numerically it has higher impact on the probability of issuing equity. This suggests that firms 
with a large financing deficit are not able to entirely finance their deficit by issuing debt only, 
given their debt capacity. The financing deficit has also a positive impact on the size of the debt 
issues for firms that issue a combination of debt and equity, but it has a negative impact on the 
pure debt issues. This suggests that firms with a large financing deficit do not tend to substitute 
equity for debt.  
 
        The projected deviation from the target leverage has the expected signs; firms that are better 
off issuing equity (ending closer to the target leverage by issuing equity) are most likely to issue 
equity instead of debt. The size of debt issue is positively related to the actual deviation from the 
target leverage, suggesting that the debt issue size is an increasing function of the distance from 
the target leverage for firms below their target leverage and a decreasing function for firms 
above their target leverage. Moreover, the higher coefficients of the actual deviation from the 
target leverage in the debt (Z|y1=1,y2=0) imply that firms below their target leverage tend to 
substitute equity for debt, whereas firms above their target leverage tend to substitute debt for 
equity.  
 
        Examining the impact of the sources of non-debt tax shields (RDAD and NDTS) on the 
choice and the size of the form of financing reveals that NDTS play a significant role in the 
decision to issue debt but not in the decision to issue equity. Whereas NDTS has only a 
significant role in the size of debt issue if firms issue a combination of debt and equity, While the 
RDAD play a significant role in the decision to issue debt or equity and in the size of the issue. 
The signs of the RDAD coefficients are consistent with the prediction of the trade-off theory and 
agency theory, where RDAD can be regarded as sources of non-debt tax shields or proxy for 
future growth options, respectively. 
 
        Consistent with trade-off theory firms with a higher marginal tax rate are more likely to 
issue debt rather than equity. Given the choice of combination issue, higher marginal tax rate 
encourages issuing more debt as proportion of their financing deficit. In addition, higher 
marginal tax rate encourages firms who issue pure debt to repurchase equity. 
 
        The net loss carry-forward increases the likelihood of issuing equity and decreases the 
likelihood of issued debt, but it has no effect on the size of the financing form. On the other 
hand, the net loss carry-forward encourages firms to substitute debt for equity. This suggests that 
firms suffering from a net loss carry forward, attempt to reduce their interest payment obligation 
by reducing the debt levels through equity issue. 
 
        The market-timing hypothesis finds a strong support for both the choice and the size of the 
financing form. A Stock price run up increases the likelihood of issuing equity and the size of 
equity issue relative to the financing deficit, for firms that issue combination of debt and equity. 
Whereas, higher stock price encourages firms to substitute debt for equity 
        Finally, firm size has a positive impact on the likelihood of issuing debt and the size of debt 
issue, while it has no significant impact on the likelihood of issuing equity. 
  
83
 
        Table 2.14 presents empirical results for the financing surplus group. Columns 2 to 5 show 
the partial derivative of the probability of repurchase debt given that the firms already 
repurchased equity, the probability of repurchase equity given that the firms already repurchase 
debt, the probability of repurchase debt or repurchase debt and issue equity, and the probability 
of repurchase equity or repurchase equity and issue debt, respectively. Columns 6 and 7 
respectively, present the factors affecting the size of debt repurchases given that the firms 
repurchase both debt and equity. The size of debt repurchases given that the firm repurchase debt 
only.  
 
        The market to book ratio is positively related to both the probability of repurchasing debt 
and the size of repurchases. The market to book ratio has no significant impact on the likelihood 
of equity repurchases. The tangible assets are positively related to both the probability of 
repurchasing debt and the size of debt repurchasing. The financing surplus has a positive impact 
on the likelihood of repurchasing debt or equity; numerically it has a higher impact on the 
probability of repurchasing debt. On the other hand, the financing surplus has a positive impact 
on the size the debt repurchases, for firms that repurchase a combination of debt and equity, but 
it has a negative impact on the pure debt and equity repurchases. Again, consistent with the 
results of the financing deficit group, this suggests that firms with a large financing surplus do 
not tend to substitute equity for debt. These results confirm my previous results that debt 
reductions track the financing surplus more closely than debt issues track the financing deficit. 
 
       The projected deviation from the target leverage has the expected sign; firms that are better 
off repurchasing equity (ending closer to the target leverage by repurchasing equity) are most 
likely to repurchase equity rather than debt. In addition, the actual deviation from the target 
leverage also indicates that firms below the target repurchase more equity and less debt, whereas 
firms above the target leverage repurchase more debt and less equity. 
 
       The RDAD variable shows no significant impact on the choice of equity or debt repurchases 
and on the size of repurchases. While the NDTS variable plays a positive significant role in the 
likelihood to repurchase debt and the size of debt repurchases, it has a negative significant one in 
the likelihood to repurchase equity and no effect on the size of equity   repurchases. A higher 
marginal tax rate increases the likelihood of equity repurchases more than it increase the 
likelihood of debt repurchases. While higher marginal tax rate decreases the size of debt 
repurchases, it has no effect on the size of equity repurchases. The net loss carry forward 
increases the likelihood of debt repurchases and decreases the likelihood of equity repurchases, 
while it has no affect on the size of equity repurchases. On the other hand, the net loss carry 
forward encourages firms to reduce their debt by an amount higher than their financing surplus 
by issuing equity (substitute debt for equity). The stock prices run up proxy has a significant 
impact on both the likelihood of securities repurchases and the size of repurchases. Higher stock 
prices increase the likelihood of debt repurchases and decreases the likelihood of equity 
repurchases, whereas higher stock prices encourages firms to repurchase more debt and to 
substitute debt for equity. 
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Table 2.14- The Repurchases Choices and the Size of Repurchases 
 
Bivariate Probit –Tobit two stage method estimation .The dependent variables in the first 
stage are: q1 equal 1 if the firm repurchases debt and 0 otherwise and q2 equal 1 if the firm 
repurchases equity and 0. In the second stage r is the size of debt repurchases relative to the 
financing surplus. The coefficients represent the partial derivative evaluated at the mean of 
the independent variables. M/B is the market to book ratio. Tang is the ratio of tangible 
assets to total assets. Deficit is the sum investment, change in working capital (excluding 
short-term debt) minus cash flow after interest, taxes, and dividends relative to total assets. 
Dev is the deviation from the target leverage at time t-1. RDAD is the summation of R&D 
and the advertising expenses relative to total assets. NDTS is the non-debt tax shield, the 
sum of depreciation and investment tax credits relative to total assets. MTR is the marginal 
tax rate at time t-1. NLCF is the ratio of firms net loss carry forward to total assets. St is a 
proxy for stock prices run up –decline calculated as the ratio of the stock price at time t 
relative to the price at time t-1. Size is the logarithm of the total assets. ** and * indicate 
that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at 0.01 and 0.05 levels. 
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E[r|q1=1,q2=1] E[r|q1=1,q2=0] 
M/B   0.038* -0.001  0.028* -0.003 0.027*  0.032** 
Tang   0.106** -0.167*  0.078** -0.181* 0.093*  0.360* 
Surplus   0.713**  0.104**  0.600*  0.189** 0.311**     -0.487* 
PDev -0.140*  0.150* -0.120*  0.156*   
Dev     -0.285* -0.148** 
RDAD -0.073  0.018 -0.057 -0.023 -0.297  0.036 
NDTS  0.564** -0.411**  0.571** -0.352**  0.238*  0.230** 
MTRt-1  0.136*  0.259**  0.100**  0.319** -0.033* -0.296** 
NLCF  0.029** -0.057**  0.015** -0.059**  0.071**  0.135** 
St  0.015** -0.093**  0.010** -0.120**  0.030*  0.025** 
Size  0.020  0.003  0.016  0.005  0.016  0.033 
12r  -0.248**   
13r       0.852**   0.800**  
23r      -0.479** -0.738**  
R2      0.107  0.168 
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       In summery, the examination of the factors affecting the choice of the financing form and 
the size of the issue indicate the trade off theory and the pecking order theory are not mutually 
exclusive. 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
 
        The examination of the factors that affect the choice of financing (repurchasing) form and 
the size of issue (repurchase) also support the notion that the trade-off and the pecking order 
theory are not mutually exclusive. The market to book ratio is negatively (positively) related to 
both the probability of issuing debt (equity) and the size of issue. The tangible assets are 
positively related to both the probability of issuing debt and the size of issue and negatively 
related to the likelihood of issuing equity. The financing deficit has a positive impact on the 
likelihood of issuing debt or equity, also it has a positive impact on the size of both the equity 
and the debt issues for firms that issue a combination of debt and equity, but it has a negative 
impact on the pure debt and equity issues. This suggests that firms with a large financing deficit 
do not tend to substitute debt for equity or equity for debt.  
 
          The two-stage model finds evidence in support of the trade-off theory; firms that are better 
off issuing equity (ending closer to the target leverage by issuing equity) are most likely to issue 
equity instead of debt. The size of debt (equity) issue is positively (negatively) related to the 
actual deviation from the target leverage, suggesting that debt (equity) issue size is an increasing 
(decreasing) function of the distance from the target leverage for firms below their target 
leverage and a decreasing (increasing) function for firms above their target leverage. In addition, 
the higher the marginal tax rates the higher the likelihood of issuing debt rather than equity. 
Higher marginal tax rate discourages firms that issue pure equity from repurchasing debt, and 
encourages firms that issue pure debt to repurchase equity. The net loss carry forward 
encourages firms to substitute debt for equity and discourages firms from substitute equity for 
debt. This suggests that firms suffering from a net loss carry forward, attempt to reduce their 
interest payment obligation by reducing the debt levels through equity issue. 
 
        The market-timing hypothesis finds a strong support for both the choice and the size of the 
financing form. Stock price run up increases (decreases) the likelihood of issuing (repurchasing) 
equity, while the size of equity issue (repurchase) relative to the financing deficit (surplus) is an 
increasing (decreasing) function of the stock prices run up. Higher stock prices increase the 
likelihood of debt repurchases and encourage firms to repurchase more debt and to substitute 
debt for equity. 
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Appendix A1: 
Fama-French industry classifications - 48 industry group 
 
1-Agriculture  33-Personal Services 
0100-0199 Agric production - crops 
0200-0299 Agric production - livestock 
0700-0799 Agricultural services 
0910-0919 Commercial fishing 
2048-2048 Prepared feeds for animals 
2-Food Products 
2000-2009 Food and kindred products 
2010-2019 Meat products 
2020-2029 Dairy products 
2030-2039 Canned-preserved fruits 
2040-2046 Flour and other grain mill products 
2050-2059 Bakery products 
2060-2063 Sugar and confectionery products 
2070-2079 Fats and oils 
2090-2092 Misc food preps 
2095-2095 Roasted coffee 
2098-2099 Misc food preparations 
4-Beer & Liquor 
2080-2080 Beverages 
2082-2082 Malt beverages 
2083-2083 Malt 
2084-2084 Wine 
2085-2085 Distilled and blended liquors 
6-Recreation 
0920-0999 Fishing, hunting & trapping 
3650-3651 Household audio visual equip 
3652-3652 Phonographic records 
3732-3732 Boat building and repair 
3930-3931 Musical instruments 
3940-3949 Toys 
7-Entertainment 
7020-7021 Rooming and boarding houses 
7030-7033 Camps and recreational vehicle parks 
7200-7200 Services - personal 
7210-7212 Services - laundry, cleaners 
7214-7214 Services - diaper service 
7215-7216 Services - coin-op cleaners, dry cleaners 
7217-7217 Services - carpet, upholstery cleaning 
7219-7219 Services - laundry, cleaners 
7220-7221 Services - photo studios, portrait  
7230-7231 Services - beauty shops 
7240-7241 Services - barber shops 
7250-7251 Services - shoe repair 
7260-7269 Services - funeral 
7270-7290 Services - miscellaneous 
7291-7291 Services - tax return 
7292-7299 Services - Miscellaneous 7395-7395 Services – photo 
finishing labs (School pictures)  
7500-7500 Services - auto repair, services 
7520-7529 Services - automobile parking 
7530-7539 Services - auto repair shops 
7540-7549 Services - auto services, except repair (car washes)  
7600-7600 Services - Misc repair services 
7620-7620 Services - Electrical repair shops 
7622-7622 Services - Radio and TV repair shops 
7623-7623 Services - Refridg and air conditioner repair 
7629-7629 Services - Electrical repair shops 
7630-7631 Services - Watch, clock and jewelry repair 
7640-7641 Services - Reupholster, furniture repair 
7690-7699 Services - Misc repair shops 
8100-8199 Services - legal 
8200-8299 Services - educational 
8300-8399 Services - social services 
8400-8499 Services - museums, galleries, botanic gardens 
8600-8699 Services - membership organizations 
8800-8899 Services - private households 
34-Business Services 
7800-7829 Services - motion picture production and distribution 
7830-7833 Services - motion picture theatres 
7840-7841 Services - video rental 
7900-7900 Services - amusement and recreation 
7910-7911 Services - dance studios 
7920-7929 Services - bands, entertainers 
7930-7933 Services - bowling centers 
7940-7949 Services - professional sports 
7980-7980 Amusement and recreation services (?) 
7990-7999 Services - misc entertainment 
8-Printing and Publishing 
2700-2709 Printing publishing and allied 
2710-2719 Newspapers: publishing-printing 
2720-2729 Periodicals: publishing-printing 
2730-2739 Books: publishing-printing 
2740-2749 Misc publishing 
2770-2771 Greeting card publishing 
2780-2789 Book binding 
2790-2799 Service industries for print trade  
9-Consumer Goods  
2047-2047 Dog and cat food 
2391-2392 Curtains, home furnishings 
2510-2519 Household furniture 
2590-2599 Misc furniture and fixtures 
2840-2843 Soap & other detergents 
2844-2844 Perfumes cosmetics 
3160-3161 Luggage 
3170-3171 Handbags and purses 
2750-2759 Commercial printing 
3993-3993 Signs, advertising specialty 
7218-7218 Services - industrial launderers 
7300-7300 Services - business services 
7310-7319 Services - advertising 
7320-7329 Services - credit reporting agencies, collection services 
7330-7339 Services - mailing, reproduction, commercial art  
7340-7342 Services - services to dwellings, other buildings 
7349-7349 Services - cleaning and builging maint 
7350-7351 Services - misc equip rental and leasing 
7352-7352 Services - medical equip rental 
7353-7353 Services - heavy construction equip rental 
7359-7359 Services - equip rental and leasing 
7360-7369 Services - personnel supply services 
7370-7372 Services - computer programming and data processing 
7374-7374 Services - computer processing, data prep 
7375-7375 Services - information retrieval services 
7376-7376 Services - computer facilities management service 
7377-7377 Services - computer rental and leasing 
7378-7378 Services - computer maintenance and repair 
7379-7379 Services - computer related services 
7380-7380 Services - misc business services 
7381-7382 Services - security 
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9-Consumer Goods  34-Business Services 
3172-3172 Personal leather goods, except handbags 
3190-3199 Leather goods 
3229-3229 Pressed and blown glass 
3260-3260 Pottery and related products 
3262-3263 China and earthenware table articles 
3269-3269 Pottery products 
3230-3231 Glass products 
3630-3639 Household appliances 
3750-3751 Motorcycles, bicycles and parts  (Harley & Huffy) 
3800-3800 Misc inst, photo goods, watches 
3860-3861 Photographic equip  (Kodak etc, but also Xerox) 
3870-3873 Watches clocks and parts 
3910-3911 Jewelry-precious metals 
3914-3914 Silverware 
3915-3915 Jewelers' findings, materials 
3960-3962 Costume jewelry and notions 
3991-3991 Brooms and brushes 
3995-3995 Burial caskets 
10-Apparel 
7383-7383 Services - news syndicates 
7384-7384 Services – photo finishing labs 
7385-7385 Services - telephone interconnections 
7389-7390 Services - misc business services 
7391-7391 Services - R&D labs 
7392-7392 Services - management consulting & P.R.  
7393-7393 Services - detective and protective (ADT) 
7394-7394 Services - equipment rental & leasing 
7396-7396 Services - trading stamp services 
7397-7397 Services - commercial testing labs 
7399-7399 Services - business services 
7510-7519 Services - truck, auto, trailer rental and leasing 
8700-8700 Services - engineering, accounting, research, 
management 
8710-8713 Services - engineering, accounting, surveying 
8720-8721 Services - accounting, auditing, bookkeeping 
8730-8734 Services - research, development, testing labs 
8740-8748 Services - management, public relations, consulting 
8900-8910 Services - misc 
8911-8911 Services - engineering & architect  
8920-8999 Services - misc 
35-Computers  
2300-2390 Apparel and other finished products 
3020-3021 Rubber and plastics footwear 
3100-3111 Leather tanning and finishing 
3130-3131 Boot, shoe cut stock, findings 
3140-3149 Footwear except rubber 
3150-3151 Leather gloves and mittens 
3963-3965 Fasteners, buttons, needles, pins 
11-Healthcare  
8000-8099 Services - health 
12-Medical Equipment 
3693-3693 X-ray, electro medical app 
3840-3849 Surg & med instru 
3850-3851 Ophthalmic goods 
13-Pharmaceutical Products 
3570-3579 Office computers 
3680-3680 Computers 
3681-3681 Computers - mini 
3682-3682 Computers - mainframe 
3683-3683 Computers - terminals 
3684-3684 Computers - disk & tape drives 
3685-3685 Computers - optical scanners 
3686-3686 Computers - graphics 
3687-3687 Computers - office automation systems 
3688-3688 Computers - peripherals 
3689-3689 Computers - equipment 
3695-3695 Magnetic and optical recording media 
7373-7373 Computer integrated systems design 
36-Electronic Equipment 
2830-2830 Drugs 
2831-2831 Biological products 
2833-2833 Medicinal chemicals 
2834-2834 Pharmaceutical preparations 
2835-2835 In vitro, in vivo diagnostics 
2836-2836 Biological products, except diagnostics 
14-Chemicals 
3622-3622 Industrial controls 
3661-3661 Telephone and telegraph apparatus 
3662-3662 Communications equipment 
3663-3663 Radio TV comm equip & apparatus 
3664-3664 Search, navigation, guidance systems 
3665-3665 Training equipment & simulators 
3666-3666 Alarm & signaling products 
3669-3669 Communication equipment 
3670-3679 Electronic components 
3810-3810 Search, detection, navigation, guidance 
3812-3812 Search, detection, navigation, guidance 
2800-2809 Chemicals and allied products 
2810-2819 Industrial inorganical chems 
2820-2829 Plastic material & synthetic resin  
2850-2859 Paints 
2860-2869 Industrial organic chems 
2870-2879 Agriculture chemicals 
2890-2899 Misc chemical products 37-Measuring and Control Equipment 
15-Rubber and Plastic Products 
3031-3031 Reclaimed rubber 
3041-3041 Rubber & plastic hose and belting 
3050-3053 Gaskets, hoses, etc 
3060-3069 Fabricated rubber products 
3070-3079 Misc rubber products (?) 
3080-3089 Misc plastic products 
3090-3099 Misc rubber and plastic products (?) 
16-Textiles 
3811-3811 Engr lab and research equipment 
3820-3820 Measuring and controlling equipment 
3821-3821 Lab apparatus and furniture 
3822-3822 Automatic controls - Envir and applic 
3823-3823 Industrial measurement instru 
3824-3824 Totalizing fluid meters 
3825-3825 Elec meas & test  instr 
3826-3826 Lab analytical instruments 
3827-3827 Optical instr and lenses 
3829-3829 Meas and control devices 
3830-3839 Optical instr and lenses 
38-Business Supplies 
2200-2269 Textile mill products 
2270-2279 Floor covering mills 
2280-2284 Yarn and thread mills 
2290-2295 Misc textile goods 
2297-2297 Nonwoven fabrics 
2520-2549 Office furniture and fixtures 
2600-2639 Paper and allied products 
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16-Textiles 38-Business Supplies 
2670-2699 Paper and allied products 
2760-2761 Manifold business forms 
3950-3955 Pens pencils and office supplies 
2298-2298 Cordage and twine 
2299-2299 Misc textile products 
2393-2395 Textile bags, canvas products 
2397-2399 Misc textile products 39-Shipping Containers  
17-Construction Mate rials 
0800-0899 Forestry 
2400-2439 Lumber and wood products 
2450-2459 Wood buildings-mobile homes 
2490-2499 Misc wood products 
2660-2661 Building paper and board mills 
2950-2952 Paving & roofing materials 
3200-3200 Stone, clay, glass, concrete etc 
3210-3211 Flat glass 
3240-3241 Cement hydraulic 
3250-3259 Structural clay prods 
3261-3261 Vitreous china plumbing fixtures 
3264-3264 Porcelain electrical supply  
3270-3275 Concrete gypsum & plaster 
3280-3281 Cut stone and stone products 
3290-3293 Abrasive and asbestos products 
3295-3299 Non-metalic mineral products 
3420-3429 Handtools and hardware 
3430-3433 Heating equip & plumbing fix  
3440-3441 Fabicated struct metal products 
3442-3442 Metal doors, frames 
3446-3446 Architectual or ornamental metal work 
3448-3448 Pre-fab metal buildings 
3449-3449 Misc structural metal work 
3450-3451 Screw machine products 
3452-3452 Bolts, nuts screws 
3490-3499 Misc fabricated metal products 
3996-3996 Hard surface floor cover 
18-Construction 
2440-2449 Wood containers 
2640-2659 Paperboard containers, boxes, drums, tubs 
3220-3221 Glass containers 
3410-3412 Metal cans and shipping containers 
40-Transportation 
4000-4013 Railroads-line haul 
4040-4049 Railway express service 
4100-4100 Transit and passenger trans 
4110-4119 Local passenger trans 
4120-4121 Taxicabs 
4130-4131 Intercity bus trans (Greyhound)  
4140-4142 Bus charter 
4150-4151 School buses 
4170-4173 Motor vehicle terminals, service facilities 
4190-4199 Misc transit and passenger transportation 
4200-4200 Motor freight trans, warehousing 
4210-4219 Trucking 
4220-4229 Warehousing and storage 
4230-4231 Terminal facilities - motor freight 
4240-4249 Transportation 
4400-4499 Water transport  
4500-4599 Air transportation 
4600-4699 Pipelines, except natural gas 
4700-4700 Transportation services 
4710-4712 Freight forwarding 
4720-4729 Travel agencies, etc 
4730-4739 Arrange trans - freight and cargo 
4740-4749 Rental of railroad cars 
4780-4780 Misc services incidental to trans 
4782-4782 Inspection and weighing services 
4783-4783 Packing and crating 
4784-4784 Fixed facilities for vehicles, not elsewhere classified 
4785-4785 Motor vehicle inspection 
4789-4789 Transportation services 
1500-1511 Build construction - general contractors 
1520-1529 Gen building contractors - residential 
1530-1539 Operative builders 
1540-1549 Gen building contractors - non-residential 
1600-1699 Heavy Construction - not building contractors 
1700-1799 Construction - special contractors 41-Wholesale 
19-Steel Works Etc 
3300-3300 Primary metal industries 
3310-3317 Blast furnaces & steel works 
3320-3325 Iron & steel foundries 
3330-3339 Prim smelt -refin nonfer metals 
3340-3341 Secondary smelt -refin nonfer metals 
3350-3357 Rolling & drawing nonferous metals 
3360-3369 Non-ferrous foundries and casting 
3370-3379 Steel works etc 
3390-3399 Misc primary metal products 
20-Fabricated Products 
3400-3400 Fabricated metal, except machinery and trans eq 
3443-3443 Fabricated plate work 
3444-3444 Sheet metal work 
3460-3469 Metal forgings and stampings 
3470-3479 Coating and engraving 
21-Machinery 
3510-3519 Engines & turbines 
3520-3529 Farm and garden machinery 
3530-3530 Constr, mining material handling machinery 
3531-3531 Construction machinery 
3532-3532 Mining machinery, except oil field 
3533-3533 Oil field machinery 
5000-5000 Wholesale - durable goods 
5010-5015 Wholesale - autos and parts 
5020-5023 Wholesale - furniture and home furnishings 
5030-5039 Wholesale - lumber and construction materials 
5040-5042 Wholesale - professional and commercial equipment 
and supplies 
5043-5043 Wholesale - photographic equipment 
5044-5044 Wholesale - office equipment 
5045-5045 Wholesale - computers 
5046-5046 Wholesale - commerical equip 
5047-5047 Wholesale - medical, dental equip 
5048-5048 Wholesale - ophthalmic goods 
5049-5049 Wholesale - professional equip and supplies 
5050-5059 Wholesale - metals and minerals 
5060-5060 Wholesale - electrical goods 
5063-5063 Wholesale - electrical apparatus and equipment 
5064-5064 Wholesale - electrical appliance TV and radio 
5065-5065 Wholesale - electronic parts 
5070-5078 Wholesale - hardware, plumbing, heating equip 
5080-5080 Wholesale - machinery and equipment 
5081-5081 Wholesale - machinery and equipment (?) 
5082-5082 Wholesale - construction and mining equipment 
5083-5083 Wholesale - farm and garden machinery 
5084-5084 Wholesale - industrial machinery and equipment 
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21-Machinery 41-Wholesale 
3534-3534 Elevators 
3535-3535 Conveyors 
3536-3536 Cranes, hoists 
3538-3538 Machinery 
3540-3549 Metalworking machinery 
3550-3559 Special industry machinery 
3560-3569 General industrial machinery 
3580-3580 Refrig & service ind machines 
3581-3581 Automatic vending machines 
3582-3582 Commercial laundry and drycleaning machines 
3585-3585 Air conditioning, heating, refrid eq 
3586-3586 Measuring and dispensing pumps 
3589-3589 Service industry machinery 
3590-3599 Misc industrial and commercial equipment and mach 
22-Electrical Equipment 
5085-5085 Wholesale - industrial supplies 
5086-5087 Wholesale - machinery and equipment (?) 
5088-5088 Wholesale - trans eq except motor vehicles 
5090-5090 Wholesale - misc durable goods 
5091-5092 Wholesale - sporting goods, toys 
5093-5093 Wholesale - scrap and waste materials 
5094-5094 Wholesale - jewelry and watches 
5099-5099 Wholesale - durable goods 
5100-5100 Wholesale - nondurable goods 
5110-5113 Wholesale - paper and paper products 
5120-5122 Wholesale - drugs & propietary 
5130-5139 Wholesale - apparel 
5140-5149 Wholesale - groceries & related prods 
5150-5159 Wholesale - farm products 
5160-5169 Wholesale - chemicals & allied prods 
5170-5172 Wholesale - petroleum and petro prods 
5180-5182 Wholesale - beer, wine 
5190-5199 Wholesale - non-durable goods 
42-Retail 
3600-3600 Elec mach eq & supply  
3610-3613 Elec transmission 
3620-3621 Electrical industrial appar 
3623-3629 Electrical industrial appar 
3640-3644 Electric lighting, wiring 
3645-3645 Residential lighting fixtures 
3646-3646 Commercial lighting 
3648-3649 Lighting equipment 
3660-3660 Communication equip  
3690-3690 Miscellaneous electrical machinery and equip 
3691-3692 Storage batteries 
3699-3699 Electrical machinery and equip  
23-Automobiles and Trucks 
2296-2296 Tire cord and fabric 
2396-2396 Auto trim  
3010-3011 Tires and inner tubes 
3537-3537 Trucks, tractors, trailers 
3647-3647 Vehicular lighting 
3694-3694 Elec eq, internal combustion engines 
3700-3700 Transportation equipment 
3710-3710 Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equip 
3711-3711 Motor vehicles & car bodies 
3713-3713 Truck & bus bodies 
3714-3714 Motor vehicle parts 
3715-3715 Truck trailers 
3716-3716 Motor homes 
3792-3792 Travel trailers and campers 
3790-3791 Misc trans equip 
3799-3799 Misc trans equip 
24-Aircraft 
3720-3720 Aircraft & parts 
3721-3721 Aircraft  
3723-3724 Aircraft engines, engine parts 
3725-3725 Aircraft parts 
3728-3729 Aircraft parts 
25-Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 
3730-3731 Ship building and repair 
3740-3743 Railroad Equipment 
27-Precious Metals 
1040-1049 Gold & silver ores 
28-Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 
1000-1009 Metal mining 
1010-1019 Iron ores 
1020-1029 Copper ores 
1030-1039 Lead and zinc ores 
1050-1059 Bauxite and other aluminum ores 
1060-1069 Ferroalloy ores 
1070-1079 Mining 
5200-5200 Retail - bldg material, hardware, garden 
5210-5219 Retail - lumber & other building mat  
5220-5229 Retail 
5230-5231 Retail - paint, glass, wallpaper 
5250-5251 Retail - hardward stores 
5260-5261 Retail - nurseries, lawn, garden stores 
5270-5271 Retail - mobile home dealers 
5300-5300 Retail - general merchandise stores 
5310-5311 Retail - department stores 
5320-5320 Retail - general merchandise stores (?) 
5330-5331 Retail - variety stores 
5334-5334 Retail - catalog showroom 
5340-5349 Retail 
5390-5399 Retail - Misc general merchandise stores 
5400-5400 Retail - food stores 
5410-5411 Retail - grocery stores 
5412-5412 Retail - convenience stores 
5420-5429 Retail - meat, fish mkt 
5430-5439 Retail - fruite and vegatable markets 
5440-5449 Retail - candy, nut, confectionary stores 
5450-5459 Retail - dairy product stores 
5460-5469 Retail - bakeries 
5490-5499 Retail - miscellaneous food stores 
5500-5500 Retail - auto dealers and gas stations 
5510-5529 Retail - auto dealers 
5530-5539 Retail - auto and home supply stores 
5540-5549 Retail - gasoline service stations 
5550-5559 Retail - boat dealers 
5560-5569 Retail - recreational vehicle dealers 
5570-5579 Retail - motorcycle dealers 
5590-5599 Retail - automotive dealers 
5600-5699 Retail - apparel & acces 
5700-5700 Retail - home furniture and equipment stores 
5710-5719 Retail - home furnishings stores 
5720-5722 Retail - household appliance stores 
5730-5733 Retail - radio, TV and consumer electronic stores 
5734-5734 Retail - computer and computer software stores 
5735-5735 Retail - record and tape stores 
5736-5736 Retail - musical instrument stores 
5750-5799 Retail 
5900-5900 Retail - misc 
5910-5912 Retail - drug & proprietary stores 
5920-5929 Retail - liquor stores 
5930-5932 Retail - used merchandise stores 
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28-Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 42-Retail 
1080-1089 Mining services 
1090-1099 Misc metal ores 
1100-1119 Anthracite mining 
1400-1499 Mining and quarrying non-metalic minerals 
30-Petroleum and Natural Gas 
1300-1300 Oil and gas extraction 
1310-1319 Crude petroleum & natural gas 
1320-1329 Natural gas liquids 
1330-1339 Petroleum and natural gas 
1370-1379 Petroleum and natural gas 
1380-1380 Oil and gas field services 
1381-1381 Drilling oil & gas wells 
1382-1382 Oil-gas field exploration 
1389-1389 Oil and gas field services 
2900-2912 Petroleum refining 
2990-2999 Misc petroleum products 
31-Utilities 
5940-5940 Retail - misc 
5941-5941 Retail - sporting goods stores, bike shops 
5942-5942 Retail - book stores 
5943-5943 Retail - stationery stores 
5944-5944 Retail - jewelry stores 
5945-5945 Retail - hobby, toy and game shops 
5946-5946 Retail - camera and photo shop 
5947-5947 Retail - gift, novelty 
5948-5948 Retail - luggage 
5949-5949 Retail - sewing & needlework stores 
5950-5959 Retail 
5960-5969 Retail - non-store retailers (catalogs, etc) 
5970-5979 Retail 
5980-5989 Retail - fuel & ice stores (Penn Central Co) 
5990-5990 Retail - retail stores 
5992-5992 Retail - florists 
5993-5993 Retail - tobacco stores 
5994-5994 Retail - newsdealers 
5995-5995 Retail - computer stores 
5999-5999 Retail stores 
43-Restaraunts, Hotels, Motels 
4900-4900 Electric, gas, sanitary services 
4910-4911 Electric services 
4920-4922 Natural gas transmission 
4923-4923 Natural gas transmission-distr 
4924-4925 Natural gas distribution 
4930-4931 Electric and other services combined 
4932-4932 Gas and other services combined 
4939-4939 Combination utilities 
4940-4942 Water supply  
32-Communication 
5800-5819 Retail - eating places 
5820-5829 Restaraunts, hotels, motels 
5890-5899 Eating and drinking places 
7000-7000 Hotels, other lodging places 
7010-7019 Hotels motels 
7040-7049 Membership hotels and lodging 
7213-7213 Services - linen 
48-Miscellaneous 
4800-4800 Communications 
4810-4813 Telephone communications 
4820-4822 Telegraph and other message communication 
4830-4839 Radio-TV Broadcasters 
4840-4841 Cable and other pay TV services 
4880-4889 Communications 
4890-4890 Communication services (Comsat) 
4891-4891 Cable TV operators 
4892-4892 Telephone interconnect  
4899-4899 Communication services 
3999-3999 Misc manufacturng industries 
4950-4959 Sanitary services 
4960-4961 Steam, air conditioning supplies 
4970-4971 Irrigation systems 
4990-4991 Cogeneration - SM power producer 
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